189 N.J. Super. 67 - State v. Ross’s Empirical Analysis
1983
Citation profile
2 district · 36 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 38 later decisions — most recently March 2017 · most notably 381 N.J. Super. 326 - State v. Godshalk (2005), 281 N.J. Super. 327 - State v. Avena (1995)
2 district · 36 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Wong Sun v. United States · State v. Johnson · State v. Barnes · State v. States · 100 N.J. Super. 71 - State v. Gillespie
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“... function is to determine the case completely anew on the record made in the Municipal Court giving due, though not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of the magistrate to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“... While it is evidently the lesser consequential significance of a summons and the lesser consequence of matters within municipal court dispositional jurisdiction which justify the law enforcement officer exception of R. 7:3-1(b), it is the nevertheless grave import of the summons, in the structure of the criminal justice process, which requires that a probable cause determination be made as the prerequisite for its issuance as well and which also requires a strict construction of R. 7:3-1(b) to the end that an appropriate neutral official make that determination. For the determination to be made by the complaining witness and for the summons to be issued over his signature is fundamentally offensive to the most elementary notions of due process, violates the spirit if not the letter of the Fourth Amendment, and is a blatant and intolerable violation of our rules of practice. The criminal and quasi-criminal system is neither designed nor intended to provide a vehicle for the raising and settlement of purely private disputes. The process here, therefore, constituted a subversion of the basic distinction between criminal and civil justice. [ 189 N.J. Super. at 74 , 458 A. 2d 1299 ]”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Because of the nature of the proceedings here, process was required generally to conform to the requirements applicable to indictable offenses. See R. 7:3-1. Among those requirements is the mandate that process issue only by a judge or clerk or deputy clerk of his court and only if the official issuing process is satisfied from the complaint that there is probable cause to believe that defendant has committed an offense. R. 3:3-1(a), 3:3-2. In lieu of the primary process of a warrant, a summons may issue if the official is satisfied that the accused will appear in response thereto and none of the other warrant-mandating criteria of R. 3:3-1(b) is present. The only modification in this procedure in respect of nonindictable criminal offenses within the municipal court jurisdiction is the authorization of R. 7:3-1(b), permitting a summons to be issued by a law enforcement officer where the Administrative Director of the Courts has prescribed the form of summons and complaint.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.