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19 Wend. 699

Morris v. Cook

New York Supreme Court

Decided May 15, 1839

New York Supreme Court · decided 1839-05-15

Motion to set aside a default for not rejoining, and the proceedings on the part of the plaintiff subsequent to the default. The action was ejectment for a dwelling house orchard and garden. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and afterwards, as to 3-10ths of one acre of the premises in question, pleaded a title acquired by him, puis darrien continuance.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““ It is supposed by the plaintiff’s counsel that a plea puis, etc., is a waiver of all previous pleas, whether it be interposed to the whole or only part of the plaintiff’s action. The rule is, perhaps, universal, where the plea goes to the whole subject of the declaration. But where it goes to one of several counts, or to any particular part of an entire claim, I can see no reason for making it- a waiver beyond what it professes to answer. In Rayner v. Dyett, 2 Wend. 300 , a plea puis of a discharge of the body from imprisonment was held to be no waiver of the previous general pleas in bar. Why was this so? Plainly because the plea puis was partial. It affected the remedy merely. It acted as a waiver no further than it was intended as an answer.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Bennet v. Gilbert

Relies on Rayner & Hope v. Dyett

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1839-05-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently May 1901

4 state decisions

1018391840185018601870188018901900decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1By ifw Court,

Cowen, J.

¶2It is supposed by the plaintiff’s counsel that a plea puis, &c. is a waiver of all previous pleas, whether it be interposed to the whole or only part of the plaintiff’s action. The rule is perhaps universal where the plea goes to the whole subject of the declaration. But where it goes to one of several counts, or to any particular part of an entire claim, I can see no reason for making it a waiver beyond what it professes to answer. In Rayner v. Dyett, 2 Wend. 300, a plea puis, of a discharge of the body from imprisonment, was held to be no waiver of the previous general pleas in bar. Why was this so ? Plainly because the plea ■ puis was partial. It affected the remedy merely. It acted as a waiver no farther than it was intended as an answer. *700There it was received to qualify the plaintiff’s claim. The former pleas being allowed to stand in full force, a repetition as to part, would have been worse than useless, because lead-*n£ to unnecessary prolixity. The plea in question may be bad for not answering the whole declaration, or some distinct count; but the remedy for that was to demur. The motion is granted with costs.

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