IN CLEMCS OFFICE
This bplnlon was filed for record
COURT,SCQE OP WASH!?ISTON
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ChtEFJUsnce
SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Petitioner, No. 94892-5
En Banc
WENDY GRANATH,
Respondent. Filed: ^ ® 2018
YU,J.— The issue in this case is whether the duration of a domestic
violence(DV)no-contact order entered by a court of limited jurisdiction is limited
to the length of the underlying suspended sentence. The State appeals a published
Court of Appeals decision that vacated a no-contact order and held that the district
court lacked authority pursuant to ROW 10.99.050 to enter a no-contact order
exceeding the duration ofthe underlying sentence. State v. Granath, 200 Wn.
App. 26,
401 P.3d 405, review granted,
189 Wn.2d 1009, 402 P.Sd 823 (2017).
We affirm.
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are not disputed. A jury convicted Wendy Granath in
King County District Court oftwo gross misdemeanor DV crimes—cyberstalking
and violation of a DV no-contact order—^based on e-mails she sent to her estranged
husband. Clerk's Papers(CP)at 35; Pet. for Review at 2. In November 2012,
Granath was sentenced to 364 days in jail with 334 days suspended for 24 months.
CP at 35. As a condition of her suspended sentence, she was prohibited from
contacting her estranged husband. The court issued a separate no-contact order
pursuant to RCW 10.99.050 reflecting the directive not to contact her estranged
husband. The judge did not enter an expiration date, and so, by the terms ofthe
pattern form order, it expired by default five years later.
Granath completed her sentence in December 2014. She thereafter moved to
vacate the no-contact order on the basis that it ended when she was no longer
subject to the underlying no-contact condition of the sentence. The district court
denied the motion, stating it "had lawful authority to issue a separate order under
[chapter] 10.99[RCW], which is a stand-alone provision." Id. at 22. Granath
appealed to the King County Superior Court, which affirmed the district court.
Granath then sought discretionary review from the Court of Appeals, which
reversed in a published opinion. It held that the district court did not have statutory
authority to issue a no-contact order that lasted longer than the defendant's
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
suspended sentence. Granath, 200 Wn. App. at 37-38. We granted review.' 189
Wn.2d 1009.
ISSUE
Whether RCW 10.99.050 provides a district court the authority to issue a
DV no-contact order that lasts longer than the defendant's suspended sentence?
ANALYSIS
A. Overview of a district court's limited sentencing authority
District courts are courts of limited jurisdiction created by the legislature.
Const, art. IV, §§ 1, 12; Smith v. Whatcom County Dist. Ct., 147 Wn.2d 98, 104,
52 P.3d 485 (2002). "The legislature has sole authority to prescribe their
jurisdiction and powers." Smith,
147 Wn.2d at 104. To understand a district
court's authority in this context, we review the relevant statutory grants of
authority.
The affirmative grant of subject matter jurisdiction in this case is
RCW 3.66.060. It provides a district courtjurisdiction that is "[cjoncurrent with
'At oral argument, Granath asserted that this case is moot because Granath's no-contact
order expired in November 2017. Wash. Supreme Court oral argument, State v. Granath, No.
94892-5 (Feb. 16, 2018), at 35 min., 51 sec., audio recording by TVW, Washington State's
Public Affairs Network, http://vmw.tvw.org. However,"we may retain and decide a moot case
'when it can be said that matters of continuing and substantial public interest are involved.'"
State V. Cruz, 189 Wn.2d 588, 598,
404 P.3d 70(2017)(quoting Sorenson v. City ofBellingham,
80 Wn.2d 547, 558,
496 P.2d 512(1972)). Here, appellate review is proper because a district
court's authority to issue a no-contact order is a matter of continuing and substantial public
interest.
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
the superior court of all misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors committed in their
respective counties and of all violations of city ordinances." RCW 3.66.060. The
statute also authorizes a district court to impose a fine of$5,000 and a jail sentence
of one year.
Id.
