concurrence">Wahls, P.J.

(concurring). I concur in the majority opinion. However, I find it necessary to address certain errors which occurred at trial that were attributable to the prosecuting attorney. In my opinion, the prosecutor’s repeated display of personal animosity towards defendant resulted in severe and reprehensible prosecutorial misconduct and denied defendant a fair trial.

During closing arguments the prosecutor mischaracterized and disparaged defendant’s presumption of innocence by stating that defendant was "clothed in a shroud of—of innocence, throughout the course of this trial” and insinuated that defendant was hiding from the jury because defendant *322was not seated at the defense table. Defense counsel’s objection on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct was sustained, and the trial court instructed the prosecutor to refrain from making such remarks.

During opening, closing, and rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor denigrated defense counsel by attempting to portray defense counsel as a sharp conniving attorney who was intentionally trying to mislead the jury. It is improper for the prosecutor to engage in arguments which attack defense counsel. Such arguments undermine the defendant’s presumption of innocence and impermissibly shift the jury’s focus from the evidence itself to defense counsel’s personality. People v Dalessandro, 165 Mich App 569, 580; 419 NW2d 609 (1988); People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 101-102; 351 NW2d 255 (1984).

A review of the prosecutor’s entire closing argument leaves one with the impression that the prosecutor was attempting to shift the burden of proof. The prosecutor suggested that defendant had to prove his contentions or come up with a reasonable explanation for the evidence against him. Such argument is wholly improper.

In sum, the prosecutor’s demeanor at trial "blatantly transgressed the rules of conduct imposed on him as a public officer.” People v Bracato, 17 Mich App 277, 304; 169 NW2d 483 (1969). The statement that defendant was hiding from the jury was, in and of itself, gross error, went beyond the bounds of propriety, and constituted a level of prejudicial impact which could not have been overcome by the sustained objection.

A careful review of the entire record, including a separate record made outside the presence of the jury, offers an explanation for the prosecutor’s misconduct throughout the course of defendant’s *323trial. Apparently, the seeds of the prosecutor’s enmity toward defendant were sown when the prosecutor and defendant knew each other as children. The prosecutor’s rancor toward defendant further increased when defendant dated and later married the prosecutor’s former girl friend, a prominent Gaylord attorney. It is very clear from the record that the prosecutor’s deportment in this case was not the result of overzealous advocacy, but rather fervent vindictiveness.

"[P]rosecutors are sworn ministers of justice, and not advocates employed to procure convictions without regard to legal guilt or innocence.” People v Carr, 64 Mich 702, 708; 31 NW 590 (1887). In the instant case, the calculated manner in which the prosecutor introduced error in the presence of the jury was a violation of his public trust. Our Supreme Court and this Court have on many occasions been called upon to express an opinion concerning the duty of the prosecutor to ensure that the accused has a fair and impartial trial. See People v Evans, 72 Mich 367, 383; 40 NW 473 (1888); People v Erb, 48 Mich App 622, 631-632; 211 NW2d 51 (1973); People v Farrar, 36 Mich App 294, 299-300; 193 NW2d 363 (1971). One would think that, at this point in time, it would be unnecessary for this Court to further reiterate the prosecutor’s role as a public official. However, in light of the prosecutor’s conduct in the instant case, I find occasion to cite Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88-89; 55 S Ct 629; 79 L Ed 1314 (1935), regarding the duty of a prosecuting attorney:

He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor— indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful convic*324tion as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree, has confidence that these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none. . . .

In these circumstances prejudice to the cause of the accused is so highly probable that we are not justified in assuming its non-existence.

See also People v Kirby, 4 Mich App 201, 204; 144 NW2d 651 (1966); Bracato, supra, p 304.

A prosecutor may not disregard with impunity his duty as an administrator of justice. Vindictive conduct by persons vested with the awesome power of prosecuting attorneys is unacceptable and cannot be tolerated. Here, defendant was entitled to that which he did not have, a fair trial.

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