¶1(concurring). I concluded my dissenting opinion previously filed in this case with the following statement:
“The trial judge’s charge was erroneous and misleading on an essential issue in the case4 and a new trial should be ordered.
¶2I am still of the opinion that we were obliged to consider the alleged instructional error even though the issue was not preserved at the trial level and, therefore, I am unable to sign the majority opinion *260which states that we reached the meritorious question in the exercise of our discretion.
¶3In the factual context of this case, the essential issue was self-defense. There was no other issue. The defendant admitted that he had killed the victim. The only question was whether the defendant acted with justification. In my view the trial judge had the nondelegable duty to charge correctly on that essential issue even though the charge was not objected to upon its conclusion. The principle applicable is the same principle that requires a trial judge correctly to charge on the essential ingredients of the people’s case. The essence of the case must go to the jury correctly. For an elaboration of my views as applied to the defense of self-defense, see People v. Keys (1968), 9 Mich App 482 (Levin, J., dissenting); cf. People v. Bowen (1968), 10 Mich App 1, 18-20 (concerning the judge’s duty to charge correctly regarding the essential elements of the charged offense).
¶4 “See People v. Liggett (1967), 378 Mich 706, 714; People v. Guillett (1955), 342 Mich 1, 7. See, also, People v. Keys (1968), 9 Mich App 482, 498-501.”