People v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[Tjhe element which distinguishes [extreme indifference murder] from second-degree murder is that the latter degree requires that the perpetrator possess the intent to take the life of a particular person while this first-degree murder statute does not. The element of ‘extreme indifference to human life’ by definition, does not address itself to the life of the victim, but to human life generally. Conversely, though the statute requires that the conduct which creates a grave risk of death be intentional, the use of ‘intentionally’ here does not necessarily mean that the intent be to take the life of a particular person. Indeed, if such were the case, there would be little difference between this statute and the other sections of the first-degree murder statute, see 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-3- 102(l)(a). Furthermore, our statutes define ‘intentionally’ as ‘when his conscious object is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct,’ 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-1-601(6), which we read to mean that the conduct creating the grave risk of death be consciously done. “Again, in contrast, the second-degree murder statute states in part that ‘he cause the death of a person intentionally, but without premeditation.’ 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-3-103(l)(a). We believe the only construction which this phrase can be given is that the intent be to cause the death of a particular person. Otherwise, there would be no need to distinguish between 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. People v. Jones, Jr.