¶1(dissenting). I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference, as stated in the opinion, “that both defendants had actual knowledge of the needle in the plaintiff’s body from the time of the May 18, 1967 operation and that they had fraudulently concealed this knowledge.” The only evidence relied upon for this proposition is the participation of the defendant Henry and of nurses employed by the defendant hospital in the operation which left the plaintiff with a needle in her abdomen. The scenario of both the doctor and the nurses realizing at the time of the operation that a needle was in the plaintiff’s body and choosing to leave it there and conceal its presence is not wholly impossible. The medical profession, like any other, has its share of villains. Common experience, however, tells us that inadvertence, which might well constitute negligence, is a far more likely explanation for this unfortunate occurrence.
¶2“Connecticut ease law firmly establishes that fraud must be proved by a standard more exacting than ‘a fair preponderance of the evidence.’ ” Alaimo v. Royer, 188 Conn. 36, 448 A.2d 207 (1982). It is incongruous that so soon after approving such formulations as “clear and satisfactory” *314or “clear, precise and unequivocal” as tests of the evidence for claims of fraud; Alaimo v. Royer, supra; we pay them merely lip service. Where there is nothing in the evidence which clearly makes actual knowledge of the wrong on the part of the tortfeasor a more reasonable inference to be drawn than any other, this standard would preclude a finding of fraudulent concealment. I do not see how the evidence in this case can be said to meet this test when it leaves simple negligence standing as a perfectly reasonable and far more probable explanation of the misconduct relied upon.
¶3I am concerned not only about this case, which I concede is a “hard” one, but also about the ramifications of the majority opinion in rendering the protection afforded by the statute of limitations largely illusory in malpractice actions and perhaps in others. In virtually every such case the wrongful conduct is susceptible of two possible explanations: (1) that it was inadvertent and (2) that it was intentional at least in the sense that the defendant was aware of his error and failed to reveal it. The majority would give the jury complete freedom to choose the second alternative without any indication from the evidence that the case presented a rare occasion of villainy rather than a common instance of negligence. This deference to the trier leaves virtually any professional exposed permanently to a claim that he had actual knowledge of his misconduct when it occurred and that, by failing to disclose it, he is guilty of fraudulent concealment which removes the statutory bar.
¶4As for the additional evidence pertaining wholly to the liability of the defendant Henry, only by sheer speculation can it be said to indicate that he had actual knowledge of the presence of the needle *315in the plaintiff prior to its discovery in 1972 as a result of the x-ray requested by Harvey. The majority opinion necessarily implies that the jury could reasonably infer that Pantaleo, the president of the Radiology Group which took both the 1969 and 1972 x-rays, conspired with Henry to conceal the plaintiff’s condition by falsifying the 1969 x-ray report which disclosed merely the presence of “radiopaque sutures.” There is no evidence that this report, given the use of wire sutures during the 1967 operation, indicated any abnormality which would lead a reasonably prudent physician to investigate further. Any knowledge of the results of the x-ray beyond what the report revealed which can be attributed to the defendant Henry must have been acquired from Pantaleo, his “long time friend.” Pantaleo testified that he never informed Henry of the presence of a needle in the plaintiff and there was no contrary testimony. The refusal to believe Pantaleo, which is the trier’s prerogative, would not justify an affirmative finding opposite to his testimony. State v. Mayell, 163 Conn. 419, 427, 311 A.2d 60 (1972); Marquis v. Drost, 155 Conn. 327, 332, 231 A.2d 527 (1967); Panicali v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 147 Conn. 344, 348, 160 A.2d 903 (1960). That friendship alone is a sufficient basis upon which to hang a reasonable inference of conspiracy is a novel proposition indeed. This fantasy envisions the willingness of Pantaleo, who was never even named as a defendant, to involve himself in grossly unethical conduct in 1969 which his own x-ray report in 1972 brought to light. Such a contrivance should be confined to the realm of fiction and not given judicial sanction as a basis for finding fraud under the established standard.
¶5Accordingly, I dissent.