DILLA

Interim Decision #2962




                             MATTER OF DILLA

                         In Deportation Proceedings

                                   A-21290714

                     Decided by Board April 17, 1984

   The Supreme Court of the United States has recently held that the 7 years' continuous physical presence requirement of section 244(aX1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 

(a)(1) (1982), was meant by Congress to be administered as written; accordingly, in an application for suspension of deportation, an
alien must establish, inter alia, that he has been physically present in the United
States without interruption for a period of 7 years before he is statutorily eligible
fur that relief. Mutter of Ilerreia, 

 (BIA 1081); and Matter of Wong, 

 (BIA 1967), overruled.
CHARGE
 Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(aX2) f8 U.S.C. § 1251(aX2)}—Nonimmigrant—rexnained longer than permitted
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:                          ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
 Ladd A. Baumann, Esquire                          Joanna London
 Baumann and Hull                                  General Attorney
 P.O. Box 20520, GMSD
  Guam, MI 96921

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Dunne, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members



  In a decision dated September 30, 1981, an immigration judge
found the respondent deportable as charged, denied his application
for suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationshty Act, S U.S.C. §1254(a)(1) (1982), and granted him the privilege of voluntary departure. The respondent has
appealed. The appeal will be dismissed.
  The respondent, a 46-year-old native and citizen of the Philippines, first entered the United States on November 12, 1965, classified as a nonimmigrant temporary worker pursuant to section
101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the Act, 

(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1982). He
was last admitted in that status at Agana, Guam, on March 8,
1980, and was authorized to remain until August 15, 1980. He
failed to depart. On. September 4, 1980, the Immigration and Natu-
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ralization Service granted the respondent the privilege of departing
the United States voluntarily prior to September 27, 1980, in lieu
of deportation proceedings. After he again failed to depart, the
Service commenced this action. At his deportation hearing, the respondent admitted the allegations in the Order to Show Cause,
Notice of Hearing, and Warrant for Arrest of Alien (Form I-221S)
and conceded deportability as an overstayed nonimmigrant under
section 241(a)(2) of the Act, 

(a)(2) (1982). We find that
deportability has been established by evidence which is clear, unequivocal, and convincing, as required by Woodby v. INS, 

 (1966). The only issue on appeal is whether the respondent's application for suspension of deportation was properly denied.
  In order to qualify for suspension of deportation, the alien must
establish that he meets the statutory requirements of section
244(a)(1) of the Act and that he merits the favorable exercise of discretion. See generally Matter of Tureotte, 

 03IA
1967). The alien must Show that he has been physically present in
the United States for a_ continuous period of at least 7 years, that
he has been a person of good moral character for all that time, and
that his deportation would result in extreme hardship to himself or
to his United States citizen or permanent resident spouse, children,
or parents. In his decision, the immigration judge found that the
respondent had satisfied the good moral character requirement but
had failed to meet the continuous physical presence and extreme
hardship requirements- He concluded, therefore, that the respondent was statutorily ineligible for suspension relief. For the reasons
stated below, we affirm.
  Since 1965, the respondent's continuous physical presence in the
United States has been interrupted on five occasions coinciding
with the expiration of his temporary worker permits. On each of
these occasions the respondent returned to his wife and family in
the Philippines for a period ranging from 8 to 12 weeks. During
these periods he sought and obtained new work contracts and renewal of his temporary worker visas. The record discloses that he
has worked for at least six different employers in Guam.
  The respondent argues that his five return trips to the Philippines did not meaningfully interrupt the required 7 years of continuous physical presence for suspension purposes. We cannot agree.
  Following passage of the Act in 1952, the Board initially adopted
a strict interpretation of the 7 years' continuous physical presence
requirement in suspension caeca. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, found greater flexibility in
this provision' and adopted the position that a departure must be
"meaningfully interruptive" in order to break the continuity re-

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Interim Decision #2962

 quirement. See Git F6o Wong v. INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1966);
 Wadman v. INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1964). Following the publication of Wadman and Git Foo Wong, the Board, in Matter of Wong,
 

 (BIA 1967), overturned its long-standing strict construction of the continuity requirement and adopted the Ninth Circuit's interpretation nationwide. See Matter of Jacobson, 

 (BIA 1964); Matter of Wong, 1G I&N Dec. 513 (BIA 1964). 1
   The construction of the continuity requirement, however, is now
controlled by the Supreme Court's recent decision in INS v. Phinpathya, 

 (1984), which rejected the interpretation imposed on "continuous physical presence" by the Ninth Circuit in
 Wadman and its progeny. The Supreme Court noted in Phinpathya
that the ordinary meaning of the words "continuous physical presence" did not readily admit any exceptions. It declared that the deliberate omission by Congress of any moderating provision in section 244(a)(1) "compel[led] the conclusion. that Congress meant this
`continuous physical presence' requirement to be admini5tered as
written." 

. The Court held: "Congress meant what it said:
otherwise deportable aliens must show that they have been pi'iysically present in the United States for a continuous period of seven
years before they are eligible for suspension of deportation." 

. Therefore, we withdraw from our avulsions in Mutter of Herrera, supra, and Matter of 

   and all subsequent Board decisions, to the extent they are inconsistent with Phinpathya, and
find that the respondent's departures to the Philippines interrupted the continuity of his physical presence in this country. As he
has failed to satisfy this statutory requirement, he is ineligible for
suspension of deportation, and, therefore, we need not reach the
issue of extreme hardship.
   Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.
   ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
   FURTHER ORDER; Pursuant to the immigration judge's
order and in accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris,

 (BIA 1977), the respondent is permitted to depart
from the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of
this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by
the district director; and in the event of failure so to depart, the
respondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration
judge's order.

  I The Ninth Circuit further expanded its ameliorative interpretation of the continuity requirement in Karakaangpatiyaoth v. INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1979), a
case upon which the respondent places much reliance. In Matter of Herrera, 

 (BIA 1981), we limited the applicability of Kamheangpatiyooth to cases arising in the Ninth Circuit.

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