NAULU

                                                       Interim Decision #3005




                            MATTER OF NAULU

                         In Deportation Proceedings

                                    A-23122658

                    Decided by Board January 30, 1986

  A derivative beneficiary "accompanying or following to join" a principal alien
under section 203(aX8) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(aX8)
(1982), cannot precede the principal alien to the United States as an immigrant;
however, once the principal alien acquires permanent resident status, his spouse or
child is not barred as a matter of Inv" from adjustment of status under section 245 of
the Act, 8 § 1255 (1982), by reason of having preceded the principal alien to
this country as a nonimmigrant. Matter of Khan, 

 (BIA 1972), aff'd
sub non:. Santiago v. INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 

(1976), distinguished.
CHARGE
 Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(a)(2) [

(aX2))—Nonimmigrant--remained longer than permitted
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:                           ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
  Bienvenido D. Junasa                               Joanna London
  Accredited Representative                          General Attorney
  State Immigrant Services Center
  2158 N. King Street, Suite 304
  Honolulu, Hawaii 96819

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Dunne, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members



   On September 28, 1983, an immigration judge found the respondent deportable as charged under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(a)(2) (1982), as a nonimmigrant who remained in this country longer than permitted, but
granted her the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. No appeal was taken from that decision. On March 12, 1984,
the respondent filed a motion to reopen the proceedings for consideration of her application for adjustment of status under section
245 of the Act, 

 255 (1982). An immigration judge denied
the motion on July 19, 1984. The respondent has appealed from the
denial of her motion to reopen.

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Interim Decision #3005

   The respondent, a 39-year-old married woman, a native and citizen of Tonga, was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant -visitor on July 15, 1975, and was authorized to remain in this
country until January 15, 1976. She has not departed.
   The respondent claims eligibility for adjustment of status as a derivative beneficiary through her husband as provided by section
203(a)(8) of the Act, 

(a)(8) (1982). Under section
203(a)(8) of the Act, a spouse or child who is not otherwise entitled
to an immigrant status or the immediate issuance of an immigrant
visa is entitled to the same preference and the same priority date
or order of consideration as the principal alien, without the approval of a separate visa petition, if "accompanying or following to
join" Lis spouse or parent. I See 

(a)(4) (1985). The respondent's husband, whom she married in February 1973, was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence on
February 9, 1984.
  In a brief in opposition to the motion to reopen, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service contended that the respondent is not eligible to adjust her status as a derivative beneficiary since she neither accompanied her husband when he was admitted to the
United States as an immigrant, nor followed to join him, but she
instead preceded him to this country. An alien who precedes the
principal alien to the United States, the Service argued, cannot
obtain derivative preference status through that principal alien. In
support of that proposition, the Service cited State Department regulation 

 (1985) and our decision in Matter of Khan,

 (BIA 1972), aff'd sub nom. Santiago v. INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 

 (1976). Defining
the term "accompanying" and "accompanied by," the foregoing
regulation, to which the Board referred in Matter of Khan, supra,
concludes with the statement, "An `accompanying' relative may
not precede the principal alien to the United States!' 

 (1985). The immigration judge denied the motion to reopen
for the reasons set forth in the Service's brief.
  On November 4, 1985, the Board asked the Service to review its
position in the respondent's case in light of a policy memorandum,
which the Acting Associate Commissioner for Examinations addressed to all Regional Commissioners on July 25, 1985, regarding

   The relationship between the principal alien and the derivative beneficiary must
exist before the principal alien gains permanent resident status as well as at the
time the derivative beneficiary seeks entry as an immigrant or adjustment of status.
Vol. 9, Foreign Affairs Manual, Part III, 

, note 5. A child or spouse of
an alien who is classified as an immediate relative is not eligible for benefits under
section 203(aX8) and must file a separate visa petition. 

(aX4) (1985).

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the eligibility of derivative beneficiaries to apply for adjustment of
status when the principal alien has already gained permanent resident status. That memorandum states, inter alia, that an accompanying alien cannot precede the principal alien to the United States
"as an immigrant." (Emphasis added.) The memorandum specifies
that there is no bar tb adjustment where, as here, a derivative beneficiary enters the United States as a nonimmigrant before the
principal alien acquires permanent resident status.
  The memorandum thus makes clear that the right of a derivative
beneficiary to permanent resident status is wholly dependent upon
that of the principal alien and may not be exercised unless and
until the principal alien becomes a permanent resident. However,
once the principal alien gains permanent residence, his spouse or
child is not precluded as a matter of law from adjusting status as a
person "accompanying or following to join" by reason of having
physically preceded the principal alien to this country as a nonimmigrant.
  We note that the current Service position is not inconsistent
with our holding in Matter of Khan, supra. In that case and in the
other cases considered by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Santiago v. INS, supra, an alien who had been
issued an immigrant visa as one 'accompanying or following to
join" his spouse or parent was erroneously admitted to the United
States for permanent residence in advance of the principal alien.
In each case, death or the expiration of her visa prevented the
principal alien from joining the derivative beneficiary. It was consequently found that the derivative beneficiary was not in possession of a valid immigrant visa at the time of his entry.
  Following the Associate Commissioner's policy memorandum, the
Service has advised the Board upon reconsideration that the respondent qualifies as a person "accompanying or following to join"
for purposes of adjustment of status. As the respondent has made a
prima facie showing of eligibility for the relief sought under section
245 of the Act, we shall sustain the appeal, grant the motion to
reopen, and remand the record to the immigration judge for consideration of the respondent's application for adjustment of status.
   ORDER: The appeal is sustained The proceedings are reopened and the record is remanded to the immigration judge for
consideration of the respondent's application for adjustment of
status pursuant to section 245 of the Act.




