Volume 185 — United States Reports

Held: on the authority of Douglas County Commissioners v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104 , that common honesty demanded that a debt thus incurred should be paid; and that there was nothing 'in the facts in this case to'set aside the application of that principle; that if anything could constitute a defacto corporation the defendant is one and that, being thus a defacto corporation, none but the State can question its existence.

Held: a general and uh-restricted license to do business as such brokers. The3r were thereby authorized to do an3T and all kinds of commission business and became liable to pa}r the privilege tax in question, which was fixed in part, and in part graduated according to the amount of capital invested in the business, or if no capital were *35 invested, by the amount of commissions received.

The plaintiff in error, being tbe plaintiff below, obtained judgment in the state Circuit Court for the city of St. Louis for. the recovery of certain land described in the judgment. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri this judgment was reversed, 151 Missouri, 348, and the plaintiff has brought the case here by writ of error. The action was ejectment for land described in the petition, which also set up a claim for the rents and profits.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON.</p> <p>This was an action brought, in 1896, in the Circuit Court of Harney County, State of Oregon, by tbe 'French-Glenn Live Stock Company, a corporation of tbe State of California, against Alva Springer, to recover possession of a certain tract of land situated in said county. The action was tried in May, 1897, and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of tbe defendant. The cause was subsequently taken to the Supreme Court of Oregon, and by that court, on August 11, 1899, the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed ; and thereupon a writ of error was allowed by the Chief Justice of that court, and the cause was brought to this court.</p> <p>The facts of the pase, as developed at the trial, were thus stated by the Supreme Court:</p> <p>“ The plaintiff, to support its contention of ownership of the fee, offered in evidence, (1) the official plat of the United States government survey of fractional township 26 south, range 31 east, of the Willamette meridian, showing the township rendered fractional by abutting upon the meander line along the south side of Malheur Lake, which plat appears to have been approved by the Land Department of the government and. filed in the local office on September 17, 1877; the plat shows said lots as bounded on the north by the meander line of Malheur Lake ; (2) the field notes of the survey of the exterior boundaries of said township and its subdivisions, and the meander-line of Malheur Lake, under the title heading, 4 Meanders of the south shore of Malheur Lake, through fractional township, 26,’ etc.., and indicating that it was run 4 with the meander of the lake ; ’ (3) a list of selections of land, made by the agent of the State of Oregon, claimed as swamp and overflowed, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, bearing date September 19, 1889 ; (4) two patents from the United States, for said lots 3 and 4, section 34, and 1 and 2, section 35, 4 according to the official plats of the survey of the said lands returned to the General Land Office by the surveyor general.’ The patents bear date March 10, 1890, and October 8,1891, respectively. The lots contain, in the aggregate, 158.53 acres; (5) two conveyances from the State, comprising the above-described lots, bearing date October 7, 1889, and April 30, 1890, respectively, and other mesne conveyances to the plaintiff; and (6) oral evidence, tending to prove that in 1877, and for some years thereafter, Malheur Lake was a continuous body of water up to the meander line of that year; that there was a narrow ridge' or reef across the west end thereof, some' 12 or 15 miles west of ' the lands inr dispute, which separated its waters from those of Harney Lake; that its waters were from 8 to 12 feet higher than those of Harney Lake ; that, in 1881, the waters of Malheur Lake, overflowing the ridge, cut a channel through,, which was enlarged from year to year for some time'; that, as a result, its surface was lowered, the waters receding from the flat shelving shore, leaving the disputed land bare, except in the spring time, from and after 1884. This constituted the plaintiffs case. On. behalf of the defendant, evidence was introduced tending tó show that there never was a lake in front of the said lots; that Malheur Lake is a well-defined, natural body of water, but that, if the east and west exterior lines of said lots were extended north indefinitely, they would not touch or intersect the margin or border of said lake, but would leave it entirely to the east thereof ; that the water of the lake had been, from a time prior to 1877, of about the same height as it was at the date of trial; that the border of the lake never at any time extended to the supposed meander line of 1877, and that there never had been any recession of the water of the lake, and no consequent reliction of land in front of the said lots.”</p>

<p>EBBOE TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OREGON.</p>

Held: that this was not an act or law impairing the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.

