PEREIRA

                                                           Interim Decision #2978




                             MATTER OF PEREIRA

                           In Section 246 Proceedings

                                     A-19331764

                      Decided by Board August 10, .1984

(1) Under current rescission regulations, the statute of limitations prescribed in section 246(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(a) (1982), is
  tolled by the issuance of a Notice of Intent to Rescind within 5 years of the respondent's adjustment of status. Quintana v. Holland, 

 (3d Cit. 1358),
  distinguished.
(2) Section 241(f) of the Act, 

(f) (1982), by its very terms, refers only to
  a deportation proceeding and is not applicable to rescission proceedings instituted
  to determine an alien's eligibility for a previous grant of adjustment of status.
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:                              ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
 Milton Kramer, Esquire                                Fatal Bond
 11 Commerce Street                                    General Attorney
 Newark, New Jersey 07102

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members



  This is an appeal from the decision of an immigration judge,
dated April 12, 1983, rescinding the respondent's prior grant of adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident. The
appeal will be dismissed.
  The respondent is a 48-year-old native and citizen of Portugal.
He last entered the United States on August 29, 1970, as a nonimmigrant visitor. On May 5, 1971, he filed an application for adjust..
ment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

 (1970), seeking immediate relative status,
based on his marriage to Barbara Moore, a citizen of the United
States. The adjustment application was granted on January 18,
1972. On January 11, 1977, the district director notified the respondent of his intent to rescind his adjustment of status, based on
his finding that the respondent's marriage to Barbara Moore was
contracted fraudulently, for the sole purpose of adjusting his status
to that of a permanent resident. The respondent requested a rescist'S
Interim Decision #2978

 sion hearing, which was commenced on May 11, 1977, and completed on July 8, 1981. At the conclusion of the hearing, the immigration judge entered his decision rescinding the respondent's adjustment of status.
   The basis for the rescission was the immigration judge's finding
that the respondent's marriage was entered into solely fcor immigration purposes. In reaching this conclusion, the immigration
judge noted the testimony of Barbara Moore that she met the respondent through a friend of hers who had asked her if she was
willing to enter into an illegal marriage with the respondent to
enable him to "get into" this country. Ms. Moore indicated that she
was promised a sum of money for entering into the marriage, with
an additional sum to be paid for signing divorce papers 6 months
after the marriage ceremony. She stated that she met the respondent 3 to 4 weeks prior to the ceremony and that she met him one
other time prior to the ceremony when they had blood tests taken.
Ms. Moore further testified that she was told beforehand that she
would not have to live with the respondent_ She stated that the
marriage was never consummated, that she returned to her own
home after the marriage ceremony, and that she had no knowledge
of where the respondent lived. She noted that she never saw the
respondent after the ceremony until the day she was to testify at
the rescission hearing.
   The immigration judge found the testimony of Ms. Moore, =refuted by the respondent, to be credible. Based on her statements
and the record before him, he concluded that neither of the parties
intended to "engage in the normal activities of a married couple."
The respondent's status as a lawful permanent resident was accordingly rescinded. The immigration judge further denied the respondent's request for relief under section 241(f) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
  1251(f) (1982), based on his finding that the respondent was statutorily ineligible for such relief.
   On appeal, counsel for the respondent reiterates his claim, made
throughout his rescission hearing, that this case is barred by the 5-
year statute of limitations set forth in section 240(a) of the Act, 

(a) (1982), because the matter was not adjudicated
within 5 years of the respondent's adjustment. It is argued that
under the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, where this case arises, rescission proceedings must not only
be instituted, but the matter must also be adjudicated within the 5
years prescribed in section 246(a) of the Act. See Quintarza v. Hollan.c4 

 (3d Cir. 1958). Since the immigration judge's
order was entered over 5 years after the present respondent was
granted adjustment of status, it is contended, rescission of that ad-
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                                              Interim Decision #2978

justment is inappropriate and the instant proceedings should be
terminated.
   We reject the respondent's argument that this case is barred by
the lapse of over 5 years between the date of the respondent's adjustment and the immigration judge's adjudication of the matter.
The case relied upon by counsel for this contention, Quintana v.

 was decided when the regulations governing rescission differed significantly from the regulations now in effect. The
differences in regulations have been discussed at some length in
two decisions from two courts of appeals, Zaoutis v. Kiley, 

 (2d Cir. 1977), and Singh v. INS, 

 (9th Cir.), cert.
deniec4 

 (1972). In both those cases the courts specifically distinguished Quintana v. 

 They found that the
decision in Quintana (holding that rescission proceedings must
have been completed within 5 years) was undermined by the
change in regulations and held that under the new regulations, the
5-year time limit prescribed in section 246(a) was tolled merely by
the issuance of the Notice of Intent to Rescind. See also Wan Shih
Hsieh v. Kiley, 

 (2d Cir. 1978).
  In our view, the Second and Ninth Circuits correctly analyzed
both the previons and the current rescission regulations and correctly distinguished Quintana v. 

 Given the significant changes in the procedures for handling rescission cases since
the decision in Quintana, we conclude that we are not bound by
that case. We find that these rescission proceedings are proper in
that the Notice of Intent to Rescind was issued within 5 years of
the respondent's adjustment. See Matter of OnaL 

(BIA 1981, 1983).
  We turn next to the merits of this case. Upon a review of the
record before us, particularly the statements of the respondent's
ex-wife, Barbara Moore, we conclude, as did the immigration judge,
that the Service has established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the respondent's marriage was entered into solely
for immigration. purposes. We have held in the past that an immigration judge's fmdings regarding the believability of witnesses appearing before him are entitled to considerable weight. See Matter
of Teng, 

 (BIA 1975); Matter of S-, 

(BIA 1960); Matter of T-, 

 (BIA 1957). We note that
the immigration judge, upon observing the demeanor of Barbara
Moore, found her statements regarding the fraudulent nature of
her marriage to be truthful. The respondent did not attempt to
deny that his marriage was arranged for immigration purposes.
Such a marriage is insufficient to confer immigration benefits. See
Matter of M , 

 (BIA 1958). We conclude that the re-
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Interim Decision # 2978

spondent was not eligible for immediate relative status and that
his adjustment to that status was thus properly rescinded.
   We further reject the respondent's claim, made during his rescission hearing, of his eligibility for relief under section 241(f) of the
Act. Without reaching the question of the respondent's statutory
qualification for such relief, we conclude that section 241(f) of the
Act relates solely to the question of deportability and is not applicable in the present rescission proceeding instituted pursuant to
section 246(a) of the Act. See Matter of Athanasopoulos, 

 BIA 1971); Matter of Vilanova-Gonzalez, 

(13IA 1969); Matter of Alemis, 

 (BIA 1967); see also
Matter of Quan, 

 (D ep . Assoc. Comm. 1967). Section
241(f), by its very terms, has reference only to a deportation proceeding and has no application in a rescission proceeding instituted
to determine whether a particular respondent was eligible for an
adjustment of status previously received.
   As the present respondent was not eligible for adjustment of
status, his adjustment was properly rescinded. The appeal, accordingly, will be dismissed.
   ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.




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