Volume 186 — Illinois Reports

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the decision of the Board of Review of LaSalle county.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Morg-an county; the Hon. C. Epler, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Elections—first question on a contest is whether ballots have been properly kept. Where it is sought to overcome the returns of an election by re-counting the ballots, the first question for determination is whether the ballots have been so carefully preserved as to assure the court that they have not been exposed to change.</p> <p>2. Same—unimpeached returns must prevail if ballots are discredited. Unimpeached returns must prevail on contest if the ballots have been so carelessly kept after being returned as to destroy their efficacy as proof over the returns, whether they were in fact changed or not.</p> <p>3. Same—when ballots are not properly preserved by the county clerk. Ballots are not properly preserved by the county clerk, though kept in his office in a vault accessible only through the office and having but a single entrance closed with a heavy door provided with a combination lock, where it is shown the lock was kept in such condition, day and night, that persons unfamiliar with the combination could open- the door; that there were many keys to the court house and the clerk’s office, and that the office employees, if at their desks, could not see the entrance to the vault; and particularly where the evidence tends strongly to show that the ballots were in fact tampered with after being placed in the vault.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law—power of General Assembly to make police regulations. The General Assembly of Illinois may, in pursuance of the police power, where not under constitutional prohibition, exercise such restraint upon private rights as may be found necessary and appropriate to promote the health, comfort, safety and welfare of society. /</p> <p>2. Same—legislature may make criminal an act not in itself immoral. By a proper exercise of police power the legislature may expressly prohibit and make criminal the doing of an act which, in the absence of such a law, would constitute a liberty or property right within the meaning of the constitution, even though such act is not immoral in itself.</p> <p>3. Same—law prohibiting option contracts need not apply to all subjects of option. It is not essential to the constitutionality of an act to prohibit, and make criminal, contracts creating options, that the act should embrace all kinds of property which had usually or commonly been the subject of option dealing.</p> <p>4. Same—act prohibiting grain options is constitutional. Section 130 of the Criminal Code, which declares grain option contracts to be gambling contracts and the making of them to be a criminal offense, is a valid police regulation, and is not in violation of the constitutional provision against depriving a person of liberty or property without due process of law, nor of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution, guaranteeing all persons the equal protection of the law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. H. Lovett, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Special assessments—when estimate of cost of improvement is void. An estimate signed by one of the three commissioners appointed and by two strangers is void, in the absence of anything in the record to show that the latter were regularly appointed in the place of the commissioners who did not sign the estimate.</p>

<p>Real property—when conveyance passes fee to first grantee. A conveyance of property to the grantor’s wife and at her death to the grantor’s son, and at his death to his wife and children, if any living, and if none, to a named person, the title to be in fee simple and each party to have the right to convey while the title is in such party, passes the fee to the grantor’s wife, whether the instrument be regarded as a deed or a will, the attempted limitations upon the fee being void as repugnant to the estate granted.</p>

Original information for disbarment. This is an information, filed in this court by Charles S. Deneen, State’s attorney for Cook county, in behalf of the People of the State upon the relation of the grievance committee of the bar association of Chicago against the respondent, Charles Pickler, an attorney and counselor at law, licensed as such under the rules of this court and the law of the State, charging the said Pickler with unprofessional, dishonorable and scandalous…

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. M. W. Schaefer, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Embezzlement—failure of borrower to return money is not embezzlement. The failure of a party to properly account for money received from another, who has relied upon the honesty of the former to return the amount with stipulated interest, does not subject him to criminal prosecution for embezzlement.</p>

<p>1. Evidence—when affidavit for introducing secondary proof of deed is not sufficient. An affidavit for introducing secondary evidence of deeds is not sufficient which merely shows that the 'deeds are not and have not been in the possession, custody or control of affiant, that affiant has made inquiry of the grantees but has not received any of the deeds, and that he does not believe such deeds have been lost or destroyed or disposed of for purpose of introducing copies.</p> <p>2. Same—proviso to section SO of Evidence act construed. The proviso to section 30 of the Evidence act, (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 493,) requiring that a deposition taken before a foreign officer shall be “accompanied” by a certificate of his official character, contemplates merely that the official character of such officer shall be established before the deposition is read in evidence.</p> <p>3. Limitations—temporary entries on land do no change its character as vacant property. Temporary entries on land or isolated acts of possession made without claim of right or with the intention of excluding others, do not change the character of vacant land to that of land actually possessed and occupied.</p>

R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. Appellant erected a fourteen-story office building in the city of Chicago, upon premises adjoining those of which appellees were in possession as lessees. Upon the dividing line was a party wall, and it became necessary to strengthen the foundations of this, and run steel columns up through channels cut into this wall in order to support the additional weight of the new structure.

