Volume 187 — United States Reports

This was a writ of error brought to reverse a judgment of the District Court imposing a fine on a finding of guilty of an offence under section seven of the act of Congress entitled “An act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, and for other purposes,” 30 Stat. 448, c. 448, otherwise known as the 'War Revenue Act of 1898. The indictment contained two counts.

This suit was brought for the distribution of the property and assets of the Harmony Society, which the bill alleged had ceased to exist. The bill also prayed for an injunction against John S. Duss to restrain him from in anywise dealing with the property, of the society, and also for a receiver. The bill was exceedingly voluminous.

<p>The question whether a general assignment for the benefit of creditors is rendered invalid by reason of a provision that the ‘ ‘ preferred creditors shall accept their dividends in full satisfaction and discharge of their respective claims ” is one determinable by the local law of the jurisdiction from which the question arises.</p> <p>Under the Act of Congress of May 2, 1890, the laws of Arkansas respecting assignments for the benefit of creditors, as well as the statute of frauds, aré extended and put in force in the Indian Territory. In adopting these laws the courts of the Indian Territory are bound to respect the decisions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas interpreting them.</p> <p>Under the laws of Arkansas, thus made applicable to the Indian Territory, a stipulation for a release in a general assignment, which is made only as a condition of preference, does not invalidate the instrument. ■</p> <p>Other objections were made in the assignments of error, but as they did not appear to have been raised in either of the courts below, it was held that they could not be raised in this court.</p> <p>While it is the duty of this court to review the action of subordinate courts, justice to those courts requires that their alleged errors shall be called directly to their attention, and that their action shall not be reversed for errors which counsel in this court have first evolved from the record.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA.</p> <p>This was an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for the District of West Virginia sustaining a demurrer to, and dismissing, a bill -filed for the purpose of impeaching a tax sale and deed of certain lands, and of obtaining a judicial declaration that the defendants, who were purchasers under such tax deed, took no title to or interest in such lands.</p> <p>The facts set forth in the bill were substantially as follows: On April 30, 1874, Turpin, a citizen of the State of-Pennsylvania, purchased from the executors of one Smith C. Hjll 225 acres of land in the county of Ritchie,. West Virginia, and received a deed therefor. In the year 18.19,100. acres'of this land were sold for delinquent taxes for prior’ years, by which the quantity owned by Turpin was diminished to 125 acres, which were assessed to him for taxes for the years 1883 and 1884. Being absent from the State for several years, in poor health and unfit for business, he paid no attention to the land, which was returned delinquent for the non-payment of these taxes, and was sold by the sheriff of Ritchie County for such taxes on January 12, 1886. Having failed to redeem the land within the year allowed by law from the time of the sale, on February 3, 1887, some weeks after the expiration of the year, a deed was made by the clerk of the county court of Ritchie County to the defendants.</p> <p>Hothing was done and no effort was made to pay these taxes until about February 21,1899, when Turpin met the defendant, John B. Lemon, and tendered him the sum of one hundred and seventy-six dollars and fifty cents, to cover the amount of the taxes paid by the defendants in the purchase of the land, and all-taxes paid by them subsequently, as well as the cost of all surveys, etc., which amount he now offers to pay into court; but Lemon refused to receive the money, and has since cut large quantities of timber and removed the saíne from the land.</p> <p>Whereupon he filed this bill, which really raises but a single question, and that is, whether the laws of the State of West Virginia, enacted with reference to the sale of delinquent lands for taxes, are contrary to the Constitution of the United States, or' constitute due process of law within the Fourteenth Amendment. Other questions were raised in the bill, but in his petition for an appeal to this court the appellant rests his case upon the single question of the constitutionality of these laws.</p>

<p>The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed a decree compelling the release of a mortgage, payment whereof had been tendered in silver dollars coined after 1878 and refused on the ground that the legal tender provisions of the act of Congress of February 28, 1878, were unconstitutional. As such decision was not against the validity of the statute but sustained its validity, and as the jurisdiction of this court over the judgments and de* crees of state courts in suits involving the validity of statutes of the Unir ted States can only be exercised under section 709 of the Revised Statutes when the decision is against their validity, the writ of error was dismissed.</p>

This was an action brought by Andrew Herman, a minor, by his next friend, in the Court of Common Pleas of Wyan-dotte County, Kansas, September 18, 1897, again'st the Union Terminal.Railway Company, a corporation of Kansas, and the Kansas City Suburban'Belt Railway Company, a corporation of Missouri, to recover damages for injuries inflicted through, their joint or concurrent negligence.

Held: That the ruling that the objection as to'non-compliance with the Statute requiring the jury to be placed in charge of a sworn officer, was not made in time and was to be deemed as waived, presented no question of a Federal nature, but was an adjudication simply of a question of criminal and local law, and did not impair the constitutional 'guaranty that no State shall deprive any person of liberty without due…

Held: through Chief Justice Marshall, that to *93 sustain its jurisdiction it must-be shown that the title set úp by the. city was protected by the treaty ceding Louisiana to the United States (the treaty involved in this case), or by some act of Congress applicable to that title.

This is an appeal under section 5 of the Circuit 'Court of Appeals act of 1891, to review directly the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri, dismissing the bill of complainants (appellants) on the merits.

ON February 2, 1895, Don A. Gillett made and delivered to John Eomig a note for seven hundred dollars, secured by a mortgage on eighty acres in Garfield County, Oklahoma. On February 6, 1895, the mortgagor sold and. conveyed the real estate to Myrtle Gillett. On March 11, 1896, the mortgagee Eomig commenced an action of foreclosure in the District Court of the county against .Don A. Gillett and Myrtle Gil-lett.

