In Re Doe 3

¶1dissenting.

¶2While I concur with much of Justice Hecht’s opinion, I write separately to emphasize a single point. When it enacted the Parental Notification Act, the Legislature made the trial court — not the Texas Supreme Court — the finder of fact. As it concerns the trial court’s fact findings in this case, the Texas Supreme Court’s role is limited to reviewing those findings under a legal sufficiency analysis.

¶3In this case, the trial court did not find that notification of one of the minor’s parents “may lead to physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the minor.” Although the record could support a trial court’s conclusion to the contrary,1 the trial court did not find to the contrary. We are thus left with *322the single task of determining whether the record establishes as a matter of law that notification may lead to such abuse. Notwithstanding Justice Enoch’s high rhetoric, the record simply does not establish that proposition as a matter of law.

¶4For the reasons discussed in Justice Hecht’s opinion, I would affirm the court of appeal’s judgment which affirms the trial court’s decision.