Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Soderberg’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

70 federal appellate · 28 district · 73 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 237 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he word 'mineral' is used in so many senses, dependent upon the context, that the ordinary definitions of the dictionary throw but little light upon its signification in a given case.”

   12 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co. · Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.

2. ““In the case of Rosse vs. Wainman, 14 M. & W., 859, (same case, 2 Exch., 200, :and 15 L.J., 67), it was held (quoting syllabus): “ ‘The term “mineral” is more fre-quently applied to substances containing metals, but in its proper sense includes •all fossil bodies or matters dug out of mines; in this sense beds of stone may be 'included in the word minerals.’ “So in the case of Micklethwait vs. Winter, 6 Exch., 644 (same case, 5 Eng. L. & E., 526); and Midland R. Co. vs. Checkley, Law R., 4 Eq., 24, it was held that stone taken from quarries is a mineral. “The above has been the construction •given the mining laws of the United States by the Interior Department since the act of 1872 was passed, until a very recent date, and even now all kinds of •stone are held to be subject to mineral entry except building stone, the test applied being uniform with regard to all mineral substances, viz., whether or not the land containing such substance is more valuable •.therefor than for agricultural purposes. In the case of Conlin vs. Kelly, decided in the Department January 2, 1891, and reported in 12 Land Decisions, 1, however, it was held that lands which contain deposits of building stone only are not subject to entry under the mining laws. This decision has brought dismay and threatened ruin and disaster to many citizens who in good faith, relying on the settled and long-continued procedure of’ the General Land Office, had invested large sums of money in the development of stone quarr”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Coleman v. United States

3. ““But, to impress the attribute of finality upon a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, it must appear that the original jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was dependent ‘entirely’ upon diverse citizenship. That is not the case here. Plaintiff’s bill does indeed set up a diversity of citizenship as one ground of jursdietion, but, as it appears that its title rests upon a proper interpretation of the land grant act of 1864 [Act July 2, 1864, c. 217, 13 Stat. 365 ] as to the exception of nonmineral lands, there is another ground wholly independent of citizenship under that clause of section 1 of the act of August 13, 1888 (chapter 866, 25 Stat. 433 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508]), clothing the Circuit Court with jurisdiction of all civil suits involving over $2,000, ‘and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.’ If the case made by the plaintiff be one which depends upon the proper construction of an act of Congress, with the contingency of being sustained by one construction and defeated by another, it is one arising under the laws of the United States. Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618 [ 8 Sup. Ct. 1228 , 31 L. Ed. 844 ; Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375 [ 13 Sup. Ct. 340 , 37 L. Ed. 209 ]. Under the allegations of the bill, the fact that the Land Department had not determined whether the land in question was mineral or nonmineral does not involve a question of fact, as the facts are admitted, but solely a question of law whether land valuable for its granite i”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Taylor v. Anderson