19 Md. App. 123 - Urciolo v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is plain, accordingly, that the lower court had jurisdiction if the evidence showed that an intent to appropriate had been formed within the state. The trial judge found that it did. There is a permissible, if not a compelling inference that appellant requested Gott to draw the check for $1788.53 to his order; it is crystal clear that appellant knew that Rogers — and no one but Rogers — was entitled to the proceeds of a fully consummated transaction; it is equally clear from the notation on the face of the check that its proceeds were intended for the use and benefit of Rogers. The words and actions of appellant both before and after settlement tend to show a fraudulent intent coexisting with actual or constructive possession of Rogers’ funds within the State. We said in Waldrop v. State, 12 Md. App. 371, 377, 278 A. 2d 619 , 622: ‘Guilt in embezzlement cases is almost always a matter of inference, Couture v. State, 7 Md. App. 269 , 255 A. 2d 84 , and if the rational inferences prove the crime was committed in Maryland, there is no error in trying appellant in Maryland.’ The trial court concluded that this State had jurisdiction. We cannot say, in the light of the evidence presented, that its decision was clearly erroneous. Rule 1086. Because jurisdiction was established by a showing of the coexistence of possession and fraudulent intent, it is unnecessary to deal here with the applicability of the ‘place to account’ doctrine, nor is it necessary to decide whether jurisdi”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Urciolo v. State

2. ““Unquestionably, the Waldrop Court reviewed the law in embezzlement cases recognizing the four different criteria announced in Martel , and also recognizing the revisions stated in Peddersen , and stated that in Peddersen the Court had concluded that since the essential element in embezzlement was intent, the venue could be laid in any county in which: (1) the money or property was received with intent to embezzle, or (2) in the county in which the money or property was possessed and the intent to embezzle was formed, regardless of the fact that actual conversion may have taken place in another county or state. In the instant case, it is clear that the defendant attended the offices of Mr. Gott in Anne Arundel County with a sum of money with which to effect a settlement on behalf of Mr. Rogers. He was at that time acting for and in behalf of Mr. Rogers. While it may be true that he received some funds belonging to Rogers by mail from Mr. Gott, and thereafter deposited that sum in an account in the District of Columbia, it is the view of this Court that at the time the defendant appeared with the money in Anne Arundel County he had then formed or continued to retain a criminal intent to embezzle funds of his principal. In the view of this Court there is ample evidence to support an inference that such an intent existed in Anne Arundel County, Maryland.” (Emphasis supplied.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Urciolo v. State

3. ““Although the defendant received the money on the cashier’s draft in New York or in Minneapolis, it cannot be doubted that the offense charged in the indictment was accomplished and completed at Berlin [Massachusetts] when Peters, at the request of the defendant, sent him the draft, whether he sent it by the hand of an agent of the defendant, or deposited it in the mail. . . . [I]f he sent it by a carrier or other agent of the defendant, the delivery to the agent was a delivery to the defendant. Com. v. Taylor, 105 Mass. 172 . So, if he sent it by mail, when he deposited it in the post-office, it passed out of his [Peters’] control into the control of the defendant, and the postmaster was the agent of the defendant to forward the letter to him. Regina v. Jones, 4 Cox C. C. 198.” (Emphasis supplied.) 142 Mass, at 462, 8 N. E. at 434-35 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Urciolo v. State