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19 Ga. 586

Printup v. Mitchell

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided February 15, 1856

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1856-02-15

Motion, in Floyd Superior Court. Decided by Judge 'Trippe, December Term, 1855. In this case, on the same being called in its order, plaintiff moved to charge against the defendant on the docket, a continuance which had been granted at the preceding term, and which the plaintiff had then insisted should be charged to him, but rvhich was not charged to him on the docket. The Court ■■refused the motion.

Cited in Bouvier (1914)’s definition of “Continuance”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1856-02-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently February 2020

5 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1By the Court.

Benning, J.

¶2delivering the opinion.

¶3In respect to the continuance first granted, it seems that the plaintiff, at the time when it was granted, insisted that it should be charged against the defendant, but that the i-Oourt charged it against neither party. This was a decision. *588And if it was an erroneous one, and the plaintiff wished it corrected, he should have excepted to it and brought it before this Court, within the regular time allowed by law. No excuse is offered for' the failure to bring the case, thus, before this Court.

¶4The motion made at the next term, to have the continuance charged nunc pro tunc against the defendant, and the exception to the refusal of the Court to grant that motion, were but an attempt to bring the decision of the preceding term in review before this Court. That is what they amount to.

¶5[1.] Such a motion the Court was, of course, right in refusing.

¶6Ought the second continuance to have been charged to the defendant ?

¶7[2.] We think not. The ground of that continuance, was the absence of Mr. Akin, one of the Counsel for the defendant, and Mr. Akin’s absence was occasioned by illness; that is, the ground was “ Providential.” And the Act of 1854 declares, that continuances for Providential cause, shall not be charged against either party. (Acts of 1854-’52.)

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