¶1No evidence was introduced on the trial in the district court. The decree is based entirely upon the pleadings. The facts alleged in the petition are admitted in the answer, with some denials. The petition set up a decree rendered in the state of Washington, in an action for divorce between plaintiff and defendant Ed Matson, which decree directed appellant to convey certain real estate in .Boone, Iowa, to the appellee. It was further averred that, at the commencement of said action for divorce in Washington, defendant Ed Matson was enjoined, from disposing of any of the property of the parties until further order of the court, and averred that the property described was the only property in Boone, Iowa, belonging to them or either of them; that, immediately after the announcement of the *610decision of the court, which announcement was in accordance with the decree afterwards filed, said defendant left the state of Washington and came to Boone, and has remained in the state of Iowa since that time; that, immediately upon arriving in Iowa, he transferred the property to defendant Ida Johnson without consideration; and that said Ida Johnson had knowledge of appellee’s rights thereto at the time of such conveyance; that the property was worth $1,600 at that time; that the decree of the Washington court provided that defendant Matson should pay monthly instalments of alimony, and the costs and attorneys’ fees in said divorce action; and that the same were unpaid, to the extent of $251.25; that the Washington court was one of general jurisdiction, and had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and that said defendant Matson appeared thereto in person and by attorney; that no appeal was ever taken therefrom; and that said decree has never been modified in any particular. The prayer of the petition in the instant case asked that the deed be set aside, and for judgment, and that the court require said defendant Matson to convey the premises to the plaintiff, or, in default thereof, that a commissioner be appointed for that purpose. The answer admitted certain of the allegations of fact in the petition, except that it averred that defendant Ida Johnson had paid her codefendant, Mat-son, $1.00 as a consideration for the premises, and that he had j>aid $80 on the judgment for the instalments of alimony and costs; averred that the decree of the Washington court was of no validity, in so far as it attempted to affect the title to real estate in Iowa; that the injunction referred to did not specifically describe the property. The answer denied that the restraining order applied to the property in controversy in this case; that the Washington court had' jurisdiction of that portion of the subject-matter before it which is involved in this case; that the di*611vorce decree was a final adjudication between the parties, so far as it concerned the Iowa property; that the defendant Matson conveyed in violation of any restraining order; that the defendant Ida Johnson knew that defendant Mat-son was bound by the divorce decree to convey the property to'plaintiff; all allegations of fraud; that plaintiff was the beneficial owner of the property in controversy; and that the defendant Matson was bound to convey this property to plaintiff; and that his deed to Ida Johnson constituted a cloud upon plaintiff’s title. The answer also alleged that the Washington decree was void, and can have no basis for an action affecting the title to property in Iowa; that plaintiff’s remedy, if any, is to be granted by the court which rendered the decree; that the courts of this state have no jurisdiction to require the defendant Mat-son to comply with an order imposed upon him by the court of another state; that the divorce decree has no effect outside of the territorial limits of' the jurisdiction of the court which rendered it; that it does not bind the conscience of defendant Matson; that the Washington court had no jurisdiction, in the divorce case, of the property involved herein.; that defendant Matson has violated no final judgment or decree to which the courts of this state are required to give full faith dnd credit. The prayer of the answer was that the plaintiff’s petition be dismissed, and that defendant Ida Johnson be decreed to be the owner of the property. These are the general allegations in the petition and answer, but the facts are stated more in detail.
