ROSALES

                                                         Interim Decision #3064




                            MA1 .1 bit OF ROSALES
                          In Deportation Proceedings
                                    A-27188547
                       Decided by Board April .21, 1988

(1)Where an attorney asks to withdraw from representation of an alien, his request
  for withdrawal should include evidence that he attempted to advise his client, at
  his last known address, of the date, time, and place of the scheduled hearing, and
  he should also provide the immigration judge with the alien's last known address,
  assuming it is more current than any address previously provided to the immigration judge.
(2) Unless these requirements are met, counsel's withdrawal should be only conditionally granted, that is, granted for all purposes except receipt of service of documents.
CHARGE:
  Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(aX2) [

(a)(2)]—Entered without inspection
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:                            ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
 Pro se                                              Howard W. Van Winkle
                                                     General Attorney
BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members



  Tn a decision and order dated August 5, 1987, an immigration
judge administratively closed the respondent's case because the respondent failed to appear for a scheduled hearing and could not be
located. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appealed. The
appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded to the immigration judge for further action.
  The decision which the Service seeks to have reviewed is interlocutory in nature. This Board does not ordinarily entertain interlocutory appeals. See Matter of Ruiz-Campuzano, 

(BIA 1979); Matter of Ku, 

 (13IA 1976); Matter of
    The respondent's prior counsel has withdrawn from this case. Service of this decision, however, will he sent to him in case the respondent should be in contact with
him. Notice of the decision will also be sent to the respondent at his last known
address.
Interim Decision # 3064

Sacco, 

 (BIA 1974). However, we have on occasion
ruled on the merits of interlocutory appeals where we deemed it
necessary to address important jurisdictional questions regarding
the administration of the immigration laws, or to correct recurring
problems in the handling of cases by immigration judges. See
Matter of Correa, 

 (BIA 1984); Matter of Victorino,

 (BIA 1982); Matter of Alphonse, 

(BIA 1981); Matter of Wadas, 

 (BIA 1980); Matter of
Seren, 

 (BIA 1976); Matter of Fong, 

(BIA 1974). We have concluded that it is appropriate for us to rule
on this interlocutory appeal.
  The Service argues in its appeal that the immigration judge
acted incorrectly in administratively closing this case instead of
holding a hearing in absentia and issuing a decision regarding deportability. Under section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(b) (1982), a hearing may be held in absentia
if an alien "has been given a reasonable opportunity to be
present . . . and without reasonable cause fails or refuses to
attend." See Matter of Marallag, 

 (BIA 1971). In the
present case the respondent appeared for earlier scheduled hearings but subsequently failed to keep either the Service or his counsel informed of his whereabouts. No explanation has been offered
for his failure to appear for the scheduled hearing on August 5,
1987.
  We agree with the Service that the immigration judge should not
have administratively closed this case but rather should have held
an in absentia hearing and issued a final order. A hearing had already been convened in this case, on April 10, 1984. The respondent appeared for that hearing and was given a continuance to
apply for asylum. An application for asylum with supporting documents was duly filed. The hearing was subsequently continued on
several other occasions. There is no issue regarding proper service
of the notice of the August 5, 1987, hearing The respondent had an
obligation to keep the Service apprised of his whereabouts. He
failed to do this, or even to keep in contact with his attorney.
Under the circumstances of this case, there is no reason why an in
absentia hearing should not have been held. Moreover, holding a
hearing allows the entry of an order which can then be executed
upon the next contact with the respondent. When a case is administratively closed, the respondent is allowed, by simply failing to
appear, to avoid an order regarding his &portability, and the 'consequences an order of deportation could bring. See Matter of Amico,

 (BIA 1988). We shall therefore remand this case to
the immigration judge for further action. It is unclear from the
                                 gSg
                                            Interim Decision #3064

record before us whether the respondent conceded deportability at
the April 10, 1984, hearing. If in fact deportability was conceded,
the immigration judge should enter a final decision in absentia,
based on the present record. If deportability was not conceded, evidence to establish the respondent's deportability should be presented on remand and a final order then entered by the immigration
judge.
  The Service also argues on appeal that the immigration judge
erred in allowing the respondent's counsel to withdraw in an "ex
parte" fashion. The immigration judge granted the motion to withdraw on July 27, 1987, so counsel is no longer representing the respondent and this issue is moot. We note, however, that where an
attorney asks to withdraw in a case such as this one, his request
should include evidence that he attempted to advise the respondent, at his last known address, of the date, time, and place of the
scheduled hearing. Counsel should also provide the immigration
judge with tho respondent's last known address, assuming it is
more current than any address previously provided to the immigration judge. Unless these requirements have been met, a request to
withdraw from representation should not be unconditionally granted since counsel is responsible for acceptance of service of documents under 

(a) (1988). Such precautions help insure
that proper notice of a hearing is given and increase the likelihood
that a respondent receives notice and appears for a scheduled hew
ing. If these steps have not been taken, counsel's withdrawal
should only be conditionally granted, that is, granted for all purposes except receipt of service of documents.
   ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the record is remanded
to the immigration judge for further action in accordance with the
foregoing decision.