Interim Decision #3025
MATTER OF PEREZ-ANDRADE
In Deportation Proceedings
A-23067022
A-23067026
Decided by Board March 13, 1987
(1) A request for a continuance was properly denied by the immigration judge because the respondents did not show good cause for a continuance.
(2) A deportation hearing was properly held in absentia where the respondents,
without reasonable cause, failed to appear for the hearing
(3) In the absence of a brief in support of their appeal, a reasonable explanation for
the respondents' failure to appear for the hearing or a demonstration that they
were prejudiced in any manner, a summary dismissal of the appeal pursuant to 8
C.F.R. 3.1(dXl-aXiv) (1987) is appropriate.
CHARGE:
Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(aX2) [8 U.S.C. § 1251(aX2)]—Entered without inspection (both respondents)
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
Martin R. Guajardo, Esquire Jane Leroe
601 Montgomery Street, Suite 1217 General Attorney
San Francisco, California 94111
BY: Tvfilhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members
In a decision dated July 3, 1985, an immigration judge found the
respondents deportable on the charge set forth above. The decision
was rendered at a hearing held in absentia due to the respondents'
failure to appear. The immigration judge denied the respondents'
applications for suspension of deportation under section 244(aX1) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1254(aX1) (1982),
because of their failure to appear and prosecute their applications.
He granted both respondents voluntary departure. The respondents
have appealed. The appeal will be dismissed summarily.
The respondents are a husband and wife, natives and citizens of
Mexico. The Orders to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Forms
1-221) allege that they entered the United States in June and
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Interim Decision #3025
August 1974, respectively, without submitting themselves for inspection. At a deportation hearing held on August 6, 1984, the respondents, with the assistance of counsel, admitted the allegations
in the Orders to Show Cause, conceded deportability, and requested
an opportunity to file applications for suspension of deportation.
The immigration judge granted a continuance and scheduled a
healing on their applications for July 3, 1985, at 2:30 p.m. Counsel
waived further notice.
On July 3, 1985, counsel appeared for the hearing, but the respondents did not. Counsel had no explanation why they were not
present but requested a continuance. The immigration judge proceeded with the hearing in absentia.
On appeal, the respondents contend that the immigration judge
abused his discretion in denying counsel's request for a continuance made when the respondents failed to appear for their hearing.
The respondents have not explained this contention or submitted a
brief in support of the appeal.
The regulations provide that a continuance may be granted in
the immigration judge's discretion if good cause is shown. 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.13 (1987). A decision to deny a continuance will not be overturned on appeal unless it appears that the respondents were de
prived of a full and fair hearing. Matter of Ramio,
14 I&N Dec. 412
(BIA 1973); see also Matter of Leyva,
16 I&N Dec. 118 (BIA 1977); cf.
Matter of Sibrun,
18 I&N Dec. 354 (BIA 1983). Further, the respondents are not entitled to relief as a result of a procedural error
unless they can establish that they were prejudiced by the error.
Matter of Santos,
19 I&N Dec. 105 (BIA 1984).
The respondents have made no effort to demonstrate that they
had good cause for a continuance, that they were deprived of a full
and fair hearing by the denial of a continuance, or that they were
prejudiced in any manner. In fact, they have not explained their
contention or submitted a brief in support of their appeal. They
have as yet offered no explanation whatsoever for their failure to
appear for the hearing. Under these circumstances, we conclude
that the hearing was properly held in absentia, section 242(b) of the
Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982); Matter of Patel,
19 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA
1985); Matter of Marallag,
13 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA 1971), and that the
appeal is frivolous or was filed solely for the purpose of delay. Accordingly, it will be dismissed summarily pursuant to
8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1(d)(1-a)(iv) (1987). Voluntary departure will not be reinstated.
Matter of Patel,
19 I&N Dec. 394 (BIA 1986).
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
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