BARCENAS

                                                        Interim Decision #3054




                          MATTER OF BARCENAS

                          In Deportation Proceedings

                                    A-26783984

                      Decided by Board March 23, 1988

(1) An alien who raises the claim questioning the legality of evidence must come
  forward with proof establishing a prima facie case before the Immigration and
  Naturalization Service will be called upon to assume the burden of justifying the
  manner in which it obtained evidence. Matter of Burgos, 

 (BIA
  1975), followed.
(2) Where an alien wishes to challenge the admissibility of a document, the mere
  offering of an affidavit is not sufficient to sustain his burden.
(3) If the affidavit is such that the facts alleged, if true, could support a basis for
  excluding the evidence, then the claims most also be supported by testimony.
CHARGE:
 Orden Act of 1952—Sec. 241(aX2) [

(aX2)J—Entered without inspection
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:                           ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
 Jan Joseph Bejar, Esquire                          Alan S. Rabinowitz
 2220 Fifth Avenue                                  General Attorney
 San Diego, California 92101

BY: Milbollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members



  In a decision dated February 12, 1985, an immigration judge
found the respondent deportable as charged, denied his requests for
suspension of deportation and voluntary departure, and ordered
him deported from the United States. The respondent has appealed. The appeal will be dismissed. The request for oral argument is denied. See 

(e) (1988).
  The respondent is a 37-year-old male, a native and citizen of
Mexico. An Order to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing, and Warrant
for Arrest of Alien (Form 221S) alleges that the respondent entered the United States near San Ysidro, California, on an unknown date in April of 1979 without inspection by an immigration
officer. During the deportation proceedings, the respondent admit-

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Interim Decision #3054

ted his name and testified that he was born on April 29, 1948, and
named his parents as Manuel Barcenas-Flores and Filomenn Casteneda. The respondent invoked the fifth amendment and refused
to answer where he was born. He further moved to suppress evidence concerning his deportability.
  In order to establish the respondent's alienage and deportability,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service introduced a Record of
Deportable Alien (Form 1 - 212) into evidence and presented the testimony of United States Border, Patrol Officer Patrick Tatro. Officer Tatro identified Form 1-213 and testified that he prepared the
form from answers provided to him by the respondent Officer
Tatro testified concerning the circumstances surrounding the respondent's apprehension, stating that he and another officer responded to a San Diego police request. Apparently the San Diego
police were detaining a number of suspected illegal aliens near a
bus station. As Officer Tatro was walking past the bus station he
spotted the respondent sitting there. Officer Tatro told the other officer that he had arrested the respondent on a previous occasion.
He also believed that there were other suspected illegal aliens sitting near the respondent Officer Tatro approached the respondent
and identified himself. In response to a question regarding his citizenship, the respondent stated that he was a citizen of the United
States and was born in San Antonio, Texas. In order to determine
the truth of the respondent's assertion, Officer Tatro asked the respondent if he knew where the Alamo was located in Texas. The
respondent had no idea of what Officer Tatro was referring to and
Officer Tatro then suspected that the respondent was not being
truthful. The respondent was advised that it was a felony offense to
claim United States citizenship before a United States immigration
officer. In response to another question the respondent then admitted that he was a native and citizen of Mexico. The respondent further admitted that he had no immigration documents in his possession. The respondent was then apprehended and transported to a
Service office where a Form 1-213 was completed. In his testimony,
Officer Tatro specifically denied that the respondent's Latin appearance was a factor in the apprehension. The immigration judge
accepted the Form 1-213 into evidence and found the respondent to
be deportable as charged.
  On appeal, the respondent contends that the evidence against
him should be suppressed because of an alleged violation of Service
regulations. The respondent also asserts that his statements were
made in an allegedly coercive environment and were not voluntary.
He therefore requests that the proceedings against him be termi-
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                                               Interim Decision #3054

nated. In the alternative, he seeks a grant of voluntary departure.
We find the respondent's contentions to be without merit.
  The Form 1-213 was properly admitted into evidence. Deportation proceedings are civil in nature and are not bound by the strict
rules of evidence. Tashnizi v. INS, 