There is a specific legislative provision that extends a district court's
jurisdiction over DV offenses for up to five years. RCW 3.66.068(l)(a) states in
relevant part:
(1) A court has continuing jurisdiction and authority to suspend the
execution of all or any part of its sentence upon stated terms,
including installment payment of fines for a period not to exceed:
(a) Five years after imposition of sentence for a defendant
sentenced for a domestic violence offense ....
This statute authorizes a district court to suspend all or part of a DV sentence for
up to five years and impose sentencing conditions in its judgment and sentence.^ If
a defendant violates a condition of the sentence, then a district court may revoke
the suspended sentence. RCW 3.66.069.
The last statutory grant of authority that is relevant to this case is RCW
10.99.050(1), which authorizes a court to issue a no-contact order to "record[]" a
no-contact condition it includes in the judgment and sentence. The statute states.
When a defendant is found guilty of a crime and a condition ofthe
sentence restricts the defendant's ability to have contact with the
victim, such condition shall be recorded and a written certified copy
^ The legislature also has provided a district court the authority to defer any or all of a DV
sentence for up to fiVe years. RCW 3.66.068(2)(a)(i).
State vJ Granath, No. 94892-5
of that order shall be provided to the victim.
RCW 10.99.050(1)(emphasis added). This case requires us to determine whether
RCW 10.99.050 authorizes a district court to issue a no-contact order that lasts
longer than the sentence it imposes. Because resolution ofthis case requires
statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d
106, 110, 156P.3d201 (2007).
B. The plain language of RCW 10.99.050 resolves the issue presented
We look to the statute's plain language to determine whether it addresses the
duration of a no-contact order. Its plain meaning is determined by consulting "the
statute in which the provision at issue is found, as well as related statutes or other
provisions ofthe same act in which the provision is found." Dep't ofEcology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 10,
43 P.3d 4(2002). If the legislature's
intent is clear based on the plain language ofthe statute,"then the court must give
effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent."
Id. at 9-10.
RCW 10.99.050 is silent on the duration of a no-contact order, and
consulting other provisions ofthe same act does not help us understand the
intended time span ofthe no-contact order. Other orders issued prior to sentencing
pursuant to chapter 10.99 RCW have explicit termination provisions and therefore
do not help us determine the duration of a postsentencing order. RCW
10.99.040(5)(a prefiling DV no-contact order expires at arraignment or within 72
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
hours if no charges are filed),(3)(a DV no-contact order entered or extended at
arraignment terminates ifthe defendant is acquitted or the charges are dismissed).^
The parties agree that the statute is silent on the order's duration, but each
interprets the statute's silence differently.
The State takes the position that RCW 10.99.050 "independently authorizes"
a district court to issue a DV no-contact order so long as it imposes a no-contact
condition of the sentence. Pet. for Review at 9. Other provisions ofRCW
10.99.050 refer to no-contact orders as "issued" rather than "recorded," and the
State infers use ofthe word "issued" means the order stands independently of the
underlying sentence condition. See, e.g., RCW 10.99.050(2)(a),(3). The State
does not cite authority for this conclusion, but proceeds to make a public policy
argument that an independently authorized no-contact order can last longer than
the defendant's sentence.
The legislature declared its intent that chapter 10.99 RCW provide victims
ofDV "the maximum protection from abuse." RCW 10.99.010. The State argues
that the interpretation that best effectuates the legislature's intent is one that grants
^ In State v. Shiiltz, we held that a no-contact order issued pursuant to RCW 10.99.040(3)
can remain in effect until sentencing. 146 Wn.2d 540, 548,
48 P.3d 301 (2002). At sentencing, a
trial court may issue a new no-contact order consistent with RCW 10.99.050(1)"or it may
extend the existing order by clearly indicating on the judgment and sentence that the order is to
remain in effect."
Id.
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
a district court the authority to issue a no-contact order for the maximum
sentencing term, regardless ofthe sentence actually imposed. Pet. for Review
at 9-10.