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Interim Decision #3006




                          MATTER OF VALENCIA

                         In Deportation Proceedings

                                    A-24305559

                    Decided by Board February 14, 1986

   Where the respondent presented a generalized statement on the Notice of Appeal
(Form I-290A), failed to express the specific rationale for his conclusory assertions,
filed no separate written brief, and did not seek oral argument to further explain
the alleged error, his appeal is summarily dismissed pursuant to 

(dX1-
aXi) (1985) for failure to adequately specify the reasons for the appeal_
CHARGE.
  Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(aX2) [

(aX2)]—Nonimmigrant—remauled longer than permitted
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:                           ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
 Louis Serterides, Esquire                           Teresita A. Guerrero
 152 Central Avenue                                  General Attorney
 Jersey City, New Jersey 07306

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Dunne, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members



   In a decision dated September 25, 1985, the immigration judge
found the respondent deportable on his own admissions under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(a)(2) (1982), as a nonimmigrant crewman who remained
longer than permitted, and granted him voluntary departure in
lieu of deportation. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be summarily dismissed pursuant to 

(d)(1 - a)(i) (1986).
   On his Notice of Appeal (Form I-290A), the respondent, through
counsel, states the following as his reason for this appeal: "I respectfully submit that the hearing officer erred in that of the appellant [sic] burden of proving a well-founded fear of persecution in
his native Nicaragua." The respondent also specified on the Notice
of Appeal that he does not desire oral argument and that he is not
filing a separate written brief in support of his appeal.
   We are unable to determine from the respondent's stated reason
for his appeal whether the error he alleges relates to the particular

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                                             Interim Decision #8006

facts of his case, the law applied to them by the immigration judge,
 or both. By presenting only a generalized statement without filing
a supporting brief to explain the specific aspects of the immigration judge's order that the respondent considers to be incorrect, he
has failed to meaningfully identify the reasons for taking an
appeal. In order to review the appeal, it would therefore be necessary for the Board to search through the record and speculate on
what possible errors the respondent claims.
   The regulations provide for summary dismissal of an appeal
where the party concerned fails to specify the reasons for the
appeal. 

(d)(1-00 (1985). In Matter of Holguin, 

 (BlA 1969), we noted that this regulation was designed to
permit us to deal promptly with appeals where the reasons given
for the appeal are inadequate to apprise the Board of the particular basis for the alien's claim that the immigration judge's decision
is wrong. We find that the respondent's appeal is one which warrants summary dismissal for failure to state with specificity the
grounds for taking the appeal. See Reyes-Mendoza v. INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1985).
   It is essential to the Board's adjudication of an appeal that the
reasons given on the Notice of Appeal be as detailed as possible so
that the alleged error can be identified and addressed. Without a
specific statement, the Board can only guess at how the alien disagrees with the immigration judge's decision. It is therefore insufficient to merely assert that the immigration judge improperly found
that deportability had been established or denied an application for
relief from deportation. See Reyes Mendoza v. INS, supra. Where
eligibility for discretionary relief is at issue, it should be stated
whether the error relates to grounds of statutory eligibility or to
the exercise of discretion. Furthermore, it should be clear whether
the alleged impropriety in the decision lies with the immigration
judge's interpretation of the facts or his application of legal standards. Where a question of law is presented, supporting authority
should be included, and where the dispute is on the facts, there
should be a discussion of the particular details contested.
  Although the regulations only refer to the reasons that must be
stated on the Notice of Appeal, the contentions made by an alien
on appeal are of course best presented in a brief setting forth his
arguments. Depending on the complexity of the issues raised, a
brief may be essential to an adequate presentation of the appeal. In
all cases, however, the reasons for an appeal must be meaningfully
identified on the Notice of Appeal.
  The respondent has stated only that the immigration judge erred
in finding no well-founded fear of persecution. He has chosen not to
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Interim Decision #3006

submit a brief to enlighten us as to the specific rationale for his
conclusory assertions and did not request an opportunity for oral
argument. Under these circumstances, we find that summary dismissal of the appeal is appropriate. Accordingly, the appeal will be
dismissed.
   ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
  FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the immigration judge's
order and in accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris,

 (BIA 1977), the respondent is permitted to depart
from the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of
this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by
the district director; in the event of failure so to depart, the respondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's
order.




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