Watts v. Mann’s Empirical Analysis
1945
Citation profile
34 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently July 2009 · most notably Perkins v. State (1963), Vinson v. Burgess (1989)
34 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on William Marbury v. James Madison · United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n · Fletcher v. Peck · Joseph Patsone v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · Stockwell v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Ingram v. State · In re J.M.““We have here a comparatively simple situation. Usury is defined and denounced by the Constitution. Independently, therefore, of the express mandate of the Constitution, the legislature under its general lawmaking powers, is authorized to adopt such measures as it may deem appropriate to prevent, suppress or minimize it; its discretion in that regard being circumscribed only by such inhibitions as are imposed by the Constitution. The effect of the constitutional provision (self-executing in that regard) was to make ‘usury a quasi offense.’ Hemphill v. Watson, 60 Tex. 679 . Usurers therefore are law violators, guilty of committing a ‘quasi offense.’ The application of the law to ‘habitual’ or chronic violators and not to mere casual violators, rests upon a well-recognized legitimate basis of classification of long standing. In the realm of criminal law second and third offenders are often meted out severer punishments than first offenders. We see no reason why a similar rule may not with propriety be applied in the realm of quasi offenses. Especially so, when dealing with purely preventive measures, as is the case here. * * * The real objective of the Act was to break up the practice or business of the habitual usurer — a business recognized by the Act as inimical to the public welfare. * * * “The third ground of invalidity, above,' — that the Act confers jurisdiction on the district court to grant injunctions at the instance of the State to protect purely private rights in vi”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““Section 1. The State of Texas through its Attorney General, or any District or County Attorney, may institute a suit in the District Court to enjoin any person, firm, or corporation or any officer, agent, servant or employee of such person, firm, or corporation who is engaged in the business of habitually loaning money for the use and detention of which usurious interest has been charged against or contracted to be paid by the borrower, from demanding, receiving or by the use of any means attempting to collect from the borrower usurious interest on account of any loan, or from thereafter charging any borrower usurious interest, or contracting for any usurious interest. All persons, firms, or corporations, and their agents, officers, servants and employees similarly engaged in making loans of money as herein defined, who reside in the same county, may be joined in a single suit and no plea of misjoinder of parties defendant shall ever be available to any defendant in such suit. “Sec. 2. * * * “By the term ‘usurious interest’ as used in this Act, is meant interest at a rate in excess of ten (10%) per centum per an-num. ⅜ * * * * * “Sec. 3. In any such suit venue shall lie in the county of the residence of a defendant, or in a county where such business of loaning money is being conducted by such defendant.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.