The State also looks outside chapter 10.99 RCW for support. Other statutes
authorize a court to issue a postconviction order protecting victims of sexual
assault and stalking if they are not eligible for a civil DV protection order pursuant
to chapter 26.50 RCW. But unlike a postconviction DV no-contact order, the
legislature has provided express statutory authority for these orders to last longer
than a defendant's sentence. See RCW 7.90.150(6)(c)(a sexual assault protection
order lasts for two years after the defendant's sentence); RCW 7.92.160(6)(c)(a
no-cpntact stalking order lasts five years regardless ofthe length ofthe defendant's
sentence). The State argues the legislature did not intend to provide victims of
sexual assault and stalking more protection than DV victims and so the legislature
must have intended for a DV no-contact order to last longer than a defendant's
sentence, despite the statute's silence.
Granath cites the plain language of RCW 10.99.050 to argue that the
legislature has not provided a district court independent authority to issue a no-
contact order. If a district court includes a condition of the suspended sentence that
"restricts the defendant's ability to have contact with the victim," then "such
condition shall be recorded" as a no-contact order. RCW 10.99.050(1)(emphasis
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
added). Because a no-contact order is "recording" a condition of the sentence,
Granath contends there is no authority for the order to last longer than the
condition it records.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Granath and resolved this case on the
statute's plain language. It concluded that "[t]he only no-contact order the statute
authorizes is one that records a no-contact condition of the sentence. It follows
that when the no-contact condition of sentence expires, there is no express
legislative authority for the continued validity of the no-contact order." Granath,
200 Wn. App. at 36.
We agree with Granath and the Court of Appeals. Although RCW
10.99.050 is silent on the duration of a no-contact order, its length can be
determined from the statute's plain language. If a district court suspends a
defendant's DV sentence and imposes a "condition of the sentence [that] restricts
the defendant's ability to have contact with the victim," then it '''record\sY that
condition as a no-contact order. RCW 10.99.050(1)(emphasis added). Without
additional statutory language indicating otherwise, our inquiry ends here because
RCW 10.99.050 is not an independent grant of authority to a district court to issue
a no-contact order. The only reason a court is permitted to issue an order of no-
contact in this context is to record a condition ofthe sentence.
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
It makes sense that a district court both imposes a no-contact condition of
the sentence and issues a no-contact order with the same duration because it allows
the no-contact prohibition to be a separate enforceable condition. A willful
violation of a no-contact order is enforceable by any court through separate
criminal prosecution without revoking the suspended sentence. RCW
10.99.050(2)(a). Tying the length of a no-contact order to the length ofthe
sentence actually imposed ensures that a defendant is not subject to criminal
penalties for contacting the victim when the defendant is no longer subject to the
sentencing condition that gave rise to the order. This result, as the Court of
Appeals noted,"is not absurd." Granath, 200 Wn. App. at 38.
Our conclusion does not prohibit a district court from issuing a five year no-
contact order, which is the longest a district court can retain jurisdiction pursuant
to RCW 3.66.068. To impose a five year no-contact order, a district court simply
suspends at least a part ofthe defendant's sentence for five years and imposes a no-
contact condition of the sentence for that same period oftime.
While we resolve the issue presented based on the statute's plain language,
we take the opportunity to distinguish State v. W.S., 176 Wn. App. 231,
309 P.3d
589(2013), which both parties argue supports their position. In W.S., the Court of
Appeals, Division One, held that a juvenile court has the authority to issue a DV
no-contact order pursuant to RCW 10.99.050 that remains in effect after the
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
defendant turns 18. It reasoned that because juvenile court is a division of superior
court, a superior court can modify or enforce the order even after the juvenile
court's jurisdiction ends.
Id. at 241-42. The court then relied on our decision in
Armendariz to summarily conclude, without analyzing RCW 10.99.050, that a
juvenile court has the authority to issue a no-contact order "for the statutory
maximum ofthe crime."
Id. at 243.