The Vicksburg Waterworks Company, a corporation of the State of Mississippi, filed, in February, 1901, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, a bill of complaint against the mayor and aldermen of the city of Vicksburg, a municipal corporation of Mississippi.

This is an appeal from the Court of Claims. The claimant, Frederick Rodgers, a Rear Admiral of the line of the Navy, brought suit to recover the sum of $3358.13, which he claims as the balance due him on account of pay and allowances for the period between March 3, 1899, and March 2, 1901.

This was a suit commenced in-the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York by the appellees, as plaintiffs, for an injunction, restraining the city of New York from maintaining a dam on the West Branch of Byram River and diverting the waters thereof from their natural flow through the farms of plaintiffs. The facts are these: Byram River is a non-navigable stream of fresh water flowing into Long Island Sound.

This was an action of ejectment brought by Hippolite Filhiol and others, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, against Charles E. Maurice, Charles G. Convers and William G. Maurice, for the recovery of a parcel of land in the city of Hot Springs, Garland County, Arkansas, on the permanent reservation at Hot Springs, described as Bath house site No. 8, and for rent-thereof as damages.

Held: or authority exercised under, the United States; and denied. The Supreme Court of the State did not refer to the Federal Constitution or consider and decide any Federal question. For aught that appears, the court proceeded in its determination of the cause without any thought that it was disposing of such a question.

The plaintiff in error is a building and loan association incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, and has its principal place of business in the city of Syracuse in that State.

This action presents the question of the liability of real estate purchased with pension money, to be taken on execution to satisfy a claim of a creditor. The action is ejectment based on a title derived from a sale under such ah execution,' and was brought in the Court of Common Fleas of Fayette County, State of Pennsylvania.

Kansas v. Colorado is a longstanding litigation before the Supreme Court of the United States between US states: Kansas and Colorado regarding the payment for the use of the Arkansas River. The Court has rendered numerous opinions on the case: Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943) Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995) Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86 (2004) Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98 (2009) When two states have a controversy between each other, the case is filed for original jurisdiction with the US Supreme Court. It is one of the very limited circumstances in which the court acts with original jurisdiction, as a trial court.

<p>error to the supreme court of the state of new TORE.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That the deeds which Mrs. Hitz sought by her cross-bill to have set aside are to be deemed valid and enforceable instruments, it having been so adjudged in Hitz v. Jenks, 123 U. S. 297 . 2.

Held: that the motion should be overruled, as the plaintiff explicitly based his right of action on Rev. Stat. §§ 5197, 5198, and as the judgment of the trial court, and that of the Supreme Court- of the State, denied such right, and this court therefore has jurisdiction.

This is an action brought in the District Court of Woodbury County, Iowa, under sections 5197 and 5198 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, relating to national banks, to recover the sum of $16,250, the amount of interest alleged to have .been unlawfully charged and collected by the defendant bank. It was argued with No. 161, ante, 171.

Held: that in the absence of any sufficient attaok upon the record, or of any evidence on the part of the Government going to disprove or discredit the averments therein, it formed enough of a basis for the finding of the court below that there was a grant made as stated in its findings, and that such grant and the record thereof in the archives had been destroyed under the circumstances stated.

This was an action of assumpsit originally brought in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County by the people of the State of Illinois against the Consolidated Coal Company of St. Louis, a corporation of Illinois, to recover the sum of $1818 for the fees of state mine inspectors for the inspection of certain coal mines located in Illinois, owned and operated by the defendant under “ An act providing for the health and safety of persons employed in coal mines,” originally enacted…

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>These three eases were all argued together. The opinion of the court is entitled only in No. 503, United States v. Lee Yen Tai The case is stated in that opinion of the court.</p>

Held: in that case, that “ the administrator of a creditor of the governmeát duly appointed in the State where the creditor was domiciled at the time of his death, has full authority to receive payment and give a full discharge of the debt due his intestate in any place where the government may choose to pay it, whether it be at the seat of government or at any other place where the public funds are deposited; and that…

Held: in 1885, that the Comptroller was in error, and adjudged that within the meaning of section 828 the clerk was entitled to five dollars a day for his attendance on court even when no business was transacted. Jones v. United States, 21 C. Cl. 1.