¶2From the detailed statement of the facts in the pleadings, plaintiff states the following facts, in addition to those already stated, which appellants concede to be complete, with one or two exceptions, which will be noted. Plaintiff and defendant Matson were married in May, in 1897, and continued to live together as husband and wife until 'the summer of 1914. About 1909, they moved to *612Washington, and thereafter continued to reside in King County, in that state, until the summer of 1914. There were four small children. In June, 1914, plaintiff commenced her divorce action in the superior court of King County, for an absolute divorce; on the date of the commencement of such action, a restraining order and order to show cause was issued, restraining the defendant from incumbering or disposing of any of the property of the parties to said action, and he (the defendant) was required to show cause before that court on July 28, 1914, why the order should not be made permanent. Said restraining order and the summons in the action of divorce were duly served upon appellant in the county of King and state of Washington, on the 22d day of July, 1914. On the 28th day of July, 1914, upon the return of the order to show cause why the restraining order should not be made permanent, appellant Matson appeared, in person and by his attorney, and the court confirmed the restraining order until further order of the court. Said action came on for hearing before said court on the 14th day of August, 1914, the appellee appearing in person and by her attorney, and appellant Matson also appearing in person and by his attorney; and the court, having heard the evidence and proofs, then and upon said day announced its decision granting plaintiff a divorce, the custody of the children, and granting to plaintiff the property in Iowa hereinafter referred to, by the following provision, afterwards incorporated in the decree, “that plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the household furniture and piano and property known as 4628 Meade Street, Seattle, Washington, and the property of the parties hereto, located in the town of Boone in the state of Iowa, and the defendant is hereby directed and 1’equired to execute to plaintiff a conveyance of said Iowa property.”
¶3On the 8th day of October, 1914, a formal finding of *613facts was made by the court, in accordance with the oral finding so announced on the 14th day of August, 1914, and on the same day, a decree was filed in accordance with said oral finding and the finding of facts above set out. The law of the state of Washington, at the time of the pendency of said action in the superior court of the state of Washington in and for King County, provided in relation to the property of parties to a divorce action as follows, being Section 4637 of Pierce’s Code of that state (1902) :
¶4“In granting a divorce the court shall also make such disposition of the property of the parties as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties, and to the condition in which they will be left by such divorce, and to the party through whom the property was acquired, and to the burdens imposed upon it for the benefit of the children, and shall make provisions for the guardianship, custody, and support and education of the minor children of such marriage.”
¶5The Supreme Court of the state of Washington has heretofore construed the provision of the law of that state, above set out, to require the parties to an action for divorce to bring into court all of their property, and a complete showing must be made; and it was decided by said court that said section conferred upon the court the power, in its discretion, to make a division of the separate property of the wife and husband.
¶6Prior to the commencement of the action above referred to, the parties thereto were the owners of the following described real estate, situated in the county of Boone and state of Iowa, the record title standing in the name of Ed Matson, and the plaintiff having her inchoate right of dower therein, said property being described as follows, to wit :
¶7Lot No. Thirty-one (31) in the Southwest Quarter (%) of the Northeast Quarter (%) of Section Twenty-nine *614(29), Township-Eighty-four (84), Bange Twenty-six (26), Boone County, Iowa, also described by metes and bounds.
¶8Said property consisted of a six-room house and seven lots, and the same was of the value of $1,600, the same being the only real property in the city of Boone, Iowa, owned by the said Ed Matson, and same being the only real property in Boone, Iowa, in which said appellee owned an interest, and the same being the only real property in the state of Iowa in which appellee or appellant Ed Matson owned any interest.
¶9Immediately after the announcement of the decision of said court in said action, the appellant Ed Matson left the state of Washington and came to the state of Iowa, arriving in said state a few days thereafter.
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¶11“That, in the deed so executed by the said Ed Matson to Ida Johnson, he described himself as single, notwithstanding the fact that the decree of divorce in the action above referred-to had not been filed at that time, and the marriage relation between these parties had not been dissolved by the filing of the formal decree, but the said Ed *616Matson then understood that the decision of said court, was as hereinbefore set out, and that he was directed by the decision of said court to convey said property to the plaintiff herein.”
¶12The answer admits Paragraph 8, except the allegation that the defendant Ida Johnson knew that the defendant Ed Matson was bound by the decree of the Washington court to convey said property to plaintiff, and also all allegations of fraud, and also the allegation that Ida Johnson paid nothing for the property, and also the last line thereof, to wit: “and that she was by virtue of said decree the beneficiary owner of said premises.”
¶13The petition further alleges:
¶14“That, at and before the time the execution and delivery of said warranty deed by defendant Ed Matson to defendant Ida Johnson, the defendant Ida Johnson had full knowledge that plaintiff and defendant Ed Matson were husband and wife, and had full knowledge of the pendency of the divorce action between said parties, and had full knowledge of the decision of the superior court of the state of Washington in and for King County, in the action above referred to, and knew that the defendant Ed Matson was directed and bound by the decision of that court to convey to the plaintiff herein the property hereinbefore described.”