Held: that this was not error as the acts of March 3, 1899, and June 6, 1900, together constituted a part of the scheme for the government of Alaska, and it is manifest from the provision in section 219 of the,act of March 3, 1899, that “nothing therein contained shall apply to or affect in any way any proceeding or indictment now found or pending, or that may be found for any offence committed before the passage of this…

Held: that the constitutional right was asserted under the state, and not the Federal Constitution.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>One convicted in a State court for an alleged violation of the criminal statutes of the State, and who contends that he is held in violation of the Constitution of-the United States, must ordinarily first take his case to the highest court of the State, in which the judgment could be reviewed, and thence bring it, if unsuccessful there, to this court by writ of error.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP NEW YORK.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error, the Home for Incurables, filed its petition in the Supreme Court for the city and county of New York, alleging that at the date of the confirmation of a certain assessment for a sewer in East 184th Street from Yanderbilt Avenue west to Washington Avenue, etc., it was the owner of certain lots affected thereby in ward number one, block number 3064, the twenty-fourth ward of the city of New York;</p> <p>That on the 22d of January, Í900, that assessment was confirmed by operation of law and the title thereof duly entered, with date of entry and of confirmation, in the record of titles of assessments confirmed, whereby such assessment became a lien upon such lots ; and,</p> <p>That the assessment, together with an interest certificate certified by the Comptroller of the city of New York to the Board of Assessors, was irregular, excessive and voidable, for reasons set forth in the petition.</p> <p>The petition alleged among other things that “ so much of the act of the Legislature of the State of Hew York, known as section 868 of the Hew York City Consolidation Act of 1882, as purports to authorize and direct the making of such interest certificate and the assessment of the amount thereof herein, is in violation of- the Constitution of the State of Hew York in that said portion of said act authorizes the taking of private property without just compensation, and said portion of said act purports to authorize an unlawful exercise of the power of taxation.”</p> <p>The petitioner prayed that the assessment be vacated or reduced, and that the lien or liens created thereby or by any subsequent proceeding be cancelled and discharged or reduced so far as the same affected the above lots.</p> <p>The case was heard upon the stipulation of facts in the Supreme Court and the relief asked by the petitioner was denied. Upon appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court the action of the court of original jurisdiction was confirmed. The case was then carried to the Court of Appeals of the State, and the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.</p> <p>Upon writ of error, to this court, it has been assigned for error that the judgment of the state court was in violation of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; also, that the judgment deprived the-Home of the equal protection of the law and of its property without due process of law.</p> <p>The record contains a certificate by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Hew York to the effect that in this proceeding the Home for Incurables claimed in the courts of the State that “ the imposition of all or a part of the assessment on its land as set forth in the record herein was in violation of the statutes and Constitution of the State of Hew York and of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and constituted a taking of property without due process of law; that the respondent in. this proceeding contended that the said assessment was neither in whole nor in part in violation of the statutes and Constitution of the State of Hew York or of the Constitution of the United States, and also that the said Home for Incurables had no remedy by petition to correct any errors in the said assessment; that this court decided that the said Home for Incurables did have a remedy by petition in the manner and form of the proceeding adopted by it to correct any errors in the said assessment, but that the assessment complained of was valid and without error as to each and every part thereof.”</p>

Held: that the exclusion was not error. After the decree caveators moved to vacate on the ground that one of the jurors was incompetent propter delictum for service, but the trial court denied the motion, the record stating that the court was of the opinion that at the trial there was no evidence of mental incompetency, fraud or undue influence.

Held: that while the lien created by a judgment creditors’ bill is contingent in the sense that it may possibly be defeated by the event of the suit, it is in itself» and so long as it exists, a charge, a specific lien, on the assets, not subject to being divested save by payment of the judgment sought to be collected, and a judgment or decree in enforcement of an otherwise valid preexisting lien is not the judgment…

<p>APPEAL EROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OE APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that a mere grant of “ exclusive jurisdiction ” to a police court over certain offences, did not ex- ' elude the authority of justices of the peace to receive complaints and issue warrants returnable before that court. To the same effect, are Commonwealth v. Pindar, 11 Metc. 539 ; Commonwealth v. Roark, 8 Cush. 210 ; Commonwealth v. Wolcott, 110 Massachusetts, 67; Hendee v. Taylor, 29 Connecticut, 448.

This was a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court for the Western District of Missouri, overruling the de-fence of suicide to an action upon a policy of life insurance, and awarding plaintiff judgment for the amount of the policy and assessments thereon.

, prepared by the court, is as follows: “ 1. The probate code of this State makes no provision for the formal discharge of an administrator, but the necessary legal effect of an order of the probate court allowing the final account of the administrator and its final decree of distribution, assigning the whole of the estate to the' heirs and dis-tributees, is to remove the estate of the deceased from the jurisdiction of the court, and to render the office of administrator,…

<p>Where a case is originally brought to this court by writ of error, but it appears that the proper course was to have brought the final judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for review by writ of certiorari, this court under the powers given by the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, may allow a writ of certiorari and direct that the copy of the record heretofore filed under the writ of error be taken and deemed as a sufficient return to the certiorari.</p> <p>The facts and questions of law involved in this case are similar to those decided in the case of Security Trust Company v. Black Biver National Bank, p. 211, ante.</p>

UndbR the act of Congress entitled “An act for the extension of Pennsylvania avenue southeast, and for other purposes,” approved March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1381, the Commissioners of the District of Cefhmbia were by the terms of section 5 of said act “ authorized and directed to institute by a petition- in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a District Court, a proceeding to condemn the land necessary for the extension and widening of Sherman avenue from…

<p>A decree of tlie Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia reversing an order of the Supreme Court of the District and remanding the cause to the lower court with directions to vacate the part appealed from and to take further proceedings according to law, is neither in form nos intention a final decree and is not reviewable in this court on appeal.</p>

This action was begun by the filing on May 27, 1899, oí a libel in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, by Anton Mencke, the master of the British ship Benlarig, against a cargo of sugar that had just been delivered from the vessel, to recover an unpaid balance of freight due for conveying the sugar from Java tó New York.

■■ The Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad Company was chartered by an act of the legislature of Maryland in 182?, with authority to construct a railroad from the city of Baltimore to the Susquehanna River.

