189 Ill. 2d 1 - People v. Wright’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate · 81 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 106 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Here, although the facts support the conclusion that defendant did not file his petition within the time limits found in section 122-1, that section allows a defendant to file a petition outside the limitations period if the late filing is not due to the defendant's culpable negligence. [Citation.] By not raising this issue until the cause was on appeal, the State has effectively precluded defendant from seeking to amend his petition to allege facts demonstrating that the late filing was not caused by his culpable negligence. While we recognize that section 122-1 requires the defendant to allege the facts demonstrating a lack of culpable negligence, we do not believe that this requirement allows the State to wait until an appeal to raise an affirmative defense that the defendant may be able to avoid by amending his petition. By failing to raise this issue below, the State has waived its right to argue that the defendant's petition is untimely." Wright, 189 Ill.2d at 11 , 243 Ill.Dec. 198 , 723 N.E.2d 230 .”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 325 Ill. App. 3d 876 - People v. Scullark · 328 Ill. App. 3d 888 - People v. Sawczenko

2. “"A review of the time limitation found in section 122-1 reveals that it has more in common with statutes of limitations than it does with statutes conferring jurisdiction. The plain language of section 122-1 demonstrates that time is not an integral part of the remedy. In fact, if a petitioner can demonstrate that the late filing was not due to his culpable negligence, there is no time limit within which a petitioner must file his post conviction petition. [Citation.] A safety valve that allows an unlimited time in which to file a post conviction petition cannot be reconciled with a concept that makes time a condition of the liability or with a position that time is an inherent element of the right created. As a lack of culpable negligence permits the filing of a post-conviction petition regardless of the length of time that has passed, a lack of culpable negligence—not time— is the inherent element." Wright, 189 Ill.2d at 8 , 243 Ill.Dec. 198 , 723 N.E.2d 230 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 202 Ill. 2d 89 - People v. Boclair · 317 Ill. App. 3d 1047 - People v. Lopez

3. “There is * * * an important distinction between the limitation provision at issue here and [other statutes of limitation] * * * The limitation provision in the Post Conviction Hearing Act provides that no action may be brought more than 10 years after rendition of final judgment, `unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence.' [Citation.] The limitations statutes involved in the other cases discussed do not contain such qualification. In our judgment, this language creates a special `safety valve,' unique to the Post Conviction Hearing Act * * *.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 317 Ill. App. 3d 1047 - People v. Lopez · Brooks v. Walls