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19 N.C. App. 373

198 S.E.2d 732

Bowes v. Bowes

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Decided September 12, 1973

Court of Appeals of North Carolina · decided 1973-09-12

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“had no jurisdiction to hold hearings and enter judgments pending the appeal. We, therefore, choose to treat the purported appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari which we have allowed. Because of the lack of jurisdiction in the trial court, the two judgments are vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Lewis v. Lewis

Relies on Wiggins v. Bunch · Dilday v. Beaufort County Board of Education · 14 N.C. App. 107 - Upton v. Upton

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1973-09-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently September 2011

6 state decisions

2019731980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

MORRIS, Judge

¶1 Defendant gave notice of appeal and the court entered appeal entries as to the judgment of 30 August 1972, granting plaintiff divorce a mensa et thoro, entered on the jury verdict of abandonment. On appeal, however, defendant does not bring forward any exception or assignment of error with respect to this judgment, nor does the record contain any assignment of error as to this judgment.

¶2 The appeal itself, however, is an exception to the judgment and to any matter appearing on the face of the record proper. Dilday v. Board of Education, 267 N.C. 438, 148 S.E. 2d 513 (1966). Prejudicial error does not appear.

¶3 Pending the appeal from the judgment entered 30 August 1972, the court held two hearings in this action. The first resulted in a judgment awarding plaintiff custody of the minor child and providing for child support, alimony, and counsel fees. The second resulted in a judgment modifying the alimony award. Defendant attempts to appeal from these judgments. The court had no jurisdiction to hold hearings and enter judgments pending the appeal. Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E. 2d 879 (1971); Pelaez v. Carland, 268 N.C. 192, 150 S.E. 2d 201 (1966). See also Upton v. Upton, 14 N.C. App. 107, 187 S.E. 2d 387 (1972). We, therefore, choose to treat the purported appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari which we have allowed. Because of the lack of jurisdiction in the trial court, the two judgments are vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

¶4 The result of the foregoing is this:

¶5 Judgment dated 30 August 1972, affirmed.

¶6 Judgment dated 1 September 1972 and Order dated 19 October 1972 modifying the judgment of 1 September 1972, vacated and cause remanded for further proceedings.

Chief Judge Brock and Judge Vaughn concur.
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