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The questions to be answered and the case on which they arise are shown in the statement of facts and resulting questions of law constituting the certificate of the court below, which is as follows:</p> <p> “Statement of facts. </p> <p>“ That the Inter-State Loan and Trust Company is a corporation created and organized under and by virtue of the general laws of the State of Kansas, July 22,1885, and as such was authorized to transact business as a land mortgage company; that in or about the month of November, 1897, E. B. Crissey commenced an action against the said The Inter-State Loan and Trust Company in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Kansas, first division, to which court jurisdiction in that behalf duly appertained; that said action was duly commenced by the issue of a summons to said company ;• that said summons was duly served upon the said company, and that said company duly appeared in said suit by attorney and defended the same, and that such proceedings were afterwards had in said action that on the 31st day of December, 1897, a judgment was duly given and. made in and by said court in said action in favor of the said plaintiff and against the said company, in and by which judgment it was decided, adjudged and decreed that there was due and owing to the plaintiff therein from and by the said company the sum of $6792.20 and $56.45 costs, and that the plaintiff therein have and recover said sum from the said company, with interest thereon from said date at the rate of six per cent per annum, and that the said plaintiff have execution therefor against the said company; that thereafter an execution against the property of the said The Inter-State Loan and Trust Company was duly issued out of the said court upon said judgment for the said sum of $6792.20 and the costs as aforesaid, directed to the United States marshal for the District of Kansas, and that thereafter the said marshal duly returned said execution wholly unsatisfied for the reason that no property, real or personal, belonging to said company could be found whereon to levy.the same; that thereafter and on or about the 9th day of June, 1898, upon the application of the said E. B. Crissey, the plaintiff herein was duly appointed receiver of the said The Inter-State Loan and Trust Company by the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, first division, to which said court jurisdiction therein duly appertained, and has duly qualified and acted as such; that thereafter and on or about the 9th day of February, 1899, an order was duly given and made in and by said Circuit’ Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, first division, by which order it was considered, adjudged, ordered and decreed that the said John H. Evans, as receiver, proceed against all or any of the stockholders of the Inter-State Loan and Trust Company, from whom, in his judgment, a recovery can be bad to collect all of their liability as stockholders in said company, a copy of which order is hereto annexed and marked Exhibit A, and which copy the plaintiff herein prays may be considered as part of his complaint as if herein set' forth in full; that the defendant is a citizen of the State of New York, and prior to the month of November, 1897, became a stockholder of said corporation and the owner of 602 shares of the capital stock thereof of the par value of $100 a share, and has ever remained a stockholder and the owner of said shares. At the time when the defendant became a stockholder of said corporation, and from that time ever since, it was provided by the constitution of the State of Kansas (sec. 2, article XII) as follows: ‘Dues from corporations’ (organized and existing under the laws of the State of Kansas) ‘ shall be secured by individual liability of the stockholders to an additional amount equal to the stock owned by each stockholder, and such other means as shall be provided by law; but such individual liabilities shall not apply to railroad corporations nor corporations for religious or charitable purposes.’ At the time the defendant became a stockholder of said corporation it was provided by the General Statutes of Kansas of 1868 (sections 32 and 44) as follows:</p> <p>“ ‘ Sec. 32. If any execution shall have been issued against the property or effects, of a corporation, except a railway or a religious or charitable corporation, and there cannot be found any property whereon to levy such execution, then execution may be issued against any of the stockholders, to an extent equal in amount to the amount of stock by him or*her owned, together with any amount unpaid thereon; but no execution shall issue against any stockholder, except upon an order of the court in which the action, suit or proceeding shall have been brought or instituted, made upon motion in open court, after reasonable notice in writing to the person or persons sought to be charged ; and, upon such motion, such court may order execution to issue accordingly; or the plaintiff in the execution may proceed by action to charge the stockholders with the amount of his judgment.’</p> <p>“ Seo. 44. If any corporation, created under this or any general statute of this State, except railway, or charitable or religious corporations, be dissolved, leaving debts unpaid, suits may be brought against any person or persons who were stockholders at the time of such dissolution, without joining the corporation in such suit; and if judgment be rendered, and execution satisfied, the defendant or defendants may sue all who were stockholders at the time of dissolution, for the recovery of the portion of such debt for which they were liable, and the execution upon the judgment shall direct the collection to be made from property of each stockholder, respectively; and if any number of stockholders (defendants in the case) shall not have property enough to satisfy his or their portion of the execution, then thé amount of deficiency shall be divided equally among all the remaining stockholders, and collections made accordingly, deducting from the amount a sum in proportion to the amount of stock owned by the plaintiff at the time the company dissolved.’</p> <p>“ By a law of Kansas enacted January 11, 1899, sections 32 and 44 aforesaid were repealed, and by sections 14 and IS it was provided as follows:</p> <p>“ ‘ Sec. 14. That section 32, chapter 23, of the General Statutes of 1868, be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows : Sec. 32. If any execution shall have been issued against the property or effects of a corporation, except a railway or a religious or charitable corporation, and there cannot be found any property upon which to levy such execution, such corporation shall be deemed to be insolvent, and upon application to the court from which such execution was issued, or to the judge thereof, a receiver shall be appointed to close up the affairs of said corporation. Such receiver shall immediately institute proceedings against all stockholders to collect unpaid subscriptions to the stock of such corporation, together with the additional liability of such stockholders equal to the par value of the stock held by each. All collections made by the receiver shall be held for the benefit of all creditors, and shall be disbursed in such manner and at such times as the court may direct. Should the collections made by the receiver exceed the amount necessary to pay all claims against such corporation, together with all costs and expenses of the receivership, the remainder shall be distributed among the stockholders from whom collections have been made, as the court may direct; and. in the event any stockholder has not paid the amount due from him the stockholders making payment shall be entitled to an assignment of any judgment or judgments obtained by the receiver against such stockholder, and may enforce the same'to the extent of his proportion of claims paid by them.</p> <p>“ ‘ Sec. 15. That section 46, chapter 23, of the General Statutes of 1868, be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows : Sec. 46. The stockholders of every corporation, except railroad corporations or corporations for religious or charitable purposes, shall be liable to the creditors thereof for any unpaid subscriptions, and in addition thereto for an amount equal to the par value of the stock owned by them, such liability to be considered an asset of the corporation in the event of insolvency, and to be collected by a receiver for the benefit of all creditors.’</p> <p>“ The present action was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York by the receiver of the said The Inter-State Loan and Trust Company, appointed as aforesaid, against the defendant to recover the sum of $60,200, alleging his liability, as a stockholder and the owner of the said 602 shares of the said corporation.</p> <p>“ Upon the foregoing facts this court desires instructions upon the following questions:</p> <p>“ Questions of Law.</p> <p>“ 1st. Are sections 14 arid 15 of the laws of Kansas of 1899 valid legislation in view of the provision of the constitution of the State of Kansas respecting the individual liability of the stockholders of corporations, or are they invalid as subjecting such stockholders to liabilities other than ‘ dues from corporations % ’</p> <p>“ 2d. Do sections 14 and 15 aforesaid contravene the Constitution of the United States by impairing the contractual liability of the defendant previously existing as a stockholder of a corporation of the State of Kansas % ■</p> <p>“3d. Is the plaintiff, as a receiver appointed as aforesaid, entitled to maintain an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York?</p> <p>“ In accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the act of March 3, 1891, establishing Courts of Appeal, etc., the fore-, going questions of law are by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit hereby certified to the Supreme Court.”</p>

Held: in accordance with the prior rulings on the subject, not to be susceptible to assessment for duty.

Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) was a US Supreme Court case that decided the US Congress has the power to pass legislation that controls the actions and property of tribal states without their consent. The Cherokee Nation brought this case against the Secretary of the Interior because the Secretary authorized mineral and oil leases on Cherokee land, an action Congress had authorized by legislation. The Cherokee Nation argued that this action violated the treaty rights promised by the US to their Indian nation. In their decision, the Court stated this was out of the Court’s power as it was a question for the legislative branch to determine, not the judicial.

Held: that the assertion that the policy had its situs, for the purposes of suit, solely at the domicil of the corporation was unfounded, and that the claim was so completely foreclosed by prior rulings as to come within the principle stated in the preceding paragraph. *309 The case is stated in the

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>This action was brought in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, by defendant' in error, against one Peyton D. Yinson, as principal and plaintiff in error as surety, on certain bonds, to recover tbe sum of $530.06. One of the bonds was in the peiial sum of $25,000, for the faithful performance of the covenants and conditions of a contract entered into by said Vinson with the District of Columbia. It was co venad ted in •the bond that Yinson would “ promptly make payments to all persons supplying him with labor or materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in said contract.” And it was alleged in the declaration that Lewis E. Smoot furnished said Yinson certain materials, which were used by the latter in the completion of the work under the contract, of the value of $599.73, of which amount only $206.95 was paid, leaving a balance of $392.78 due.</p> <p>The other bond was for the penal sum of $6000, with like covenants and conditions. The declaration alleged that said Smoot furnished materials of the value of $143.28 to Yinson, which were used in the performance of the latter’s contract with the District of Columbia, and that said amount was not paid, though demanded. And recovery of said amounts due was prayed against Yinson and the plaintiff in error, amounting to the sum of $530.06. The declaration was accompanied by an affidavit made by Smoot under the requirements of rule 73 of the court, hereinafter set out. The affidavit was very full and circumstantial, and virtually repeated the declaration.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error filed pleas to the declaration, in which it alleged-that neither it nor Yinson owed the sums of money demanded, or any part of either, “ in the manner and form as the said United States above complained.” And also pleaded that neither it nor Yinson had broken the conditions, or any of them, on said bonds “in the manner and form as the said United States had above complained.”</p> <p>The plaintiff in error on March 14, 1902, filed the following affidavit of defence:</p> <p>“ J. Sprigg Poole, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:</p> <p>“ 1. That he is now, and for ten years last past has been, the general agent for the District of Columbia of the Fidelity and. Deposit Company of Maryland, the defendant in the above-entitled cause.</p> <p>“2. That the said defendant admits the execution of the bonds as alleged in the declaration in said cause.</p> <p>“ 3. That the said defendant, its officers and agents, has no personal knowledge of the contracts alleged in said declaration to have been entered into by and between Lewis E. Smoo.t and Peyton D. Yinson, or of the indebtedness alleged to be due from said Yinson to said Smoot under- said alleged contracts; that the said defendant, its officers and agents, has not sufficient information, in the opinion of the affiant and of the counsel of said defendant, its attorney of record in said eause, to be safe in admitting or denying under oath the allegations of said declaration in regard to said contracts between said Smoot and Yinson, or the indebtedness thereunder, and in so far as said defendant is sought to be charged with the payment of said alleged indebtedness from Yinson to Smoot it calls for strict proof of said alleged indebtedness.</p> <p>“ 4. That said defendant is advised by its counsel that it is entitled under the law of the. land to trial by jury as to the truth of the allegations of the declaration in regard to said alleged contracts between the said Smoot and Yinson and the alleged indebtedness under said contracts; that said defendant does not waive, but expressly claims, the benefit of the right of trial by jury, and prays that this honorable court will notenter judgment against it, the said defendant, without trial by jury upon the issues tendered by the pleas filed to said declaration.</p> <p>“ That this prayer for trial by jury is not made for the purpose of delay, but solely because the defendant is advised by counsel and believes that, under the law of the land, it is entitled to trial by jury in this cause, and that it cannot waive or surrender that fight without exposing itself to the danger of being deprived of its property without due process of law.”</p> <p>On the 18th of March the defendant in error filed a motion “ for judgment, under the seventy-third rule, for failure of the defendant to file with his' plea a sufficient affidavit of defence.”</p> <p>Upon hearing, the motion was granted and judgment entered as prayed for in the declaration. The judgment was affirmed by the fciourt of Appeals, and the case was then brought here.</p> <p>The seventy-third rule is as follows :</p> <p>“ In any action arising ex contractu, if the plaintiff or his agent shall have filed, at the time of bringing his action, an affidavit setting out distinctly his cause of action, and the sum he claims to be due, exclusive of all set-offs and just grounds of defence, and shall have served the defendant with copies of his ■ declaration and of said affidavit, he shall be entitled to a judgment for the 'amount so claimed, with interest and costs, unless the defendant shall file, along with his plea, if in bar, an affidavit of defence denying the right of the plaintiff as to the whole or some specified part of his claim, and specifically stating also, in precise and distinct terms, the grounds of his de-fence, which must be such as would, if true, be sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s claim in whole or in part. And where the defendant shall have acknowledged in his affidavit of defence his liability for a part of the- plaintiff’s claim as aforesaid the plaintiff, if he so elect, may- have judgment entered in his favor for the amount so confessed to be due.</p> <p>“ Sec. 2. The provisions of this rule shall not apply to defendants who are representatives' of a decedent’s estate except when the affidavit filed with the declaration sets forth that the contract sued on was directly with such representative, or that a promise to pay was made by him.</p> <p>“ Seo. 3. When the defendant is .a corporation, the affidavit of defence may be .made by an officer, agent or attorney of such corporation.</p> <p>“ Eules of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia adopted at the April term, 1898, p. 28.”</p>

<p>■ The Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission is -entitled to be reimbursed- for. telegrams sent by him pursuant to directions of the Commission, on presenting vouchers in the form prescribed by law to the proper auditing officer of the Treasury Department, approved'by the chairman of the Commission and accompanied by the request of the chairman that the rules of the Comptroller as to the production of cdpies of telegrams for which credit is asked be disregarded on account •of the confidential character of the messages, the secretary having also offered to submit the books of the Commission to the Comptroller and Auditors of the Treasury.</p>