T. M. Shaw, Judge, presiding. This was a bill in chancery filed April 28, 1899, by Maud F. Kimmel and Nellie H. Kimmel, in the circuit court of Peoria county, Illinois, against Jessie A-Keyes, Charles A. Kimmel, Charles E. Kimmel, (a minor,) and Charles A. Kimmel as guardian of Charles E. Kimmel, defendants, contesting and seeking to set aside a will executed by Martha A. Kimmel, deceased, dated July 16, 1895,' and a codicil thereto, dated February 26, 1898.

Information for disbarment. This is an information filed by the State’s attorney of Cook county, on the relation of five members of the Chicago bar association, constituting a committee on grievances of the said association, against Charles E. George, the respondent, an attorney at law practicing in the city of Chicago, asking for his disbarment.

<p>Constitutional law—act relating to mine inspections is not unconstitutional. The provisions of section 11 of the act on mines, as amended in 1895 and 1897, (Laws of 1895, p. 252; Laws of 1897, p. 269;) requiring mine inspections and making the mine owner liable for inspection fees, are not unconstitutional in that they do not lay down rules for carrying the law into impartial execution, or fix a reasonable number of annual inspections at fees based upon some definite circumstance or condition. (Chicago, Wilmington and Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 181 Ill. 270, followed.)</p>

<p>1. Schools—cost of proposed building need not be submitted to voters. Section 31 of article 5 of the School law of 1889, concerning the submission to the electors of the question of building a school house, does not require that the cost of such building be voted upon.</p> <p>2. Taxes—when levy for “building purposes” is valid. A levy for building purposes, within the statutory limit, to make up the difference between the cost of a school building and the amount realized from the sale of bonds, is valid, where the election at which the erection of the building was authorized did not limit the cost to the amount of the bonds voted nor specify the purpose for which the bonds were to be issued.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Farlin Q. Ball, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Criminal law—giving oral instructions as to law of case is error. It is error in a criminal case for the court to give an oral instruction as to the law of the case. (Ellis v. People, 159 Ill. 337, followed.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jonas Hutchinson, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jonas Hutchinson, Judge, presiding.' In this case the State’s attorney for the county of Cook filed in the superior court of Cook county a petition for leave to file an information in the nature of quo tuarranto upon the relation of Clarence E. Mooar against the town of Thornton in Cook county, alleging that the said town is a public corporation, existing under the laws of Illinois, and had been for more than two…

James Shaw, Judge, presiding. On the sixth of June, 1882, the city of Freeport, organized under the general law for the incorporation of cities and villages, passed an ordinance granting to one Nathan Shelton or his assigns the exclusive right, for the term of thirty years, of supplying the city and citizens thereof, by a system of water-works.to be constructed as in said ordinance prescribed, with water, the terms and conditions of which ordinance were accepted by said…

T. M. Shaw, Judge, presiding. This is an action of assumpsit, brought by the appellant, James P. Fritze, for the use of M. N. Gish, against the appellee, the Equitable Building and Loan Society of Peoria, to recover for services alleged to have been rendered to appellee under a written contract. The declaration as finally amended consists of a special count upon the contract and the common counts. The defendant filed the general issue and three special pleas.

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Morgan county; the Hon. Robert B. Shirley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Orrin N. Carter, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors—freehold is involved if subject of partition is a freehold estate. A freehold is involved, on appeal from a partition decree, if the subject of partition is a freehold estate.</p> <p>2. Same—one cannot complain of error affecting, others alone. One cannot assign for error that which does not in any way affect his rights but only those of his co-defendant, who makes no complaint.</p> <p>3. Costs—statute creating lien for costs in criminal cases, construed. Section 15 of division 14 of the Criminal Code, creating a lien on the property of one convicted of an offense to cover fines and cost of prosecution, contemplates that such lien shall date from the finding of the indictment, but in case of conviction without an indictment, as on information, from the date of the arrest.</p>

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Warren county; the Hon. George W. Thompson, Judge, presiding.

