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186 A.D. 652

Ward v. Baker

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · decided 1919-03-07

<p>Debtor and creditor — supplementary proceeding — extension of receivership to subsequent judgment — distribution of funds — priorities.</p> <p>The title of a receiver in supplementary proceedings now extends back to the date of the service of the order for the debtor’s examination although the receivership has been extended to subsequent judgments.</p> <p>A receiver takes legal title to the personal property of the judgment debtor for the benefit of the judgment creditor for whom he is appointed receiver and all other judgment creditors to whose judgments the receivership may be extended.</p> <p>As an order appointing a receiver at the instance of a first judgment creditor stopped the debtor from transferring his property, where the debtor’s subsequent earnings were recovered by the receiver it inured to the benefit of a second judgment creditor, for there is no distinction between moneys earned before and after the receivership had been extended to the second judgment.</p> <p>After the expenses and costs of the receivership and the first judgment creditor have been paid, the second judgment creditor, to whose judgment the receivership has been extended, should next be paid in full, where he alone appealed from an order distributing the fund among all the judgment creditors.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently April 1925

1 federal appellate ·

Relies on Kennedy v. . Thorp

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1919-03-07

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Per Curiam:

¶1The order under review ranks the creditors, after the Smith Premier Company, according to the times when the receivership was extended to their judgments. The receiver’s title, however, now extends back to the date of the service of the order for the debtor’s examination. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2469.)

¶2A receiver takes the legal title to the personal property of the judgment debtor for the benefit of the judgment creditors for whom he is appointed receiver and of other judgment creditors to whose judgments the receivership may be extended. (Kennedy v. Thorp, 51 N. Y. 174; Matter of Walker, 157 App. Div. 609, 617; Steinert v. Van Aken, 165 206, 209.) It was immaterial which of the creditors secured the appointment of the receiver, because the order of the Smith Premier Typewriter Company stopped the debtor from transferring his property. The subsequent earnings from the city in 1910, by this order of 1913 became subject to this receivership, without distinction between such moneys earned before and after June 15, 1910.

¶3*655As Ward alone has appealed, the order should be modified so that after costs and expenses of the receivership (which are not questioned on this appeal) Ward should be paid in full, after the Smith Premier Company. The further readjustment will follow according to dates of service of orders for the debtor’s examination.

¶4As thus modified, the order will be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to appellant Ward.

¶5Jenks, P. J., Mills, Rich, Putnam and Kelly, JJ., concurred.

¶6Order of the County Court of Richmond county modified in accordance with opinion per curiam, and as modified affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to appellant Ward. Order to be settled on notice before Mr. Justice Putnam.

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