<p>In the exercise of original jurisdiction by this court the usual practice in , equity cases is to hear applications for leave to file bills, ex parte, and, ordinarily, leave is granted as of course.</p> <p>But this is not an invariable rule, and where it is apparent on the face of the proposed bill that there is a defect of parties, which cannot be supplied without ousting the jurisdiction, leave will be denied.</p> <p>Where the objection is one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and the case is of grave importance, leave to ñle will be granted that the fullest argument maty be had.</p>

These appeal's concern the title to a tract of land situated in the county of Pima, Territory of Arizona. The litigation was begun by the’ filing in the Court of Private Land Claims, on February 27, 1893, on behalf of Alfred A. Green, of a petition by which th‘e court'was asked to declare the validity of the title of Green to the tract.

<p>Matters within the pleadings in this case having been left undetermined by the court below, and the cause having been'detained for the purpose of thereafter passing upon them, and for the entry of a further decree, the decree entered below was not final, and this court is without jurisdiction to pass upon it.</p>

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims entered, in favor of the appellee (claimant below) for the sum of $993. 35 C. Cl. 214.

This was a bill in equity filed by tbe Excelsior Wooden Pipe Company, a California corporation, against the Pacific Bridge Company, also a California corporation, but having a branch in the city of Seattle, Washington, and Charles P. Allen, for the infringement of a patent issued to Allen, one of the defendants, for a wooden pipe.

<p>The power to exclude or expel aliens is vested in the political departments of the Government, to he regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to such regulations, except so far as the judicial department is authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution, to intervene. And this is true of the privilege of transit.</p> <p>By the treaty between the United States and China, of 1894, the privilege of transit across the territory of the United States could only be enjoyed subject to such regulations of the Government of the United States as might be necessary to prevent the privilege from being abused.</p> <p>The treaty, in recognizing the privilege and providing that it should continue, proceeded on the ground of its existence and continuance under governmental regulations, and no act of Congress was required to carry it into effect.</p> <p>Under existing regulations the action of the collector of customs in refusing transit cannot be interfered with by the courts.</p>

<p>The authority of the Government in prescribing regulations in respect of transit being unqualified, and the existing regulations not open to constitutional objection, the court below could not interfere by habeas corpus with the collector’s orders, and its ruling on an offer of evidence, the entire record considered, was not erroneous.</p>

Held: that a provision of a state enactment relating to corporations, foreign or domestic, was legally operative or binding if such provision be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States ? It is one thing for a State to forbid a particular foreign corporation, or a particular class of foreign corporations, from doing business at all within its limits.

This is a proceeding in the nature of a quo 'warranto, brought by the attorney general of the State of Louisiana, in the name of the State, to obtain a forfeiture of the charter of the .defendant, the waterworks company.

The question arising for decision in this cause is embodied in the following certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit: . “ The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting at the city of St. Louis, Missouri, on this 27th day of December, 1900, hereby certifies that upon the record on file in said court in the above-entitled causes, wherein Lucian Woodworth, Frank D. Brown and George N. Clayton are plaintiffs…

Section 2 of chap. 153 of the Public Acts of Connecticut, passed in 1897,’ reads as follows-: “ The cashier or secretary of each corporation whose stock is liable to taxation, and not otherwise taxed by the provisions of this title, shall, on the first day of October, annually, or within ten days thereafter, deliver to the comptroller as worn list of all its stockholders residing without this State on said day, and the number and market value of the shares of stock therein…

This is a suit in equity, commenced in. this court by the State of Minnesota to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior añd the Commissioner of the General Land Office from selling any sections 16 and 36 in what was on January 14, 1889, known' as the Eed Lake Indian reservation. ' By the bill, answer and an agreed statement the following facts appear : By section 18 of the act to establish the territorial government of Minnesota, approved March 3,1849, 9 Stat. 403, it was…

Held: for use, and drawn as required into a casting ladle and carried to the molds, as already mentioned. In 1855 and 1856, Sir Henry Bessemer obtained various patents covering his discovery for producing malleable iron and steel by forcing currents of air through molten iron.

