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19 I. & N. Dec. 208

RODRIGUEZ-COTO

Board of Immigration Appeals

Decided July 1, 1985

Board of Immigration Appeals · decided 1985-07-01

RODRIGUEZ-COTO, 19 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 1985) ID 2985 (PDF) (1) The phrases "particularly serious crime" and "serious non-political crime" in sections 243(h)(2)(B) and (C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1253(h)(2)(B) and (C) (1982), respectively, cannot be interpreted in a manner that would vary dependent on the nature of the evidence of persecution an alien introduces. (2) The modifiers "particularly serious" and "serious" in sections 243(h)(2)(B) and (C) of the Act relate only to the nature of the crime itself.

Cited by 2 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2006

1 federal appellate ·

Applies 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (§ 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (§ 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (§ 243 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-07-01

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Interim Decision #2985




                     MATTER OF RODRIGUEZ-COTO

                           In Exclusion Proceedings

                                   A-23221132

                    Decided by Board February 21, 1985

(1) The phrases "particularly serious crime" and "serious non-political crime" in sections 243(hX2)(B) and (C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
8 U.S.C. §§1253
(hX2)(13) and (C) (1982), respectively, cannot be interpreted in a manner
  that would vary dependent on the nature of the evidence of persecution an alien
  introduces.
(2) The modifiers "particularly serious" and "serious" in sections 248(hX2XB) and (C)
  of the Act relate only to the nature of the crime itself.
EXCLUDABLE: Act of 1952—Sec. 212(aX9) [
8 U.S.C. § 1182
(aX9)]—Crime involving
                                moral turpitude

                              Sec. 212(aX20) [
8 U.S.C. § 1182
(aX20)]—No valid immigrant visa
ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:                            ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
 Pro se                                             David M. Dixon
                                                    Appellate Counsel

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Dunne, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members



  In a decision dated May 7, 1984, we dismissed the applicant's
appeal from a decision of an immigration judge, which found him
excludable from the United States and denied his applications for
asylum and withholding of deportation under sections 208(a) and
243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158
(a)
and 1253(h) (1982). In that decision, we found that the applicant
had been convicted of a "particularly serious crime" representing
criminal behavior that "constituted a danger to the community of
the United States." See section 243(hX2)(B) of the Act.' By form
motion, the applicant now moves this Board to reopen exclusion
proceedings to consider additional evidence regarding his applica-

  I The applicant was convicted of armed robbery in the State of California.

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                                                       Interim Decision #2985

dons for asylum and withholding of deportation. The motion will
be denied.
   The basis of the applicant's present motion is that new and material evidence is available to support his claim for asylum and withholding of deportation based on his claimed fear of persecution
arising from his membership in the "Freedom Flotilla as a particular social group." It is submitted that he is not barred from eligibility for the relief sought under the provisions of section 242(h)(2) of
the Act and 
8 C.F.R. § 208.8
(f) (1985) under the rationale set forth
in Matter of Rodriguez Palma, 
17 I&N Dec. 465
 (BIA 1980), and
Matter of Ballester - Garcia, 
17 I&N Dec. 592
 (BIA 1980). It is stated
that "[w]hen any crime I have committed in either Cuba or the
United States is balanced against the degree of persecution I fear,
it is clear that I am not ineligible for the relief requested."
  The motion will be denied_ First, in Matter of Leon-Orosco and
Rodriguez-Colas, 
19 I&N Dec. 136
 (BIA 1983; A.G. 1984), we concluded that the evidence of persecution on which this applicant
principally relies does not support reopening of these proceedings.
Moreover, the intervening event of the December 14, 1984, agreement with Cuba regarding the return of 2,746 Cubans significantly
detracts from the evidence offered by the applicants therein and
previously considered by this Board. We do not find the December
14, 1984, speech by Fidel Castro referenced in the motion papers to
warrant a contrary conclusion.
  Secondly, even were we to balance this applicant's crime against
the nature of the persecution that he claims he would face, we
would find his crime to render him statutorily ineligible for withholding of deportation under the provisions of section 243(h)(2)(B) of
the Act and to be one which supports the denial of asylum in the
United States.
  Finally, however, we reject any interpretation of the phrases
"particularly serious crime" and "serious nonpolitical crime" in
sections 243(h)(2)(B) and (C), respectively, which would vary with
the nature of evidence of persecution. 2 We cannot find that the
language and framework of section 243(h) supports such an approach, which would in effect transform a statutory exclusionary
clause into a discretionary consideration. Moreover, it is presupposed that all persons barred from relief by the provisions of section 243(11)(2) can demonstrate a clear probability that their life or
freedom would be threatened. on account of their race, religion, na-

  2 We did not find it necessary to resolve this issue in Matter of Rodriguez Palma,
supra, and Matter of Ballester-Garcia, supra, but do so here in view of the manner
in which these motions are framed.

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Interim Decision #2985

tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion- We find that the modifiers "particularly serious" and "serious"
in sections 243(h)(2)(3) and (C) relate only to the nature of the
crime itself.
  In this case, we have previously found that the applicant has
been convicted of a "particularly serious crime" and "constitutes a
danger to the United States." No new evidence relevant to this
finding has been offered. This finding renders the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief under section 243(h) and supports the previous denial of asylum.
  Accordingly, the motion will be denied_
  ORDER: The motion to reopen is denied.




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