Appeal, from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. E. F. Dunne, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Undue influence—there is a distinction as to undue influence between strangers and between persons in fiduciary relation. There is a well defined distinction between undue influence arising from acts which the law deems fraudulent and undue influence resulting from fiduciary relations between the parties, as the presence of such relationship creates a presumption of influence.</p> <p>h- 2. Fiduciary relations—burden of proof in transactions between parties in fiduciary relation. Transactions between a party and one occupying a fiduciary relation to him are, upon his motion, prima facie voidable, and, the relation being established, the burden is upon the other party to show an absence of undue influence by establishing that the transaction was had in good faith upon his part and was equitable and just between the parties, or that the complaining party acted upon the competent and independent advice of another, or such other facts as will satisfy the court that the dealing was at arm’s length.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Carroll county; the Hon. James S. Baume, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Orrin N. Carter, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon: Philip Stein, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Special assessments—Wien paving ordinance is not uncertain. A paving ordinance requiring the brick to be made “of pure shale, of equal quality to that found in Galesburg, Glen Carbon and Streator, in the State of Illinois, and Canton, in the State of Ohio,” is sufficiently certain in its standard of shale to be used.</p> <p>2. Same—general appearance waives objections to notice. Parties who appear and urge general objections to the merits of a special assessment petition cannot complain that they were not notified.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John C. Garter, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Highways—notice should show what part of road is claimed to be obstructed. One charged with obstructing a highway is entitled to be advised, from the commissioners’ notice, what part of the road he is charged with obstructing.</p> <p>2. Same—when description of place obstructed becomes material. Where highway commissioners particularly describe the location of the road obstructed, and nature of the obstruction, in their notice and complaint, such description becomes material and must be proved.</p> <p>3. Same—when instructions in a road obstruction case are erroneous. Instructions in a case for obstructing a road are erroneous which hold the defendant guilty if any part of his fence is in the road, where the written notice and complaint charge that the entire fence is an obstruction, and the plaintiff has attempted to prove such fact but has failed to prove the location of the road as described in such notice and complaint.</p> <p>4. Variance—when question of variance is not waived by a failure to object. A defendant in a road obstruction case does not waive his right to raise the question of variance between the proof and the written notice and complaint by not objecting at the trial, where he had no opportunity to do so, the plaintiff having attempted to "prove the case made by the complaint, and claiming only in the instructions the right to recover upon less proof.</p> <p>5. Evidence—hearsay evidence of defendant’s guilt is not admissible. Testimony by plaintiff’s witness in a road obstruction case that he overheard the party who complained'to the commissioners state that the defendant ought to be made to move his fence back as he was in the road, is not admissible where defendant was not present at such conversation.</p>

Charles G. Neeley, Judge, presiding. The appellant, Tichenor, brought assumpsit against the appellee, Newman, in the circuit court of Cook county and recovered a judgment in the sum of $4000, which judgment was reversed by the Appellate Court for the First District, on appeal. The Appellate Court did not incorporate in its judgment a finding of facts and did not remand the cause.

<p>1. Street railways—right to diverge from street does not depend upon judgment of city council. The right of a street railway company to diverge from the highway and. go upon private property depends upon the necessities of construction as a question of fact, and not upon the judgment of a city council.</p> <p>2. Same—city council cannot fix route over private property. A city council has no power to fix a route for a street railway company over private property or prohibit a route over particular private property, and its action in so doing is a nullity.</p> <p>3. Same —paragraph 25 of section 1, article 5, of the City and Village act, does not apply to street railways. Paragraph 25 of section 1, article 5, of the City and Village act, authorizing the city council “to provide for and change the location, grade and crossings of any railroad,” applies to general or commercial railroads, and not to street railways.</p> <p>4. Same—council cannot consent to use of streets without public notice. A city council has no right to grant to a street railway company authority to use the public streets for its tracks, unless at least ten days’ public notice of the time and place of presenting the railway company’s petition shall have first been published. (Laws of 1899, p. 332.)</p> <p>5. Same—when ordinance granting right to lay tracks becomes a contract. When an ordinance granting to a street railway company, for an adequate consideration, the right to lay tracks upon certain streets has been accepted and its conditions performed by the railway company, it ceases to be a mere, license and becomes a valid and binding contract.</p> <p>6. Same—"what not a condition precedent to right to condemn private property. Authority to cross a public street after passing through private property is not a condition precedent to the right of a street railway company to condemn its route over such private property.</p> <p>7. Res judicata—doctrine is not confined to matters actually determined. The doctrine of res judicata embraces not only what has been actually determined in the former suit, but also extends to any other matter which might have been raised and determined in it.</p>

