Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 190 F.3d 455 - In Re: Seymour Markowitz, Debtor. Seymour Markowitz v. Carolyn Campbell

In Re: Seymour Markowitz, Debtor. Seymour Markowitz v. Carolyn Campbell’s Empirical Analysis

190 F.3d 455 · 1999

Citation profile

284
cited by 284 later decisions
March 2020
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 12 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 284 later decisions — most recently March 2020 · most notably Su v. C Su, George Jercich James Petralia v. George Jercich (2001)

13 federal appellate · 12 district ·

15301999200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 11 U.S.C. § 523

Relies on Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment · Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore · Montana v. United States · Kawaauhau v. Geiger · Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 284 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he Court held that “willful” means “voluntary,” “intentional,” or “deliberate.” As such, only acts done with the intent to cause injury — and not merely acts done intentionally — can cause willful and malicious injury. The Court explained its holding by discussing the importance of context: The word “willful” in (a)(6) modifies the word “injury,” indicating that non-dischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. Had Congress meant to exempt debts resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead “willful acts that cause injury.” Or, Congress might have selected an additional word or words, i.e., “reckless” or “negligent,” to modify “injury.” Moreover, as the Eighth Circuit observed, the (a)(6) formulation triggers in the lawyer’s mind the category “intentional torts,” as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts. Intentional torts generally require that the actor intend “the consequences of an act,” not simply “the act itself.””
    18 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “A discharge under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... (6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity....”
    17 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “desires to cause consequences of his act, or ... believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”
    17 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.