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← 186 F.2d 951 - Jones v. Trapp

Jones v. Trapp’s Empirical Analysis

186 F.2d 951 · 1950

Citation profile

19
cited by 19 later decisions
1
states following
June 2015
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 19 later decisions — most recently June 2015

9 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

901950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Commissioner v. Sunnen · Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Culbertson · Tait v. Western Maryland Railway Co. · Sage v. United States · United States v. Nunnally Investment Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The additional facts relied upon in the instant case' as justifying a different result in tax liability for the two years, consist of letters written by the taxpayer to a bank in 1911 in connection with his application for credit, and Mrs. Trapp’s testimony concerning their business relationship through the years. One of the letters to the bank recited that the Trapps were trying to get into the municipal bond business; that Mrs. Trapp was interested in the business, and was furnishing her own separate collateral as security for the proposed loan with which to engage in business. But these facts are historical and were available in the former trial. “No new facts were tendered in this case which did not exist and were not available for production in the former case. The applicable and controlling facts remain the same — they are static, immutable, and therefore precisely identical for the purposes of estoppel.” * * * [Emphasis supplied.]”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Suffice it to say that under the law of Texas, oil and gas in place is realty, and its removal and sale amounts to a depletion of that part of the corpus. Stephens v. Stephens, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W. 290 . And, since the proceeds from the sale of the oil represents a sale of a part of the realty, the income therefrom is separate income of the owner. Commissioner v. Wilson, 5 Cir., 76 F.2d 766 ; Welder v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 148 F.2d 583 ; Merten’s, Vol. 3, Sec. 19.16, p. 34. Cf. Commissioner v. Gray, 5 Cir., 159 F. 2d 834 ; United States v. Harang, 5 Cir., 165 F.2d 106 . There is nothing on this record to indicate what, if any, of the reported income is attributable to the community labor, skill and talent. We therefore have no occasion to consider whether the separate income became unidentifiably commingled with community income. See McFaddin v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 148 F.2d 570 .””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.