dissent">STEPHENS, Judge,

dissenting.

Because I do not conclude that Officer Jones had probable cause to stop Defendant’s vehicle, I respectfully dissent.

At the hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court made only two findings of fact that could support its conclusion that Officer Jones had probable cause to stop: (1) that Officer Jones “observed a vehicle being operated by the defendant immediately in front of him[]” and (2) “[t]hat [Defendant’s] vehicle changed lanes in front of the officer without signaling a change.” The only evidence supporting these findings is one exchange between the prosecutor and Officer Jones:

Q. Okay. And what attracted your attention to the vehicle operated by Mr. Styles?

A. Upon getting behind the vehicle in question, the defendant had changed lanes and failed to signal. That’s why I stopped the vehicle.

This evidence arguably supports the trial court’s finding that Defendant “changed lanes in front of [Officer Jones] without signaling a change.” This evidence does not, however, support the court’s finding that Defendant’s vehicle was “immediately” in front of Officer Jones, nor do the findings support the court’s conclusion that Officer Jones “had probable cause to stop [Defendant].”

*277It is settled that, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-154(a), “[t]he duty to give a statutory signal of an intended . . . turn [or lane change] does not arise in any event unless the operation of some ‘other vehicle may be affected by such movement.’ ” Cooley v. Baker, 231 N.C. 533, 536, 58 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1950). “[F]ailure to give a signal, in and of itself, does not constitute a violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-154(a) . . . .” State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562, 566, 633 S.E.2d 459, 462 (2006).

The majority concludes without explanation that Defendant’s lane change “affected the operation of Officer Jones’ vehicle].]” Officer Jones offered no such testimony, and the trial court made no such finding. On the contrary, Officer Jones testified that there was nothing “erratic” about Defendant’s movement from one lane to the other. Furthermore, the State offered no evidence that there was any other automobile traffic on the road at the early morning hour when Defendant and Officer Jones were traveling down Main Street in Bryson City. Therefore, I cannot conclude from the evidence in the record that “a reasonable officer would have believed, under the circumstances of the stop, that defendant’s actions violated subsection 20-154(a)[.]” Id. at 565, 633 S.E.2d at 461.

I can imagine factual circumstances under which the movement of one’s vehicle from one lane to another without signaling could affect the safe operation of another vehicle traveling in the same direction. Just as easily, I can imagine factual circumstances under which a lane change would have absolutely no effect on the operation of other vehicles traveling in the same direction. Here, the evidence not only fails to establish that the former factual circumstance was created when Defendant changed lanes in front of Officer Jones, it is patently insufficient to permit even an inference of such. When constitutional rights and protections are involved, I will not presume a violation of the law to give Officer Jones probable cause.

The mere fact that Officer Jones, while traveling “behind” Defendant on a road with two lanes of traffic headed in the same direction, observed Defendant change lanes without signaling did not give Officer Jones probable cause to stop Defendant. Thus, I would reverse the ruling of the trial court on Defendant’s motion to suppress.

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