Hiram Bigelow, Judge, presiding. This was a claim by appellee, a physician, against the estate of Andrew Ebner, deceased, for medical services rendered Ebner and his wife. The claim, as sworn to and lodged with the county clerk for filing, was for $370. Before claim day $50 was paid thereon. At the trial in the circuit court before a jury, on an appeal from the county court, said credit was allowed, and a verdict was rendered and judgment was entered for $320.

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding.</p>

O. A. Harker, Judge, presiding. By this appeal appellants seek to reverse a decree of the court below perpetually enjoining the collection of a “high-water road tax” and the issuing of anticipation warrants upon such tax. The bill upon which the decree is based was filed by appellee February 24, 1900, to the following February term of the circuit court of Alexander county, and a temporary writ of injunction was issued.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. W. H. Gest, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Dower—effect of wife’s failure to,join in purchase money mortgage. Under section 4 of the Dower act, where the wife fails to join in a purchase money mortgage she is not entitled to dower as against the mortgagee or those claiming under him, but is entitled to dower as against all other persons.</p> <p>2. Same—if deed is set aside wife’s dower is not released. If a deed is set aside as in fraud of the husband’s creditors, the fact that the wife has joined in the deed does not release-her dower, but she may assert it after the death of her husband if not otherwise barred.</p> <p>3. Same—effect upon dower right of wife’s attempfto claim fee. Where a transfer of the husband’s property to his wife through a third party is set aside during the husband’s lifetime as in fraud of his creditors, the fact that the wife seeks to claim the fee under the deeds does not affect her dower right, which was then a mere expectancy which she could not set up or have admeasured to her.</p> <p>4. Same—when wife is not entitled to dower in entire premises. If part of the proceeds of a sale of the husband’s land for the benefit of creditors is paid over to the wife to re-imburse her for the redemption of the property sold under a purchase money mortgage in which she did not join, she is not entitled to dower in that part of the land which represents the amount of the encumbrance.</p> <p>5. Bes judicata—when the fact of wife’s redemption is res judicata. Where a wife seeks to claim the fee as assignee of a certificate of purchase on foreclosure, as against a purchaser of the property at a sale for the benefit of her husband’s creditors, hut the purchaser’s contention that the transaction amounted merely to a redemption prevails, that question is res judicata, as against the purchaser, in a subsequent proceeding by the wife for dower in the property.</p>

<p>Appeals and errors—when appeal lies to Appellate Court thqugh ownership of land is incidentally involved. An action before a justice of the peace for injury to real property is a suit for injury to the possession, only, and hence an appeal should be taken to the Appellate Court from the circuit court, even though defendant attempts to justify his acts under claim of ownership.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. F. Bookwalter, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding.

<p>Schools—defeat of proposition to build school house does not excuse establishing school. School directors have power to lease a suitable roont or rooms for establishing a school without submitting the question to the electors, and they are not discharged from their duty in that regard by the failure of a proposition to build a school house, at an election held for that purpose.</p>

<p>This case is controlled by the decision in Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co. 175 Ill. 619.</p>

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. Colostin D. Myers, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Axel Chytraus, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard iñ that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Debtor and creditor—husband may in good faith prefer wife's bona fide claims. A husband may in good faith lawfully prefer his wife and discharge any legally subsisting bona fide indebtedness to her, even though he thereby devotes to the payment of her demands the only property to which other creditors might resort.</p> <p>2. Same—when wife's failure to obtain a deed before credit is extended does not defeat her rights. The wife’s failure to obtain a deed to property owned by her and held in her husband’s name, before the debt was contracted, does not defeat her right as against a creditor’s bill based on the judgment in which the debt was merged, where she obtained and recorded her deed some eighteen months before the creditor brought suit, and where she had been vigilant to obtain the legal title, never misleading or concealing anything from the creditor, who had notice of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the wife’s claims before she obtained the conveyance.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. F. Bookwalter, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. L. D. Puterbaugh, Judge, presiding. The original bill in this case was filed on July 19,1898. A demurrer was filed and sustained to the original bill, and leave was granted to the complainant therein to amend the bill. Accordingly, on January 11, 1899, a supplemental and amended bill was filed.