 (5th Cir. 1978).
Rather, the tests for the admissibility of documentary evidence in
deportation proceedings are that evidence must be probative and
that its use must be fundamentally fair. Trias-Hernandez v INS

 (9th Cir. 1975); Marlowe v. United States INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1972); Matter of Toro, 

 (BIA 1980).
  Border Patrol Officer Tatro testified concerning the respondent's
admissions in regard to his alienage and deportability. The Form I-
213 reflects that Officer Tatro completed the form based upon admissions made by the respondent. The respondent admitted that he
was a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection by an immigration officer. He did not testify during the
deportation proceedings. While counsel objected to the admission of
Form 1-213 robe evidence, he offered no evidence to even suggest
that the contents of the form did not relate to the respondent, that
the information was erroneous, or that it was the result of coercion
or duress_ Absent any indication that a Form 1-213 contains information that is incorrect or was obtained by coercion or duress, that
document is inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence to
prove alienage and deportability. Matter of Mejia, 

(BIA 1976); Matter of Davila, 

 (BIA 1976), remanded, Davila-Villacaba v. INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1979); see also
Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d '721 (9th Cir. 1980). We therefore find
that the Form 1-213 was properly authenticated and admitted into
evidence.
  We also observe that "[o]ne who raises the claim questioning the
legality of the evidence must come forward with proof establishing
a prima facie case before the Service will be called on to assume
the burden of justifying the manner in which it obtained the evidence." Matter of Burgos, 

 (BIA 1975); see also
Matter of .Ramirez-Sanchez, 

 (BIA 1980);
Matter of Wong, 

 (BIA 1971); Matter of
Tang, 

 (BIA 1971). Where a party wishes to
challenge the admissibility of a document, the mere offering of an
affidavit is not sufficient to sustain his burden. First, if an affidavit
is offered, which, if accepted as true, would not form a basis for excluding the evidence, the contested document may be admitted into
the record. Such was the case here. If the affidavit is such that the
facts alleged, if true, could support a basis for excluding the evidence in question, then the claims must also be supported by testi-
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Interim Decision #3054

many. The respondent's declaration alone was therefore insufficient to sustain his burden.
   The respondent also contends that his application for voluntary
departure should have been granted. We disagree. In order to qualify for the privilege of voluntary departure under section 244(e) of
the Act, 

(e) (1982), the respondent must establish
that he has been a person of good moral character for at least 5
years preceding his application. Section 101(0(6) of the Act, 

(0(6) (1982), provides as follows:
     No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character
 who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established, is, or was—

        (6) one -who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this Act.
  The respondent testified under oath that he entered the United
States for the first time in April of 1977 and had not left the country since that time. The respondent was advised that he was testifying under oath. The Service attorney asked the respondent,
"Have you left the United States since April of 1977 and gone
across the border to Mexico?" The respondent testified, "No, Sir."
Once again. the Service attorney naked, "Are you telling the truth,
Sir?" The respondent again testified, "Yes, Sir." The respondent
not only testified that he had not left the United States since April
of 1977, he produced a witness to corroborate that assertion. Finally, the respondent's assertion that he had not left the United
States since April of 1977 was exposed as a prevarication when he
admitted under cross-examination that he had returned to Mexico
in 1983 to marry his wife. We find, therefore, that the respondent
gave false testimony under oath during the deportation proceedings. Consequently, he is statutorily ineligible for a grant of voluntary departure. See Bufalino v. Holland, 277 17.2d 270, 276 (3d Oft.),
cert. denied, 

 (1960); Matter of Namio, 

(BIA 1973); Matter of Ngan, 

 (BIA 1964); Matter of
G L
 -        

 (BIA 1959); cf. United States v_ Ahdulghani,

 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
  Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissd.
  ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.




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