In W.S., the Court of Appeals' reliance on Armendariz was misplaced
because that case turned on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter
9.94A RCW. The court in Armendariz determined that the SRA's statutory
scheme and plain language provide trial courts the authority to impose a no-contact
order as a crime related prohibition for the statutory maximum term of the offense.
160 Wn.2d at 120. Armendariz has no application when determining the duration
of a no-contact order issued by a court of limited jurisdiction pursuant to RCW
10.99.050. W.S. addresses a separate challenge to juvenile courtjurisdiction that is
not before this court.
Finally, while the State raises valid concerns regarding the need to protect
victims of DV,its public policy argument is inconsistent with the plain language of
the statute. The legislature's codified declaration of intent cannot "trump the plain
language of the statute." State v. Reis, 183 Wn.2d 197, 212,
351 P.3d 127(2015).
If the legislature disagrees with our plain language interpretation, then it may
10
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
amend the statute. Cornelius v. Dep't ofEcology, 182 Wn.2d 574, 589-90,
344
P.3d 199(2015).
In sum, a district court's authority is limited to what the legislature has
affirmatively granted. RCW 10.99.050 authorizes a district court to issue a no-
contact order to record a no-contact condition ofthe sentence. While the statute is
silent regarding the order's duration, its plain language supports the conclusion that
a no-contact order issued by a court of limited jurisdiction lasts for the length of
the defendant's suspended sentence.
C. Granath's no-contact order was enforceable until she completed her
suspended sentence
Each of Granath's two gross misdemeanor DV crimes carried a maximum
jail term of 364 days and a $5,000 fine. RCW 3.66.060. The district court could
have suspended part of her sentence for five years, imposed a no-contact condition
of the sentence, and issued a ho-contact order that would have been enforceable for
five years. The district court did not do this. Instead, it suspended 334 days of her
sentence for 24 months, imposed a no-contact condition ofthe sentence, and issued
a no-contact order purportedly valid for five years.
The no-contact order could not last longer than the no-contact condition of
the sentence. Therefore, the district court erred when it refused to vacate the order
11
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
after Granath completed her suspended sentence in December 2014. We affirm the
Court of Appeals. , .
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that RCW 10.99.050 authorizes a
district court to issue a DV no-contact order that lasts for the duration ofthe
defendant's suspended sentence. The no-contact order issued in this case was not
enforceable after Granath completed her suspended sentence in December 2014,
and the district court should have granted her motion to vacate.
12
State V. Granath, No. 94892-5
WE CONCUR:
)
%
/
13
State V. Granath (Wendy)
(Stephens, J., dissenting)
No. 94892-5
STEPHENS,J.(dissenting)—disagree with the majority's narrow view of a
district court's authority to enter a domestic violence no-contact order (DVNCO).
RCW 10.99.050 authorizes a sentencing court to issue a specialized condition of
receiving a suspended or deferred sentence: a stand-alone DVNCO that is
enforceable by any court in Washington. Contrary to the majority's reading ofRCW
10.99.050, the statute effectively specifies the duration of the stand-alone order by
directing that it shall be designated in the DVNCO itself. RCW 10.99.050(3).
Accordingly, a DVNCO does not tacitly expire with the conclusion of a suspended
sentence. The victim is entitled to protection for the full period oftime specified in
the order, which cannot exceed five years.
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
1. A DVNCO Issued under RCW 10.99.050 Stands on Its Own and Is Not
Limited to the Length ofthe Underlying Sentence
A DVNCO can survive independently of the term of probation if the district
court retains postconviction jurisdiction over a defendant. In sentencing
misdemeanor violations, the district court may suspend all or part of any sentence
and fix conditions of such suspension. RCW 3.66.067-.068. When a defendant
commits a domestic violence offense, the district court has the ability to retain
jurisdiction over a defendant for up to five years after the imposition ofthe sentence.