This action was begun by Swafford, plaintiff in error, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee.

Held: and so charged the jury, that Ross, who did the cutting, must have been not only a bona fide resident of the Territory, but also a citizen of the United States; and if he were not, then the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict.

This litigation was begun in the United States Court for the Indian Territory, Central Judicial District, sitting at Atoka, by •the filing of a bill in equity on behalf of Ilyram T. McBride, a citizen of the Choctaw Nation. The defendants named in the bill were the National Bank of Denison, the Southwestern Coal and Improvement Company (hereafter referred to as the Coal Company) and J. A. Ilandell, as administrator of the estate of G. G. Randell, deceased.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>In the United States Court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, in April, 1897, an issue was tried between the Evans-Snider-Buel Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, and William McFaddin & Son. One J. R. Blocker was the owner and .in .possession of 6775-head of cattle pasturing in the Indian Territory. McFaddin & Son were judgment creditors of Blocker, and, as such, levied an attachment on said cattle. The Evans-Snidei’-Buel Company filed a proceeding by way of interpleader in the attachment suit, claiming to -have a prior lien on said cattle by -means of certain mortgages given by said Blocker, who, as shown by the mortgages themselves, as well -as the testimony in the case, was a ■ resident of Bexar County, Texas, in which county some of the mortgages relied on had been duly executed and recorded. The cattle in question were grazing in the Creek Nation, Indian Territory, and the mortgages were again recorded in the Northern District of the Indian Territory,-at Muskogee'and in .the. Creek Nation. The cattle at the time of the levy were in the possession of Blocker, the mortgagor.</p> <p>■ After the filing of the interpleader, and on January 29,1897, a judgment was entered against the defendant Blocker, in the sum of $55,87^.71, and sustaining the attachment. There were several trials in the case, but at the last trial in the Northern District, where the plaintiffs, McFaddin & Son, for the second time lost their suit, it was agreed' that in case the judgment should be reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Indian Territory, judgment should be rendered, against the Evans-Snider-Buel Company, the interpleader. The judgment was reversed by that court, and, pursuant to-said agreement, on the 4th day of January, 1900, judgment was entered against the interpleader and its bondsmen for the sum of $72,250.35. From that judgment the interpleader prosecuted its writ of error to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p> <p>At the time the attachment was levied upon the., cattle in controversy the following laws in relation to the registration of chattel mortgages were in force in the Indian Territory, being sections 4742 a.nd 4743 of Mansfield’s Digest:</p> <p>“ Sec. 4742. All ’ mortgages, whether .for real or personal estate, shall be proved or acknowledged in the same manner that deeds for the conveyance of real estate are now required by law to be proved or acknowledged; and when so proved or acknowledged shall be recorded — if for lands, iu the county or counties in which the lands, lie, and if for personal property, in the county in which the mortgagor resides.</p> <p>“ Sec. 4743. Every mortgage, whether for real or personal property, shall be a lien on the mortgaged property, from the time the same is filed in the recorder’s office for record, and not before; which filing shall be notice to all persons of the existence of such mortgage.”</p> <p>As before stated, the attachment in this case was sustained on the 29th day of January, 1897. On February 3, 1897, Congress amended the law above quoted by an enactment which reads as follows:</p> <p>“ Section 4742 of Mansfield’s Digest of the Laws of Arkansas, heretofore put in force in the Indian Territory, is hereby amended by adding to said section the following: Provided, that if the mortgagor is a non-resident of the Indian Territory the mortgage shall be recorded in the judicial district in which the property is situated at the time the mortgage is executed. All mortgages of personal property in the Indian Territory heretofore executed and recorded in the judicial district thereof in which the property was situated at the time they were'executed are hereby validated.” Stat. 1896^7, p. 510.</p> <p>On November 19, 1900, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit filed an opinion and judgment, Sanborn, J., dissenting, reversing the judgment of- the United States Court of Appeals in the Indian' Territory, and affirming the judgment of the United States Court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory. Whereupon a writ of error was allowed and the cause brought to this court. '</p>