<p>The right of a person, against whom an involuntary petition of bankruptcy has been filed, to a trial by jury under section 19 of the bankruptcy act is absolute and cannot be withheld at the discretion of the court.</p> <p>The trial is a trial according to the course of the common law and the court cannot enter judgment, as the chancellor may, contrary to the verdict, but the verdict may be set aside or the judgment may be reversed for error of law as in eommou law cases.</p> <p>The distinction between-a writ of error which brings up matter of law only, and an appeal, which, unless expressly restricted, brings up both law and fact, has always been observed by this court and recognized by the legislation of Congress from the foundation of the Government.</p> <p>Congress did not attempt by section 25a of the bankrupt act, which provides for appeals as in equity cases from the District Court to the Circuit Court of Appeals from judgments adjudging or refusing to adjudge the defendant a bankrupt, to empower the appellate court to reexamine the facts determined by a jury underf section 19, otherwise than according to the rules of the common law. The provision applies to judgments where trial by jury has not been demanded and the court proceeds on its own findings of fact. In such case the facts and the law are reexaminable on appeal; but in case of a jury trial the judgment is reviewabie only by writ of error for error in law, and alleged errors in instructions, the giving or refusal of instructions or in the admission or rejection of evidence which must appear by exceptions duly taken and preserved by bill of ex-eeptions in the absence of which such alleged errors cannot be consider,ed, although the transcript of the record contains what purports to be the evidence heard by the jury, exceptions reserved to evidence, admitted or exeludéd, the charge and exceptions, instructions asked and refused and exceptions.</p>

Held: not the law of commercial paper, but the contract of the parties determined the conditions of forfeiture, and that the contract of the parties was expressed in the draft to be that the policy should become void if the draft was not paid at maturity. “"We think it clear,” was said: “Therefore, that notwithstanding the renewal receipt, the condition expressed in the draft was binding on the insured.

Layton was prosecuted in the St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction, on information, for violation of an act of the general assembly of the State of Missouri, entitled, “ An act to prevent the use of unhealthy chemicals or substances in the preparation or manufacture of any article used or to be used in the preparation of food,” approved May 11, 1899, and reading as follows: “ Seo. 1.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This was an action, to recoyer on a policy of life insurance, commenced in tbe District Court of Travis County, Texas, and removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas. The policy was issued August 1, 1894. William E. Burt was the insured. The policy, in case of death, was payable to Anna M. Burt, the wife of the insured, if living, otherwise to his executors, -administrators or assigns. On September 10, 1895, the beneficiary Anna M. Burt and her husband, the insured, assigned a one half interest to plaintiffs to secure them as creditors of the assignors. . On July 24,1896, the beneficiary, Anna M. .Burt, died intestate, as did also the only children of the beneficiary and the insured. On February 4, 1897, the insured, William E. Burt, conveyed to the plaintiffs' the remaining interest in the policy, making' them the sole owners of it. They are also his sole heirs, and as such are entitled to the full benefit of the policy, there being no administration on his estate nor any necessity for one.</p> <p>On November 27, 1896, the insured, having been indicted for the murder of his wife, Anna M. Burt, the beneficiary, was tried and convicted in the District Court of Travis County, Texas, a court of competent jurisdiction, was sentenced to be put to death, and on May 27,1898, was hanged pursuant to such sentence. The petition in this case alleged that, notwithstanding such conviction, sentence and execution, the insured, William E. Burt, did not in fact commit the crime of murder, nor participate therein, but that if he did the policy was not avoided thereby, because he was at the time insane.</p> <p>The policy, which in its general scope was an ordinary policy of life insurance, contained these provisions :</p> <p>“ Third. If the insured should, without the written consent of the company, at any time enter the military or naval service, the militia excepted, or become employed in a liquor saloon, or if the insured should die by self-destruction, whether sane or insane, within three years from date hereof, this policy shall be null and void.</p> <p>‡*****:!:*</p> <p>“ The contract of insurance between the parties hereto is completely set forth in this policy and the application for the same.”</p> <p>A demurrer to the petition was sustained and judgment entered for the defendant, which was thereafter affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit, 105 Fed. Bep. 419, and thereupon the case was brought here on certiorari. 181 U. S. 617.</p>

Held: and this court now affirms such conclusion, that because of their laches the petitioners are cut off from obtaining that judicial relief to which they would otherwise be entitled.

Held: that on his death the institution was entitled to this part of the principal also, and that it did not pass to the residuary devisees; although a similar bequest for the benefit of another husband and wife contained an express direction for a transfer of the second half of the principal to the charitable institution upon the death of the survivor.” Gray, C. J., said: “ The decision of this question doubtless depends…

<p>An ordinance of the borough of New Hope, Pennsylvania, imposing an annual license fee of one dollar per pole and two dollars and a half per mile . of wire on the telegraph, telephone and electric light poles within the limits of the borough is not a tax on the property of the telegraph company owning the poles and wires, or on its transmission of messages or on its receipts for such transmission, but is a charge in the enforcement of local governmental supervision, and as such is not in itself obnoxious, to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.</p> <p>As the elements entering into such a charge are various, and as in this case the courts of Pennsylvania have decided that the charge imposed by tlie ordinance is reasonable in the circumstances and the ordinance valid, this court does not feel justified in holding that conclusion to he so manifestly erroneous as to require revision.</p>

<p>EEEOE TO THE OIECUIT COUET OE APPEALS EOE 'THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas by J. W. Eckman, a citizen and resident of that district, as guardian of Alfonso Huesselmann, a minor, against the Mexican Central Railway Company, a corporation of Massachusetts, to recover damages for injuries sustained by him in the Republic of Mexico through the negligence of the company, in whose employment he then was.

