Young v. Barker’s Empirical Analysis
1959
Citation profile
2 district · 30 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently May 2000 · most notably Smith v. Marshall (1978), Kawauchi v. Tabata (1966)
2 district · 30 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co. · Geier v. Eagle-Cherokee Coal Mining Co. · Dearborn Motors Credit Corporation v. Neel · Hirt v. Bucklin State Bank · State Ex Rel. Fatzer v. Miller
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Under the circumstances here alleged, it would be unjust and unconscion able to permit the defendant to retain the usurious interest or charges contracted for and received, and the law imposes a duty to repay such unjust and unmerited enrichment and provides a remedy to the borrower by an action for money had and received, to recover the amount of such unlawful payments. It would be futile to say that conduct of the defendant which is unlawful and the road to prison on the criminal side of the court, is lawful on die civil side of tire court and would preclude plaintiffs from recovering the fruits of the defendant’s crime. We import no such abortive intention to the legislature. “For the reasons stated above, it is our conclusion that a borrower who has paid excessive or usurious interest or charges to a lender upon a note or other written instrument may recover back such excessive or usurious interest or charges from the lender, notwithstanding his previous voluntary payment. . . .” (p. 258.)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““. . . Further, that plaintiffs have mistakenly construed G. S. 1955 Supp. 16-203 as the basis of their cause of action since that statute gives rise only to a cause of action to those borrowers who are forced to pay excessive charges to a bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument, in which event such a borrower may recover back in an action against the party originally exacting the usury, double the amount of the excessive interest or charges incorporated in the negotiable instrument.” (pp. 251, 252.) (Emphasis added.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Forney v. Gerling““It is clear that plaintiffs petition does not state a cause of action under 16-203. That section gives a cause of action to a borrower against the party originally exacting the usury to recover back from such party double the amount of such excess where the instrument has been negotiated to a bona fide endorsee without notice of the alleged usurious charges, and the borrower has paid the full amount of such charges to the endorsee. . . .” (p. 254.) (Emphasis added.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Forney v. Gerling
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.