RCW 3.66.068(l)(a). District courts possess wide discretion to issue suspended
sentences or to impose sentences and conditions with '"carrot-and-stick
incentive[s]'" to promote rehabilitation—a central goal of misdemeanor sentencing.
Harris v. Charles, 171 Wn.2d 455, 459, 465,
256 P.3d 328 (2011)(alteration m
original)(quoting Wahleithner v. Thompson,
134 Wn. App. 931, 941,
143 P.3d 321
(2006)). Conditions such as no contact with the victim, engaging in a mental health
evaluation, or completing substance abuse treatment serve as reformative incentives
in the face of purely punitive punishment—jail time. However, a court may not
impose sentencing conditions unless it suspends jail time. State v. Gailus,
136 Wn.
App. 191, 201,
147 P.3d 1300 (2006), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Sutherby,
165 Wn.2d 870,
204 P.3d 916(2009).
-2-
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
This case concerns the proper interpretation of RCW 10.99.050. Statutory
interpretation is a legal question reviewed de novo. State v. Costich, 152 Wn.2d
463,470,
98 P.3d 795(2004). The court must first look to a statute's plain meaning.
Plain meaning may be discerned from all that the legislature has said in the statute
and related statutes that disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.
Dep't ofEcology V. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC,
146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10,
43 P.3d 4(2002).
Courts must keep in mind the need to satisfy the intent of the legislature while
avoiding absurd results. In re Det. ofSwanson,
115 Wn.2d 21, 28,
793 P.2d 962,
804 P.2d 1 (1990).
a. The Plain Language ofRCW 10.99.050 Establishes a Stand-Alone Order
While a DVNCO can be issued only when a sentence is suspended or deferred,
the order can nonetheless survive for up to five years following a conviction.
Chapter 10.99 RCW anticipates that courts may issue no-contact orders at every
possible juncture of prosecution. See RCW 10.99.040(2)(a)(court may impose a
no-contact order before arraignment or trial),(3)(at the time of arraignment, "the
court shall determine whether a no-contact order shall be issued or extended"),
.050(1)(the court may issue a postconviction no-contact order as a condition of
sentence);State v. Schultz, 146 Wn.2d 540,544,
48 P.3d 301 (2002). Victims remain
vulnerable throughout their abuser's prosecution and especially when a convicted
-3-
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
abuser is released from jail or completes active probation. Chapter 10.99 RCW
recognizes these victims' reality.
The State and Granath argue over RCW 10.99.050(l)'s use of the phrase
"such condition shall be recorded" in determining whether the authority to issue a
DVNCO under RCW 10.99.050 is tethered to the length of probation. (Emphasis
added.) The majority agrees with Granath that "recorded" indicates that a DVNCO
is merely "recording" a condition of the sentence, thus there is no authority for the
order to last longer than the condition it records. See majority at 7. This view fails
to read chapter 10.99 RCW as a whole, including its stated purpose.
At each point of prosecution, a corresponding statute under chapter 10.99
RCW grants the judge the authority to "issue" a no-contact order. The verb "issue"
connotes authority. See RCW 10.99.050(2)(a)("[wjillful violation of a court order
issued under this section"),.040(7)(referring to orders "issued under this chapter").
RCW 10.99.050(1) empowers sentencing courts to issue DYNCOs as long as a
DVNCO is recorded as a condition ofthe sentence. RCW 10.99.050(2)-(3) discuss
the parameters for issuing such an order. "Recorded" merely indicates that RCW
10.99.050 can be utilized by a sentencing court. As long as a condition of the
sentence that includes the issuance of a DVNCO has been laid out in the judgment
and sentence,RCW 10.99.050 may be separately invoked. Ifa DVNCO were a mere
-4-
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
recording instrument of the no-contact condition in the judgment and sentence, as
the majority posits, the creation of RCW 10.99.050 would be unnecessary because
the judgment and sentence already orders no contact with the victim.