¶15This allegation is not denied, except that defendants denied, in Paragraph 1, that Ida Johnson knew that the defendant Matson was “bound” by the decision of that court to convey to the plaintiff the property hereinbefore described. Manifestly, if Matson knew that he was directed by the decision to convey the property to appellee, and if Ida Johnson knew that he was directed by the decision to convey same, the oral announcement of the decision must have directed that such conveyance be made. As to the denial of fraud by the conclusion in the answer, the facts *617being admitted that Ida Johnson knew that the conveyance to appellee had been directed by the court, that she had full knowledge of the decision of the court, and that she took the property for $1.00, while it Avas worth $1,600, are sufficient to establish fraud. The conclusion denying same did not put the facts pleaded in issue, especially as it was coupled Avith an admission thereof.
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¶17“The fundamental question in this case, the question upon which all others depend, is whether, by the law of this state, a wife has an equity in the land of her husband during coverture. The question is briefly disposed of in the former opinion (ante p. 101), and it is there considered that she has such equity. The meaning of the court, however, as expressed in the former opinion upon this point, has been substantially overlooked, or entirely misunderstood. It is, therefore, thought advisable to discuss the question more at large.”
¶18He then proceeds to discuss that proposition. We have held that:
¶19“The dower right, given by statute to a wife in the property of her husband, though inchoate, pending the life *621of the husband, is in the nature of a property right, and; she cannot be divested of it by any act of her husband,; whether done in good faith or in fraud, either of his imme-j diate grantee or of those who may come after him.” Warner v. Trustees of N. Cemetery Assn., 139 Iowa 115, at 123.
¶20We regard this as a matter of importance, in view of the holding in the Fall case, the BuMoolc case, supra, and perhaps others, that, under statutes different from those of this state and of the state of Washington, the subject of a divorce action is the matrimonial status, and that a decree adjudging land to the successful party is only in the nature of a decretal order, áncillary to the subject-matter of the suit. It may be true that alimony could not be allowed, nor a division of property made, without a divorce; still, since the wife has, under the Iowa law, an interest in the real property of her husband, and since, under the laws of Washington and of this state, the court may divide and award the property of the parties, where, as here, a divorce was granted, we think it is moi'e than a mere matter of matrimonial status, and that the award of alimony and division of property is also the subject-matter of the action, though, perhaps, for the reason stated, in a sense ancillary.
¶21This being so, we are of opinion that, though it is a divorce case, under its peculiar circumstances, and under the laws of Washington and Iowa in such matters, a court of equity in the state of Washington, having personal jurisdiction of the parties, had jurisdiction to grant the decree requiring tu conveyance of land in Iowa. Under all these circumstances, we see no reason why the rule of the cases holding that a decree in one state may not be such as to affect land in another state should apply here. We understand appellants to concede that, had Matson executed a deed to plaintiff, pursuant to the decree, even though by compulsion, it would have been valid. Such was the situation in some of our cases, but we think some of our cases *622go even further than that, — for instance, Sullivan v. Kenney, infra, and. perhaps others.
¶22We are not holding that such decree, of itself, operates to convey the title to the land, and plaintiff is not making such a claim. But we do hold that, under the record, such a decree is a proper aud sufficient basis for the present action. And conceding the rule that the Washington decree operates only in personam, the plaintiff may maintain this action and obtain a decree that will operate in pensonam against the defendant here, and require him to convey the land in Iowa, and do the thing that defendant himself, by his fraud upon the Washington court, put it beyond the power of that court to do. We need not review the decision in the Bulloch case, supra, since the opinion proceeds upon the same reasoning as the Fall case: that, under their statute, the division or awarding of property did not possess any element of judgment upon the issue submitted to the court,, which was whether the marriage between the parties should be dissolved, and that the courts of New Jersey could not be asked to give greater efficacy to a decree for alimony made in New York than they would give to a like decree in New Jersey; but the court in that case said, in effect, that, if the courts, in New Jersey could enforce such a decree, they would not refuse like relief on an extra-territorial judgment. The opinion in the Bulloch case, as in the Fall case, was by a divided court.