<p>Where'a rear admiral of the United States Navy who has filed a libel in prize in his own behalf and also in behalf of all the officers and enlisted men in the Navy taking part in the engagement, dies, and his death has been suggested on the record, it is not necessary that the personal representatives of the deceased should come in of that any person should be designated ex officio, but the court may substitute any one interested in the prosecution of the litigation, who has personally appeared in the case.</p>

<p>1. While, in a general sense, the laws in force at the time a contract is made enter into its obligation, parties have no vested right in the particular remedies or modes of procedure then existing.</p> <p>2. Thé Legislature may not withdraw all remedies, and thus, in effect, destroy the contract; nor impose such new restrictions or conditions as would materially delay-or embarrass the enforcement of rights under the contract,' according to the course of justice as established when the contract was made. Neither could be done without impairing the obligation of the contract. But the Legislature may change existing remedies or modes of procedure, without impairing the obligation of contracts, if a substantial or efficacious remedy remains or is provided, by means of which á party can enforce his rights under the contract.</p> <p>The contract clause of the Constitution of the United States has reference only to a statute of a State enacted after the making of the contract whose obligation is alleged to have been impaired.</p>

APPEAL PROM THE DISTRICT C0URT OE THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT" OF ALASKA.

<p>APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES EOR THE DISTRICT OE ALASKA.</p> <p>These cases were argued by the same counsel as in No. 2’6, p. 450, a/nte.</p>

This, like the preceding cases, was brought to prevent the payment of an Alaskan license tax. The method pursued was, however, different. It is a suit in equity brought by a stockholder against a corporation — the stockholder and the corporation being the sole parties plaintiff and defendant — to restrain it from paying the tax.

<p>APPEAL EEOM THE DISTRICT OOUBT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA.</p> <p>This case was argued by the same counsel as appeared in No. 10, p. 458, ante.</p>

Held: reversing the trial court, competent to show a parol agreement between the parties made at the time of the delivery of the note that it should not become operative as a note until the maker could examine the property for which it was given and determine whether he would purchase it.

Held: “ First, the shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the States respectively. Secondly, the new States have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original States.

This was an action upon a policy of insurance upon the life of Frank C. Johnson, dated December 27, 1890, whereby the defendant insured his life in the sum of $25,000 for the benefit of his executors, administrators or assigns. This policy was assigned to the plaintiff in 1895, and on September 28,1896, Johnson died. The annual premium was fixed at $1060, payable in advance on November 11 of each year..

<p>OEBTIOEAEI TO THE' 0IB0ÜIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH ' CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This was a writ of certiorari to review a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a decree of the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, which itself affirmed the action of the board of general appraisers, holding a cargo of refined sugar imported into Baltimore from Russia subject to a countervailing duty leviable upon merchandise upon which a bounty is paid upon- exportation.-</p> <p>The proceedings were instituted by a petition filed in the Circuit Court setting up the importation of sugar on the steamship Assyria, July 6, 1899, the imposition of a countervailing duty by the collector of customs at Baltimore, and the payment of the same under protest; and the fact that the decision of the collector had been affirmed by the board of general appraisers. The grounds stated in the petition for a review are, generally, that the country from which the sugar was exported. did not pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the exportation of said sugar.</p> <p>The return of the general appraisers contained a copy of the proceedings before them, including a copy of the Russian law and regulations, a stipulation of facts, a copy of certain reports from the United States consul at Odessa, and their opinion ovérruling the protest, and affirming the decision of the collector. The Circuit Court affirméd the action of the general appraisers, and upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals that court in turn affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court. 113 Fed. Rep. 144.</p> <p>supported the contention that no bounty or grant was paid or bestowed by. the Russian government upon the exportation of the consignment of sugar involved in the action. The Russian sugar law is not a covert scheme to pay concealed bounties on exportation, but the genuine effort of a paternalistic government to wrest the control of the trade from a pernicious sugar' ring and to regulate, the industry in the interest of producer and consumer alike.</p> <p>Section five of the tariff act of 1897 (in full in opinion, p. 501 post), applies only to bounties on exportation and is distinguished from bounties on production. Allen, v. Smith, 173 U. S. 402. By specifying only bounties upon exportation, Congress must have intended to exclude bounties on production from the operation of section five, and unless the bounty alleged to be paid by the Russian government be conditioned solely on exportation, and in such fashion th at the exporter gets it and the non-exporter does not, unless, in other words, the exporter is placed in a better position than if he had not exported, then the bounty is not a true bounty on exportation, and section five can have no application thereto. The purchase price of the “ free sugar” export certificate is not a bounty on exportation; and merely liquid atingthe value of the right cannot convert that into a bounty on exportation which was not one before.. The enhanced prices secured to manufacturers by the operation of a high protective tariff constitute a virtual bounty ora. production. Alexander Hamilton’s Report • on Manufactures ; United States ir. Realty Go., Í36 U. S. 427, 434; Colder v. Henderson, 54 Fed. Rep. 802, 803; Lord Pirbright, P. O., Prest, of Sugar Conference of 1888, in Empire Review for April, 11902, p. 264. Tbe question is not whether protective duties, are indirect bounties, but whether Congress intended to include them within the scope of section five, and it is plain that Congress could not have had any such intention. The action of the Russian government in further limiting the market to a portion only of the product distinguishes the system in degree, but not in principle, from the American system. The wording of the section excludes the theory that Congress intended to include therein the “ virtual bounties ” resulting from the operation of protective tariffs or other artificial'limitations of the home market.</p> <p>The Russian law doés not, either directly or indirectly, require the manufacturer to export any portion of his sugar as a condition precedent to selling the balance in the home market, but on the contrary invites him not to do so but to carry over his surplus into the next campaign. This disposes of all arguments based on a supposed obligation to export in order to obtain the benefit of the artificially high prices in the home market. The Brussels Sugar Conference decided, not that Bussia paid a bounty on exportation, but that the artificially high prices ensured on the home market by the high protective tariff acted as virtual bounties - on production, enabling the manufacturer to endure losses abroad. If such conclusions are to be-adopted the United States is the greatest bounty paying country in the world'. Congress never intended the words “ bounty or grant ” as used in section five to have any such extreme application: The remission of excise .taxes on the exportation of sugar is not a bounty or grant on exportation, as the terms are used in section five. If the question is one in doubt; the d.crabt must be resolved in favor of the importer “ as duties are never imposed on citizens upon vague or doubtful interpretation.” Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 616; Adams v. Bancroft, 3 Sumner, 38.</p> <p>The' single question involved is whether' a bounty was bestowed by . Bussia on the exportation of the sugar. The point of jurisdiction which might be urged in favor of exclusivé executive authority- to determine the question appears to have been waived by. the Secretary of - the Treasury having .voluntarily submitted the. matter to the judicial determination of the Board of Geueral Appraisers and the courts. The only other case under this .law is Hills v. United States, 99 Fed. Bep. 425 ; on appeal, 107 Fed. Bep. 107, which decided that the practical effect of the Dutch law is to make the remission of the Excise Tax from the standpoint of other countries a bounty on ex- ■ .portation. .</p> <p>The Bussian government desires to maintain prices,, and therefore limits the output on the domestic market. It also desires to stimulate production, and for this purpose puts a premium on exportation. It is neither necessary nor proper to suggest a covert purpose to bestow a bounty by seeking a covert method; but the Russian attitude offers some excuse for such a suggestion. It is enough to establish that the premium on exportation, the indirect bounty, is the necessary effect and re-, suit of the scheme. The grant as a governmental allowance is shown by the complete control of the government over if. The government reserves the right to suspend the remission of excise in order to guard against the effect of such a rise of prices in the rest of Europe as might cause an abnormal domestic over-production, One highly significant feature in the arrangement is the cession or transfer of free sugar from one mill to another in order to facilitate exportation, which transfer carries a consideration to the producer who cedes his home. market right, and constitutes the concrete evidence of the premium or indirect bounty on exportation. Hwrtfl'anft v. Wies-mann, 121 U. S. 609, distinguished, but see Henderson v. The Mayor, 92 .U. S. 259, 268, as to the doctrine of reasonable interpretation. This court does not accept a foreign remission of internal tax as conclusive upon its effect with respect to our own láws. United States v. Hassavant, 169 U. S. 16. The Russian scheme earned out under their sugar law and regulations clearly amounts to the paying or bestowing indirectly of a bounty or grant upon the exportation of sugar which properly subjects the merchandise upon importation into this country to the countervailing duty presented by section five of the tariff act of 1897.</p>