A DVNCO issued under RCW 10.99.050 does more than record a sentencing
condition; it enables a sentencing court to exercise discretion in how to best keep a
victim safe from further abuse. The sentencing judge issuing a DVNCO achieves
this by outlining specific parameters of how a defendant is to accomplish the
rehabilitative portion of his or her sentence in not coming into contact with his or
her victim. This structure is illustrated by the fact that a DVNCO contains
additional, specific provisions of no-contact that are not included in the judgment
and sentence. In Granath's case, she was not ordered merely to have no contact with
the victim as indicated on the judgment and sentence, she was specifically ordered
by the DVNCO to remain 500 feet away from her victim, not to keep her victim
under surveillance, and not to contact her victim through third parties, among other
restrictions. Clerk's Papers(CP)at 39. If the DVNCO were purely a recording of
the sentencing condition, we would expect it to match the judgment and sentence.
The plain language of RCW 10.99.050 also reveals that a DVNCO is
enforceable beyond the duration of a probationary period, reinforcing that the order
stands on its own. RCW 10.99.050(2)(a) and RCW 10.99.050(3) are instructive.
-5-
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
RCW 10.99.050(2)(a) states that a "[w]illfull violation of a court order issued under
this section is punishable under RCW 26.50.110." Nowhere in RCW 10.99.050 is
it stated that a violation of a DVNCO must necessarily result in revocation of a
suspended sentence. The only language that RCW 10.99.050 sets out for violating
the DVNCO condition ofreceiving a suspended or deferred sentence is punishment
under RCW 26.50.110. It follows that during active probation, a DVNCO may be
enforced by both revocation of the suspended or deferred sentence pursuant to the
judgment and sentence, and by independent punishment provided by RCW
10.99.050(2)(a). After the term of probation ends, a DVNCO is enforced solely
under RCW 26.50.110. This understanding of the statute is consistent with a plain
reading of RCW 10.99.050(2)-(3) that lays out the terms for complying with a
DVNCO issued under RCW 10.99.050(1).
Further,RCW 10.99.050(3)provides that a sentencing judge must indicate on
the order that the district court actively retains jurisdiction over the defendant in
enforcing the order. That jurisdiction could operate during probation only or up to
five years as part of receiving a suspended or deferred sentence. This reading is
compatible with RCW 3.66.068(l)(a), which states that district courts can retain
"continuing jurisdiction and authority" over defendants for up to five years to
suspend or defer a sentence upon stated terms. Such terms of suspension or
-6-
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
deferment may include the issuance of a stand-alone no-contact order under RCW
10.99.050, as is the case here. Thus, an order issued under RCW 10.99.050 cannot
exceed the court's jurisdiction, and Granath's does not.
Pursuant to RCW 10.99.040(2)(c), the legislature tasked the Administrative
Office ofthe Courts(AOC)with developing master pattern forms for all no-contact
orders issued under chapter 10.99 RCW. Such no-contact orders issued under
chapter 10.99 RCW are to "substantially comply" with the pattern form developed
by AOC. Id. On Granath's DVNCO,a bold text box indicates that the district court
could retain, and did retain, continuing jurisdiction and authority to issue the
DVNCO for five years. CP at 39. The pattern form does not limit the DYNCO's
duration to the end of the probationary period. While the AOC's interpretation
provided in the pattern DVNCO is not binding, it follows from a plain reading of
RCW 10.99.050 as providing for a stand-alone no-contact order. Further reinforcing
this view,the "conditions" section on Granath'sjudgment and sentence refers to "the
separate No-Contact Order," evidence of the that fact that RCW 10.99.050 orders
are in addition to terms of sentencing. CP at 35.
Finally,"closing" a case is not synonymous with "terminat[ing]" a case under
the plain language of RCW 10.99.050(4). When Granath "closed" her case on
December 8, 2014 by paying the remainder of her fines, the court did not also
-7-
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
"terminate^" her DVNCO under RCW 10.99.050(4). The specialized condition for
receiving a suspended sentence remained in effect for three more years after her case
"closed," despite the end ofthe probation term. Because RCW 10.99.050(4)requires
actual "modifi[cation]" or "terminat[ion]" of a DVNCO, not simply assuming a
DVNCO is void at the end ofa probationary period, this plain language indicates the
legislature intended a DVNCO to be issued as a stand-alone order that must also be
vacated independent ofthe probationary period's completion.
b. Legislative Purpose: To Protect Victims
Statutes should be interpreted to further, not frustrate, their intended purpose.