¶23.It is suggested in the case of Fall v. Fall, supra, that, if the courts of other states can so adjudicate the rights of parties to land in another, it would nullify the recording acts, and cease to afford protection to purchasers of land. We suppose no one would claim that an innocent purchaser, purchasing land under such circumstances, without notice, would not be protected; but it is unnecessary for us to pass upon this point, because the record shows that defendant Ida Johnson had notice of all the facts, and that *623she purchased property concededly worth $1,600 for $1.00, which, of itself, is a circumstance tending to establish fraud on both her part and Matson’s. This, in connection with all the other circumstances in the case, is sufficient to show that it was a fraudulent conveyance, under the authorities. We shall not attempt an extended review of the other cases cited by appellants. It is enough to say that the earlier cases are referred to in the later ones, and the discussion and reasoning is much the same. We shall only briefly notice them.
¶24Some of the cases are where the decree does not, on its face, purport to pass title to land in another state. In the Proctor case, supra, cited by appellants, there was no personal service upon the defendant, in Illinois, and no appearance for him; and in that case it further appears that the defendant had no property within the state of Illinois, and the decree sought to award the plaintiff an interest in real estate in Ohio. Under such circumstances, the Illinois court held that so much of the decree as sought to vest an interest in real estate in Ohio was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that it was purely a proceeding in rem, with the property in another state. The Proctor case is annotated in 69 L. R. A. 673, where cases are cited extending the doctrine of Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148 (3 L. Ed. 181), to actions cognizable in equity which do not directly arise out of fraud, trust, or contract. The Massie case is also annotated in Volume 1, Rose’s Notes, 428. Some of the cases there cited hold that, under some circumstances, a decree in Federal and state courts may affect the title to land in foreign countries even; but others hold that this may not be done where it violates treaty obligations. In the case of Rodgers v. Rodgers, supra, the court granting the decree did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. We think neither the Rodgers case nor the Proctor case nor the Bodie case, *624supra, deny the identical proposition advanced by the appellees in the instant case. In the BodAe case, it appears that the Arkansas court, granting the decree of divorce, was prohibited by statute from taking into consideration the value of real estate outside the state, in determining the amount of alimony. In the case of MacGregor v. MacGregor, 9 Iowa 65, the Massie case Avas referred to and discussed; but it Avas held that a decree of the state of New York, rendered affecting lands in Iowa, Avas valid, and would be recognized. It is held in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641), that the court does not go back of the decree itself, to ascertain the cause of action resulting in the decree of a sister state; and in Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (16 L. Ed. 226), it is held that parties to a divorce action are bound by the provision of the decree as to divorce and alimony, and that the judgment or decree Avill be carried into judgment in another state, to have there the same binding force as in the state Avliere rendered. In Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (19 L. Ed. 604), it is held that a decree affecting real estate outside the state binds the parties personally, and can be enforced in the state where the real estate is situated. Appellees contend that, even under the authorities cited by appellant, the judgment of the Washington court is a contract of record, citing Johnson & Stevens v. Butler, 2 Iowa 535; Spilde v. Johnson, 132 Iowa 484. Though not deciding the precise question in this case, the following may be cited to sustain our conclusion, some of which are, we think, analogous: Sullivan v. Kenney, 148 Iowa 361, 387, and cases cited; Page v. McKee, 3 Bush. (Ky.) 135 (96 Am. Dec. 201); Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474 (15 Am. Rep. 621); Fletcher v. Ferrell, 9 Dana (Ky.) 372 (35 Am. Dec. 143); Moore v. Moore, 208 N. Y. 97 (101 N. E. 711); White v. Warren, 214 Mass. 204 (100 N. E. 1103); Newton v. Bronson, 13 N. Y. 587 (67 Am. Dec. 89).
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¶30We reach the conclusion that the judgment and decree of the trial court ought to be, and it is, — Affirmed.