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19 I. & N. Dec. 394

PATEL

Board of Immigration Appeals

Decided July 1, 1986

Board of Immigration Appeals · decided 1986-07-01

PATEL, 19 I&N Dec. 394 (BIA 1986) ID 3015 (PDF) (1) The legitimate purpose recognized in Matter of Chouliaris, 16 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1977), of protecting the alien's right to appeal by avoiding a forced election between a grant of voluntary departure and the filing of an appeal is not served where, as here, the alien's appeal is determined to be frivolous or filed solely for the purpose of delay. (2) To the extent that Matter of Chouliaris requires a further order granting voluntary departure in appeals determined to be frivolous or filed solely for the purpose of delay, it is disapproved and ismodified to preclude a further grant of voluntary departure where the original grant has expired.

Applies 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (§ 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (§ 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))

Relies on Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Rios-Pineda · Chour v. Ferro

Decided 1986-07-01

Interim Decision *3015




                             MATTER OF PATEL

                         In Deportation Proceedings

                                   A-26532196
                                   A-26531749

                       Decided by Board July 11, 1986

(1) The legitimate purpose recognized in Matter of Chouliaris, 
16 I&N Dec. 168
 (BIA
  1977), of protecting the alien's right to appeal by avoiding a forced election between a grant of voluntary departure and the filing of an appeal is not served
  where, as here, the alien's appeal is determined to be frivolous or filed solely for
  the purpose of delay.
(2) To the extent that Matter of Chouliaris requires a further order granting voluntary departure in appeals determined to be frivolous or filed solely for the purpose of delay, it is disapproved and is modified to preclude a further grunt of voluntary departure where the original grant has expired.

CHARGE:
 Order. Act of 1952—Sec. 241(aX2) [
8 U.S.C. § 1261
(aX2)]—Nonimmigrant—remained longer than permitted (both respondents)
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS:                          ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
  Marshult M. Taheri, Esquire                       Franklin Bell
 5433 Westheimer, Suite 1000                        General Attorney
 Houston, Texas 77056

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members



  In a decision dated February 6, 1984, an immigration judge found
the respondents deportable as charged, concluded that they were
not eligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1255
 (1982), and granted
them the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation for
a period of 6 months, with an alternate order of deportation to
India. The respondents have appealed. The appeal will be summari.




                                        394
                                                        Interim Decision *3015

ly dismissed pursuant to 
8 C.F.R. § 3.1
(d)(1-aXiv) (1986). 1 The request for oral argument before the Board is denied.
   The respondents, a 45-year-old male and his 40-year-old wife, are
natives and citizens of India who last entered the United States at
Seattle, Washington, on January 13, 1978, as nonimmigrant visitors authorized to remain until February 12, 1978. At their deportation hearing begun on October 24, 1983, and completed on February 6, 1984, the respondents, who were represented by counsel, admitted the factual allegations contained in their respective Orders
to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing, and Warrant for Arrest of Alien
(Form I-221S) and conceded deportability as "overstays" under section 241(a)(2) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1251
(a)(2) (1982). The respondents do not now challenge the finding of deportability and we are
satisfied from a review of the record that they received a fair hearing and that their deportability has been established by evidence
which is clear, unequivocal, and convincing as required by Woodby
v. IV'S, 
385 U.S. 276
 (1966).
   The respondents' Notice of Appeal (Form I 290A) states only that
                                                         -


"Eaittorney for appellants requests a copy of the transcript of the
hearing and exhibits and thirty (30) days from receipt of same to
file a written brief." Although indicating that a brief would he submitted in support of their appeal, the respondents have failed to do
so. Where, as here, the respondents do not challenge the finding of
deportability, have neither requested nor shown eligibility for any
form of relief from deportation, and were granted voluntary departure in excess of 30 days, we conclude that the appeal is frivolous
or filed solely for the purpose of delay and should therefore be
summarily dismissed pursuant to 
8 C.F.R. § 3.1
(d)(1-a)(iv) (1986).
Compare Matter of Valencia, 
19 I&N Dec. 354
 (BIA 1986) (summary
dismissal for failure to adequately specify reasons for the appeal).
  In Matter of Chouliaris, 
16 I&N Dec. 168
 (BIA 19'77), we stated
that an alien in deportation proceedings must be assured that he
will not risk losing a grant of voluntary departure by filing an
appeal from an adverse decision of an immigration judge and that
his right to appeal is protected by ensuring the preservation of
some period of voluntary departure during the pendency of the
appeal. However, Chouliaris did not involve a frivolous appeal or
one filed solely for the purpose of delay, and thus the Board was