Bostain v. Food Express, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 700, 712,
153 P.3d 846 (2007)(citing
Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co.,
123 Wn.2d 93, 99,
864 P.2d 937 (1994). Chapter
10.99 RCW was enacted for the protection of the victim, not punishment of the
abuser. The plain language of RCW 10.99.050 reflects the clear statutory purpose
outlined in RCW 10.99.010; "[T]o recognize the importance of domestic violence
as a serious crime against society and to assure the victim ofdomestic violence the
maximum protectionfrom abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can
provide."" (Emphasis added.) Recognizing a DVNCO lasts for the maximum term
of authority a sentencing judge has to impose sentencing conditions under RCW
3.66.068 provides "maximum protection from abuse" for victims, without further
-8-
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
punishing the defendant. Keeping a convicted domestic abuser away from his or her
victim is not punishment; it is deserved protection for the domestic violence
survivor. That it may also require the abuser to exercise rehabilitative self-control
around those who do not desire unwanted contact does not alter its purpose. Thus,
while RCW 3.66.068 concerns pimishment, RCW 10.99.050 concerns protection
without overstepping the jurisdictional limits provided by RCW 3.66.068. This
relationship between the two statutes is consistent with the legislative purpose set
out in RCW 10.99.010—^protection of victims.
I am concerned that the majority's interpretation of RCW 10.99.050 will
undermine the protective purpose of chapter 10.99 RCW. A copy ofthe DVNCO is
provided to both the victim and law enforcement. RCW 10.99.050(1),(3). RCW
10.99.050(3) instructs that the DVNCO shall be entered for "one year or until the
expiration date specified on the order." If DYNCOs that specify a duration longer
than the length of probation become automatically void after probation without
further court action, as the majority advances, how is law enforcement and, most
importantly, the victim to know of the abuser's lawful ability to contact the victim?
See majority at 8-10 (stating that the State's "public policy argument is inconsistent
with the plain language ofthe statute"). We should not interpret chapter 10.99 RCW
-9-
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
to create such a risk of confusion—and harm. Such an interpretation goes against
the legislative purpose to protect victims' safety.
Discerning RCW 10.99.050's plain meaning requires this court to examine
not only RCW 10.99.050 but also related statutes, with an eye toward finding a
harmonious statutory scheme. State v. Bigsby, 189 Wn.2d 210, 216,
399 P.3d 540
(2017). The majority references related statutes, but fails to fully appreciate and
analyze their interlaced relationship to RCW 10.99.050. See majority at 5, 7. Two
related statutes concerning the same subject matter—a sentencing court's authority
to protect victims—illuminate the fact that DVNCOs are imposed as stand-alone
orders. RCW 7.90.150(6)(a) (sexual assault postconviction orders) and RCW
7.92.160(6)(a)(stalking postconviction orders)share the same enabling language as
RCW 10.99.050(1) for a sentencing court to issue a specialized no-contact order:
"When a defendant is found guilty of[the relevant type of crime] and a condition of
the sentence restricts the defendant's ability to have contact with the victim, such
condition shall be recorded . . . ." The only difference between these victim-
protecting statutes and RCW 10.99.050 is that duration of the order is explicitly
stated in the statute.^ However, these other specialized orders were intended to be
^ See RCW 7.92.160(6)(c)("A final stalking no-contact order entered in conjunction
with a criminal prosecution shall remain in effect for a period of five years from the date
of entry."); RCW 7.90.150(6)(c) ("A final sexual assault protection order entered in
conjunction with a criminal prosecution shall remain in effect for a period of two years
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State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
issued only if a victim could not qualify for a DVNCO.^ In addition, RCW 7.90.150
was designed to mirror domestic violence protections issued under RCW 10.99.050.^
Given this statutory scheme, it makes little sense that the legislature intended to
afford sexual assault and stalking victims protection even after a defendant has
completed probation, but denied similar protection to domestic violence victims.
