State v. Coleman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate · 111 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 125 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Thomas · State v. Fitzpatrick

2. “"The holding in Sandstrom is not to be construed to mean that whenever a trial court instructs a jury that it may resort to inference to determine subjective matters, such as knowledge or purpose, that thereby the State has been relieved of its burden of proof. The United States Supreme Court did not intend such limitation, and we do not find any such intention in the language of Sandstrom or its related cases. The jury was not allowed to rest solely upon the permitted inference in the Coleman case, but under the instructions, had to require such an inference to meet the standard as beyond a reasonable doubt. "The true test under Sandstrom , in determining the effect of an instruction such as the one disputed here is whether that instruction has the effect of allocating to the defendant some part of the burden of proof that properly rests on the State throughout the trial. See Holloway v. McElroy (D.Ga. 1979), 474 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 . We do not find that to have occurred here. "On that basis we distinguish the Coleman instruction from those cases involving a burden-shifting presumption as in Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975), 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 ; and conclusive presumptions like those involved in Sandstrom, supra, Morissette v. United States (1952), 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 , and United States v. United States Gypsum Company (1978), 438 U.S. 422 , 98 S.Ct. 2864 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 . Instead, the inference is purely permissive, in the sense d”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Bad Horse · State v. Woods

3. “[Section 1-2-109] is but a rule of construction and what is “retroactive” so as to warrant application of the rule has been defined judicially by this and other courts. A statute is not “retroactive” merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation. Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. at 157, 43 S.Ct. 154 . A statute is “retroactive” in a legal sense “which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions already past.” City of Harlem v. State Highway Commission (1967), 149 Mont. 281 , 425 P.2d 718, 720 ; Dunham v. Southside National Bank (1976), 169 Mont. 466 , 548 P.2d 1383, 1386 ; Butte & Superior Mining Co. v. McIntyre (1924), 71 Mont. 254 , 229 P. 730 ; Sturges v. Carter (1885), 114 U.S. 511 , 5 S.Ct. 1014 , 29 L.Ed. 240 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mordja v. Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court · Tipton v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court