  1 The regulation at 
8 C.F.R. §3.1
(dX1-aXiv) (1986) provides, inter alia, for the summary dismistal of an appeal in any case in which the Board is satisfied, from a
review of the record, that the appeal is frivolous or filed solely for the purpose of
delay. The provisions of 
8 C.F.R. § 3.1
(dXl-a) (1986) are included in the instructions
on the reverse side of the Notice of Appeal (Form I-290A), so that every alien who
files an appeal has notice of them.

                                         OAC
Interim Decision #3015

not required to address the effect of such an appeal on a prior
grant of voluntary departure by an immigration judge. The legitimate purpose recognized in Chouliaris of protecting the alien's
right to appeal by avoiding a forced election between a grant of voluntary departure and the filing of an appeal is not served where,
as here, the alien's appeal is determined to be frivolous or filed
solely for the purpose of delay.
   It was not our intent in Chouliaris to reward an alien whose
appeal is determined to be frivolous or filed solely for the purpose
of delay with a further grant of voluntary departure. Chouliaris, in
fact, specifically modified our prior rule which required the reinstatement of the original period of voluntary departure granted by
an immigration judge. See Matter of Villegas Aguirre, 
13 I&N Dec. 139
 (BIA 1969). Our modification of the rule was premised on its
undesirable effect, in some cases, of providing a mechanism to prolong unduly the departure of deportable aliens.
   Both this Board and the courts have long recognized the practice,
all too frequently adopted by aliens subject to an order of deportation, of employing meritless or dilatory tactics, having no colorable
legal or factual basis, solely for the purpose of delaying their departure from the country as long as possible. See INS v. Rios - Pineda,
471 U.S. 444
 (1985); Contreras Aragon v. INS, 
789 F.2d 777
 (9th Cir.
1986); Riasati v. INS, 
738 F.2d 1115
 (10th Cir. 1984); Der-Rong
Chour v. INS, 
578 F.2d 464
 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 980
(1979); Ballenilla-Gonzalez v. INS, 
546 F.2d 515
 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 
434 U.S. 819
 (1977); Acevedo v. INS, 
538 F.2d 918
 (2d Cir.
1976); Panagopoulos v. INS, 
434 F.2d 602
 (1st Cir. 1970); Fan Wan
Keung v. INS, 
484 F.2d 301
 (2d Cir. 1970); Matter of Barocio, 
19 I&N Dec. 255
 (BIA 1985); Matter of Onyedibia, 
15 I&N Dec. 37
 (BIA
1974); Matter of Gamboa, 
14 I&N Dec. 244
 (131A 1972); Matter of
Holguin, 
13 I&N Dec. 423
 (BIA 1969); Matter of Laqui, 
13 I&N Dec. 232
 (BIA 1969), aff'd Laqui v. INS, 
422 F.2d 807
 (7th Cir. 1970);
Matter of Arao, 
13 I&N Dec. 156
 (BIA 1969).
  We will no longer sanction the abuse of the appellate procedures
authorized under the regulations with a further grant of voluntary
departure. To the extent that Chouliaris requires a further order
granting voluntary departure in appeals determined to be frivolous
or filed solely for the purpose of delay, it is disapproved and is
modified to preclude a further grant of voluntary departure where
the original grant has expired.
  Accordingly, the appeal will be summarily dismissed.
  ORDER: The appeal is summarily dismissed pursuant to 
8 C.F.R. § 3.1
(d)(1-a)(iv) (1986).

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