Iowa Life Insurance v. Lewis’s Empirical Analysis
187 U.S. 335 · 1902
Citation profile
73 federal appellate · 11 district · 100 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 209 later decisions (7 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 1992 · most notably Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. McGuire (1911), People of Sioux County v. National Surety Co. (1928)
73 federal appellate · 11 district · 100 state decisions — followed in 28 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Fidelity Mutual Life Ass'n v. Mettler · Insurance Company v. Norton · New York Life Insurance Company v. Statham et al. · Thompson v. Insurance Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 209 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““But whilst this is true, it must be conceded that promptness of payment is essential in the business of life insurance. All the calculations of the insurance company are based on the hypothesis of prompt payments. They not only calculate on the receipt of the premiums when due, but on compounding interest upon them. It is on this basis that they' are enabled to offer assurance at the favorable rates they do. Forfeiture for non-payment is a necessary means of protecting themselves from embarrassment. Unless it were enforceable, the business would be thrown into utter confusion, * * *' The case, therefore, is one in which time is material and of the essence of the contract. Non-payment at the day involves absolute forfeiture, if such be the terms of the contract, as is the ease here.””
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““The delivery of a policy of insurance and the payment of the premium are reciprocal or concurrent considerations. Necessarily, therefore, the payment of the premium can be exacted simultaneously with the delivery of the policy. Of course, such payment can be waived and a note — the credit of the assured — accepted, either absolutely or upon conditions. And we do not see. how it can make any difference where the conditions are expressed — whether in the policy, in the note or in the receipt given for the premium, or whether on the face of the latter or on its back. The agreements of parties may be expressed in many papers, and if the connection of the papers is not apparent it may be shown by parol. The present case does not e.ven need the aid of that rule. The receipt expressed the conditions upon which the note was received — unmistakably expressed them. The receipt of the premium was expressed to be ‘subject to the terms of the contract and the conditions on the back’ of the receipt. And the assured was directed to read the notice upon the back of th'e receipt. The notice was as follows: ‘If note be given for the payment of the premium hereon or any part thereof, and same is not paid at maturity, the said.policy shall cease and determine.’ “It is not contended that it was not competent for the company to make the condition. It is asserted that it did not become a part of the contract upon which the minds of the parties met — that the minds of the parties only met upon the ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“"But we think it matters not how vigorously the insurance company may have denied its liability or asserted its determination not to pay. This cannot be made to take the place of what this statute prescribes as essential to the accrual of those penalties. These acts do not constitute a failure to pay the loss after demand made therefor, when there has been no demand. If the legislature had intended that a suit on the policy was the demand provided for, and the defense of the suit constituted a failure to pay after demand, it was useless to provide for a demand and failure to pay in order to render the company liable for these items. It would have been sufficient to provide that defendant would be liable for them if payment was not made in a reasonable time after suit. We think it was the intention of the legislature to require a demand to be made after the policy became due, and before a suit, in order to satisfy the valid demand, without putting the policy holder to the necessity of suing therefor. The demand was the significant act, intended to put the company upon election whether it would pay the sum demanded, or require the policy holder to sue therefor, and subject itself to those penalties if the plaintiff recovered judgment for such sum. We do not mean to say that the demand could not be made after suit; on the contrary, we think that the demand might be made thereafter, and a cause of action for the penalties set up by an amended petition as an original suit; but, in”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.