O. H. Gilmore, Judge,.presiding. This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court, confirming a special assessment levied for the improvement of a system of streets in the north-west part of the city of Chicago, including North Sacramento avenue and other streets. Objections to the entry of judgment against his property were filed by the appellant and overruled by the court.

Original petition for mandamus. This is a petition in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, on the relation of A. L. Kelly, for a mandamus. The petition was filed at the October term, 1899, of this court, but by leave of court an amended petition was subsequently filed.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. H. Lovett, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. O. H. Gilmore, Judge, presiding.</p>

Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. October 29, 1891, one William H. Eddy filed a petition in the superior court of Cook county, under the provir sions of the Burnt Records act, for a decree confirming and establishing title in him to a certain tract of land .described as the south twenty acres of the north half of the east half of the north-west quarter of section 28, town 38, north, range 14, in Cook county, excepting railroad right of way, etc. January 16, 1892, the…

Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal to reverse a judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District, affirming a decree in favor of appellee, rendered in the circuit court of Cook county. On Saturday, April 3,1897, appellant had on deposit in the Globe Savings Bank of Chicago over §3000.

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.</p>

R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. This is a petition by the People, on the relation of the town of Cicero, filed at the December term, 1899, of the Cook county circuit court, for a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, as county clerk, to extend the taxes of said town for the years 1899 and 1900 at a rate in excess of two per cent of the value of its taxable property.

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles G. Neeley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Municipal corporations—city not liable for damages to private property for establishment of small-pox hospital. Under clause 77 of section 1 of article 5 of City and tillage act, (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 222,) concerning the establishment of hospitals, a city may establish a small-pox hospital upon its own ground, and if the hospital is rightfully located and well conducted no action will lie for damages to the value of property in the neighborhood, as such act does not constitute a taking or damaging of private property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Edmund W. Burke, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of McLean county; the Hon. R. A. Russell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—when town supervisor cannot be convicted of embezzling town money. A town supervisor cannot legally be convicted of embezzling town money, under section 80 of the Criminal Code, if the evidence shows that what he received and receipted for as money was in fact town orders.</p> <p>2. Same—when Statute of Limitations begins to run against embezzlement by town officer. Under section 80 of the Criminal Code, providing for the punishment of public officers who embezzle or convert to their own use public money received by them, the Statute of Limitations begins to run when the offense is committed, and not when discovered or made manifest by failure to pay on demand.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Fulton county; the Hon. Jefferson Orr, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. John H. Moffett, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—-heard in that court on appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. E. W. S. Wheatley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Fulton county; the Hon. John A. Gray, Judge, presiding.</p>

Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding. This is a petition, filed on July 7, 1899, by the People upon the relation of William Conlon for a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, as mayor of the city of Joliet, to sign a dram-shop license. The respondent filed his answer setting forth the reasons why he refused to sign said license. Issues were joined, and a jury was waived.

Writ of Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding.

Abner Smith, Judge, presiding. The appellee filed its bill in the circuit court of Cook county on December 24, 1897, against Jacob Glos and Philip Knopf, county clerk of Cook county, for an injunction restraining Knopf, as county clerk, from issuing, and Glos from obtaining, a deed to lot 11, block 8, North Evanston, Cook county, Illinois. An injunction was issued against Knopf only. A motion to dissolve and a general demurrer filed by Glos were heard together.

Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding. This is a bill, filed March 5, 1895, by William A. Galbraith, since deceased, against the appellants, Thomas Kelly, John Kelly and James Kelly, composing the firm of Thomas Kelly & Bros., for the reformation of the lease hereinafter mentioned, and for the correction of a mistake in the description of the premises thereby demised, as hereinafter stated.

P. Bookwalter, Judge, presiding. Appellants exhibited their bill in equity, alleging they, together with appellee, were the owners in common of lot 22 in Tincher & English’s third addition to the city of Danville, as the only children and heirs of W. H. Allison, deceased, each an. undivided one-fourth part in fee, and asking for an accounting of rents by appellee on account of use and occupancy by him of the premises since the death of his father, March 23, 1895.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of DuPage county; the Hon. George W. Brown, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. William Hartzell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Original petition for mandamus.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. F. Bookwalter, Judge, presiding.</p>