¶1dissenting.
¶2I find myself unable to agree with the majority that the judgment in this case should be reversed because of an erroneous instruction to the jury.
¶3Conceding that instruction “A” should not have been framed in the form given, I think the error was, nevertheless, harmless in view of the circumstances. ' It seems/ tó me that the jury, as reasonable and fair-minded men, could have reached no other conclusion than that the collision *720resulted from the failure of the defendant, Allen, to observe a reasonable lookout. If the jury had found for the defendants, the verdict should have been set aside because Allen, the driver of the truck, was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
¶4The uncontradicted evidence is than Forsyth was proceeding in an easterly direction along a three-lane arterial highway, approximately thirty-three feet wide. Allen was approaching this highway from the north. In compliance with the highway sign, he stopped his truck before entering the highway at a distance within four feet of the hard surface, where he says he remained for two or three minutes. At that point, his view in the direction from which the car ■of Forsyth was coming was unobstructed for at least a ■distance of one hundred and seventy-five yards, that is, five hundred and twenty-five feet. Several witnesses testified that the distance was greater.
¶5Allen does not claim that his view of the Forsyth car was obscured by traffic approaching from his left or from his right. The car of Forsyth was in plain view. If Allen had looked with reasonable care, he was bound to have discovered it. Y et, he says that after looking first to his right and seeing no car, and then looking to his left, he started across the road at five or six miles an hour, and did not see the car of Forsyth until he was within five feet of it. If he looked so hastily or so carelessly that he failed to see it, he was guilty of negligence. That he did not exercise reasonable care is shown by his statement. “I did not see the car, and l had plenty of chance to look up the road, and which I did look up the road and there was no car, whatever coming.” (Italics added.)
¶6In Moore v. Vick, 181 Va. 157, 24 S. E. (2d) 429, under circumstances much similar to those here, we said at page 160:
“Admitting, for the sake of argument, that defendant stopped before entering the intersection, by her own testimony she admitted that she had a clear view of the highway *721for a distance of one hundred and fifty yards to her right. This being true, it is inconceivable why she failed to see the approaching car of plaintiff. In our opinion, there is but one conclusion to be drawn, and that is, she failed to look when looking would have been effective.”
¶7In Stillman v. Williams, 181 Va. 863, 27 S. E. (2d) 186, in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, Mr. Justice Hudgins, now Chief Justice, said on page 866:
“Plaintiff is mistaken when he states that he looked to the east as far as the highway was open before he made his turn, and there was nothing in sight. Either he did not look at all, or he looked so hastily or so carelessly that he failed to see that which was clearly visible.”
¶8And on page 867, “The statement of a person, who, with full knowledge that he is leaving a place 'of comparable safety and moving into a traffic lane, a place of potential danger, says that he looked twice and did not see the approaching car which was in plain sight, is incredible. See Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Barlow, 155 Va. 863, 156 S. E. 397.”
¶9In Temple v. Moses, 175 Va. 320, 8 S. E. (2d) 262, at page 331, we said:
“Common sense, reasonable caution and prudence dictate that the driver of the stopped vehicle, before entering the main artery of travel, shall look, and not enter into the public highway without seeing that such movement can be made with safety. He is under a duty to see what is in plain sight.”
¶10In Yellow Cab Co. v. Gulley, 169 Va. 611, 194 S. E. 683, we said on page 617:
“Keeping a lookout is without avail unless one utilizes the information thereby secured. One who keeps a lookout, and fails to take advantage of what it discloses is as guilty of negligence as one who fails to keep a lookout. The result is the same.”
¶11In Brown v. Lee, 167 Va. 284, 189 S. E. 339, this court said on page 285:
*722“The land is fairly level, and from the crossing the truck could be seen for at least 300 feet, its driver could have seen the coupe when it was 75 feet from the intersection, beyond which his view was obstructed by woodland.
“Incredible as it may seem, he tells us that he never saw this coupe until he struck it, and for this he offers no excuse. … * The negligence of Lee is too plain for argument.”
¶12In Johnson v. Harrison, 161 Va. 804, 172 S. E. 259, at page 808, Justice Gregory said:
“For the plaintiff to stand upon his right of way and fail or refuse to look for another automobile which is using the intersecting road, 'when such automobile is in plain view and approaching at a dangerous speed, is the clearest kind of concurring negligence.”
¶13Also see Garrison v. Burns, 178 Va. 1, 16 S. E. (2d) 306; Penoso v. D. Pender Grocery Co., 177 Va. 245, 13 S. E. (2d) 310; and Nicholson v. Garland, 156 Va. 745, 158 S. E. 901.
¶14It has been frequently held by this court that a verdict of a jury will not be set aside where it is such that no other verdict could have been properly found, even under proper instructions. Mister v. Mister, 180 Va. 364, 23 S. E. (2d) 152; and Talley v. Drumheller, 143 Va. 439, 130 S. E. 385.
¶15The facts in this case have been submitted to two juries, both of which rendered verdicts against the defendants.
¶16The State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, owner of the automobile driven by Forsyth, in its separate action against the defendants recovered $474.73, property damage to its automobile. Nevertheless, in the present case, the defendant filed a cross-claim for $250, damage to the truck driven by Allen.
¶17Instructions were given relating to negligence, contributory negligence, and concurrent negligence. Instruction “A” related to the right of the defendants to recover on their cross-claim. It defined Allen’s duty before the defendants could recover. The duty of Allen to Forsyth, insofar as Forsyth’s recovery against the defendants was concerned, *723was defined by other instructions, to which no assignment of error has been made. For this reason, I think the harmless effect of instruction “A” is the more apparent.
¶18It is inconceivable to me why Allen failed to see the approaching' car. Neither of the defendants give a reasop. The majority opinion shows none. There is but one conclusion to be drawn, and that is he failed to look when looking would have been effective. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶19Hudgins, C. J., concurs in this dissent.