In sum, I would hold that the plain language of RCW 10.99.050 establishes
that a DVNCO is issued as a stand-alone order at the time of sentencing and is not
dependent on the length of probation.
II. Duration ofthe DVNCO Is Found on the Face ofthe Order
Although a sentence may be suspended for less than five years, that does not
mean a DVNCO issued as part ofthe sentence, generally, must match the length of
the imposed suspended sentence. Contrary to the majority's interpretation.
following the expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and subsequent period of
community supervision, conditional release, probation, or parole.").
^ See RCW 7.90.005 ("It is the intent of the legislature that the sexual assault
protection order created by this chapter be a remedy for victims who do not qualify for a
domestic violence order of protection."); RCW 7.92.010 ("Victims of stalking conduct
deserve the same protection and access to the court system as victims of domestic violence
and sexual assault . . .. The legislature finds that preventing the issuance of conflicting
orders is in the interest of both petitioners and respondents.").
^ House Judiciary Comm., H.B. Analysis on H.B. 2576, at 3, 59th Leg., Reg.
Sess.(Wash.2006)("Violations of a SAPO [sexual assault protection order] have the same
penalties as violations of domestic violence protection orders."); SENATE COMM. ON
Judiciary, S.B. Rep.on S.B.6478,at 2-3, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess.(Wash.2006)("[A sexual
assault victim] should be able to get the same protections as a domestic violence
victim.... This legislation is meant to mirror domestic violence protection orders.").
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State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
durational language is indicated in RCW 10.99.050(3)—^by reference to the
expiration date specified on the order. The majority reads "expiration date specified
on the order" to be synonymous with "expiration date of the suspended or deferred
sentence." See majority at 5-6. This is not the plain language of the statute. For
Granath's convictions, the district court imposed 364 days in jail with 334 days
suspended for 24 months on various conditions, including the issuance of a separate
no-contact order. CP at 35-37. On its face, the order stated,"This no-contact order
expires on: . Five years jhom today if no date is entered." CP at 39. No
date was written in the blank. Id. Consistent with the plain reading of RCW
10.66.068, the district court lawfully retained jurisdiction over Granath by issuing a
DVNCO for a period offive years as a condition ofreceiving a suspended sentence
and specified this duration on the face ofthe DCNVO.
The scheme of issuing a DVNCO for a greater length than the probationary
period reinforces the sentencing court's wide discretion in determining what kind of
sentence best rehabilitates a domestic violence offender. A sentencing court may
decide that active probation is not necessary after two years, but this does not mean
the victim's protection must end. RCW 26.50.110 may act as an incentive for
offenders to remain in compliance with a DVNCO without the added cost of
probation and active monitoring. RCW 10.99.050(2)(a). For this to happen,RCW
-12-
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
10.99.050 ensures a DVNCO does not expire the moment a person is released or
completes her term of probation. The legislature articulated that the response to
domestic violence is "the enforcement of the laws to protect the victim and [to]
communicate the attitude that violent behavior is not excused or tolerated." RCW
10.99.010. A protection order that lasts beyond probation serves this purpose
without further punishing the defendant. It is properly understood as a stand-alone
order.
CONCLUSION
A DVNCO's purpose is clear: to protect survivors of domestic violence from
further harm. To effectuate this purpose, RCW 10.99.050 authorizes a sentencing
judge to issue a stand-alone no-contact order and to impose it for the duration stated
on the order, not to exceed five years. I would reverse the Court ofAppeals decision
and reinstate the district court's denial of Granath's motion to vacate the no-contact
order.
-13-
State V. Granath (Wendy), 94892-5 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
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