<p>When the owner of a trade mark applies for an-injunction to restrain the defendant from injuring his property by making false representations to the public it is essential that the plaintiff should not in his trade mark or in his advertisements and business, be himself guilty of any false or misleading representation, and if he makes any material false statement in connection with the property which he seeks to protect, he loses his right to claim the assistance of a court of equity; and where any symbol or label claimed as a trade mark is so constructed' or worded as to make or contain a distinct material assertion which is false, no property can be claimed on it, or, in other words, the right to the exclusive use of it cannot be maintained.</p>

<p>EEROE TO SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA..</p> <p>In April, 1897, John M. Kelley filed his petition in the Civil District Court for the parish of Orleans against Edmund- H. Chadwick, to enforce payment of a lien on a certain square of ground in the city of New Orleans, created and arising out of a contract between one A. J. Christopher and said city for paving Hagan avenue. The petition alleged due completion of the work, an assignment or transfer by Christopher, of all his rights and claims under the contract, to the petitioner, and a liability of Chadwick for the amount of $638.80, with interest thereon from September 24,1896; and also alleged that for the payment of said sum he had by law a lien and pledge upon said property.</p> <p>Chadwick answered this petition, wherein he pleaded the general issue and" certain special pleas, in one of which he denied that his property was benefited by the paving, and alleged that, if it was so benefited, he could only be made to pay the amount of benefit to ah increased value of .property, and that no personal judgment should be rendered against him. He also filed, in September, 1899, a supplemental answer in which, among other things, he alleged that the ordinance under which the work was done required the contractor to employ only Iona fide resident citizens of the city of Hew Orleans as laborers on the work, thus depriving the citizens of the State and of’ each and every State of the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, secured to them by the Constitution of the United States, which, by the second section of its fourth article, provides that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of the citizens of. the several States ; and he also alleged that the ordinance was likewise illegal and unconstitutional because it imposed a liability on the property owner, irrespective of .the question whether or not his-property was benefited or damaged by the pavement; and he alleged that the paving of the street in front of his property had been of no benefit to it, and that the rendition of any judgment against him would be taking his private property for public purposes, contrary to the constitution of the State of Louisiana and- to that of the United States.</p> <p>Evidence was taken, and the cause was so proceeded in that on March 5, 1900, judgment was rendered against the defendant, Chadwick, in the sum of $638.80, with interest from .September 24,1896, with costs of suit, with recognition of plaintiff’s lien and privilege for the payment thereof on the said property, the same to be sold and the proceeds to be applied to the payment of plaintiff’s claim. .</p> <p>A suspensive appeal was thereupon allowed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana,, and that court, on February 4,1901, affirmed the judgment of the trial court, 104 Louisiana, '719, and subsequently allowed a writ of error to bring the cause to this court.</p>

<p>EÉEOB TO THE SUPEEME COUET OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.</p> <p>Biohard Á. Paek was plaintiff in the original action, brought in the District Court of Atchison County, Kansas, against William H. Bisk, executor of thé estate of George Manley, deceased. It was alleged in the petition, in substance, that the decedent was at .the time of his death the owner of stock of the par value of $27,500, in a Kansas corporation, known as the Kansas Trust & Banking Company; that said corporation, subsequent to the death of Manley, became indebted to plaintiff; that the corporation was insolvent and had no property from which such indebtedness could be realized; that the defendant, as executor of the estate of Manley, became seized and possessed of all the property of the decedent within the State of Kansas, including the shares of stock referred to, and, by reason of a contractual liability imposed on the stockholders of said corporation, defendant was liable to plaintiff for the indebtedness in question. There was filed with the petition an affidavit for attachment, because of the non-residence of the defendant, and after the return of the summons an attachment was levied on certain real estate in Atchison County, Kansas, “as the property of said defendant William H. Bisk, executor of the estate of George Manley, deceased.” Publication of notice of the pendency of the action was made, as required by laws of Kansas.- Within the’ time limited for answering the defendant appeared generally by filing a demurrer to the petition on the grounds of a want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and the subject of -the action, because several causes of action were improperly joined, and because the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Thereafter, Beuben A. Manley, successor to William H. Bisk, as executor and trustee 'of the estate of George Manley, deceased, was substituted as defendant in the stead of Bisk. An answer was thereupon filed, in which most of the material averments of the petition were admitted, such as the ownership by George Manley in his lifetime of the stock in question; the execution of his last will and testament; its admission to probate and the grant of letters testamentary to Bisk and to his successor by a Kew Jersey orphans’ court; that Bisk and his.successor “became seized and possessed of all the property of the. late George Manley, deceased, lying and being situated in the State of Kansas,” and that the substituted defendant (Reuben M. Manley) “ became and is now a stockholder of the said, The Kansas Trust & Banking Company, and as such executor of said estate is the owner and holder of said shares of stock of said corporation, amounting to the sum of $27,500.” Separate defences were interposed to defeat recovery, such as that plaintiff had not reduced his claim against the Kansas corporation to judgment, that there ; was a defect of parties plaintiff, that a special fund created by the Kansas corporation for the payment of the indebtedness in question existed, and should first be exhausted, and that various actions were pending in which recovery was sought by judgment creditors of said Kansas corporation, upon the liability of defendant as a stockholder in said corporation.</p> <p>Issue was joined by the filing of a reply, the cause was tried by the court, judgment for the amount claimed was rendered against the defendant, and the attached real estate was ordered sold. The cause was taken to the Supreme Court of Kánsas, and that court dismissed the petition in error because of an informality in the proceedings and without passing on the merits. 61 Kansas, 857. After the mandate had.been filed in the lower court separate motions were made on behalf of defendant, to set aside the judgment and to withdraw the order for the sale of the attached property. The same grounds were assigned in support of each motion, and the claim of the protection of the Constitution of the United States was embodied in the third ground, by the assertion that a statute of Kansas, upon which the judgment complained of «was based, violated the first and ' second: sections of the fourth article of and the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. ■ The motions were overruled, and the “ decision and judgment ” was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kansas. 62 Kansas, 553. By writ of error the cause was then brought to this court. The original defendant in error having died, Anna Q. Park has been substituted as defendant in error.</p>

Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case brought against the US government by the Kiowa chief Lone Wolf, who charged that Native American tribes under the Medicine Lodge Treaty had been defrauded of land by Congressional actions in violation of the treaty. The Court declared that the "plenary power" of the United States Congress gave it authority to abrogate treaty obligations between the United States and Native American tribes unilaterally. The decision marked a departure from the holdings of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), which had shown greater respect for the autonomy of Native American tribes.

This is a suit to condemn, land in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, under the laws of Utah, and was brought in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of that State. The complainant in the suit, defendant in error here; was a corporation of Utah. The plaintiff in error was a Colorado corporation. Ferguson and Holbrook were citizens of Utah; Nunn was a citizen of Colorado.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>Ejectment and trespass brought in the Circuit Court of the United. States, Western Division of the Western District of Tennessee, for the recovery of lands and damages. Part of the land is an island in the Mississippi River. The declaration was in the usual form, and the ground of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court was diversity of citizenship, expressed as follows:</p> <p>“ The plaintiffs, who are citizens of the State of Indiana, residing in Evansville, therein, complain of the defendants, Joe 0. Marley, Thomas Price, E. J. Eoy, T. A. Eoy, L. L. Coleman and E. M. Ayres, who are citizens of the State of Tennessee, residing in the Western Division of the Western District thereof, in an action of trespass and ejectment.”</p> <p>The declaration alleged ownership in fee of the plaintiffs (defendants in error here) and their possession, and alleged the entry of the defendants as follows.:</p> <p>“And the plaintiffs being so entitled to the said property, and so in possession thereof, the said defendants, to wit, on the said October 1st, 1898, at the said county of Lauderdale, unlawfully and without right entered into and upon the said premises, and falsely and unjustly set up title thereto, as in them respectively, and cut timber therefrom and removed the same, and exercised acts of ownership thereof under-such false and unjust claim of title, and denied and refused to recognize the claim of these plaintiffs to the title, or their possession thereunder, and wholly refused to admit and repudiated the same, as they still do.”</p> <p>Judgment for the recovery of the land was prayed and $30Q0 damages.</p> <p>.Price pleaded not guilty. The plaintiff in elror also pleaded, not guilty, and “.that plaintiff’s action accrued more than seven years before suit brought.” Against the other defendants no judgment was sought.</p> <p>Upon the issues thus joined the jury found for the plaintiffs (defendants in error) as follows :</p> <p>“ That they find that the plaintiffs are the owners in fee and entitled to and in possession of the following lands, situated in Lauderdale County, Tennessee, to wit: . . .”</p> <p>They also further found—</p> <p>“ That the plaintiffs are the owners in fee, and entitled to. all the accretions and alluvion formed by the Mississippi Eiver in front of the said three (3) tracts of land above described, the same being and constituting all the land added by accretion and alluvion to the river front, as such front of the said three tracts of land existed on the Mississippi Eiver' when the said tracts of land respectively were granted, and extending from and including all the accretions and alluvion in front thereof, from the line on the river of the tract first mentioned above, furthest up stream.</p> <p>“ As to the other land herein sued for not embraced in the above descriptions, the jury finds the plaintiffs are not entitled to the same.”</p> <p>Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict. To this judgment plaintiff in error sued out a writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit, which was dismissed upon the motion of defendants in error, on the ground •that there had been no summons and severance of the defendant Thomas Price. 105 Fed. Rep. 787. A petition for rehearing was filed but denied. This writ of error was then sued out.</p> <p>The assignments of error are as follows:</p> <p>“ 1. The court erred in dismissing the writ of error of petitioner upon the ground that the judgment was against two jointly, and that they did not join in the appeal.</p> <p>“2. The court erred in dismissing the petition for rehearing made by this petitioner,</p> <p>“ In support of this assignment he submits herewith counsel’s brief Ho. 2.</p> <p>“ 3. The court erred in refusing to entertain jurisdiction of this cause and not reversing it. upon the merits. And in support of this he refers to the assignment of error Record pp. 266, 273 and submits herewith his counsel’s brief thereon Ho. 3. •</p> <p>“ The ground of this application is that the record in this cause shows that petitioner claimed under muniments of title from the State of Arkansas and Polsdorfer and wife and also Price claimed under muniments of title from the State of Tennessee. In other words, petitioner claims that he has a right to the writ of error under the Constitution of the United States, article 3, section 2.”</p>

The appellant is a resident of Philadelphia, Pa., and. has been a member of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange in good standing since the year 1880. On the 16th of November, 1899,-he was adjudged a voluntary bankrupt in the' District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the cause was referred to Alfred Driver, Esq., referee in bankruptcy.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>EEEOE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOE THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>APPEAL EEOM THE CIKCÜIT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES FOE. THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

At June term, 1900, of the Superior Court of Guilford' County, State of North Carolina, E. M. Caldwell was' tried before a court and jury for an alleged offence in having engaged in the business of delivering pictures without having first obtained a license so to do.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California:</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Yirginia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Colorado.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Hew Hampshire.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims. Motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska-</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. Motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of. the State of Washington.</p>