¶1
¶2Defendant answered, admitting the execution of the notes and mortgage, and pleaded counterclaim, praying that the notes and mortgage sued on be canceled, and demanding damages against the plaintiff for false representations. The matters of fraud claimed by defendant are, in substance:
¶3(1) That the plaintiff fraudulently and falsely represented to the defendant that he personally knew the cash value of the Jasper County farm in controversy, and that it was actually worth, on November 23, 1917, $175 per acre.
¶4*1270(2) That said land was not subject to overflow.
¶5(3) That said land had been subject to overflow but once in the previous six years, but that this did not prevent the producing of good crops thereon for that season.
¶6(4) That the plaintiff had raised crops on said land of full and average yield during each of said six years.
¶7(5) That a drainage district had legally been established which included said farm, and that such improvement would be completed within the near future.
¶8To entitle defendant to recover, it was incumbent upon him to establish that one or more of the representations were made by plaintiff, as alleged; that such representations were false; that plaintiff knew that such representations were false when he made them, or that he made said representations, assuming and asserting that he had personal knowledge thereof; that they were made for the purpose of inducing the defendant to make the trade; that the defendant relied upon the representations, and was thereby induced to make the exchange of properties.
¶9The court made findings of fact, finding that the plaintiff, J. W. Davis, made false representations as to the value of the Jasper County land on November 23, 1917, and as to the quality of the land, its productiveness, and the amount capable of cultivation, substantially as pleaded by defendant in his answer and counterclaim and claimed by him in his evidence; that the statements or representations were not made by the plaintiff as mere expressions of opinion, but were made as positive statements of fact, for the purpose of having them acted upon as true; that the defendant believed the false representations to be true, and relied upon them, and in such belief and reliance was induced to exchange farms with the plaintiff. The court further found that the Jasper County farm was worth $80 an acre on November 23, 1917, instead of $175 an acre, as represented by plaintiff. The court canceled the $21,500 mortgage on the Jasper County land, given by defendant to plaintiff, and found that the defendant made a case entitling him to relief in damages in the sum of $23,885, less the notes in suit, secured by mortgage in the amount of $21,500, leaving due from plaintiff $2,385, and interest thereon at 6 per cent to the date of judgment in the sum of $278, making a total of $2,663; and that, the *1271plaintiff Raving paid interest on the first mortgage on tRe Jasper County farm, amounting to $818, Re was entitled to a credit for said sum, leaving a net balance of $1,845 due tRe defendant Prank Walker on Ris counterclaim, for wRicR Re was entitled to judgment against tRe plaintiff. Prom tRe decree canceling tRe $21,500 mortgage, and from tRe judgment against plaintiff on defendant’s counterclaim, tRis appeal is taken.
¶10’ Altkougk tRe case was Reard in equity, tRe demand in tRe counterclaim is for damages. TRe defendant confirmed tRe ex-cRange of properties, and elected to recoup in damages for injury wRicR Re claims in consequence of tRe false representations wRicR Re claims were made to Rim by plaintiff, to induce Rim to make tlie exckange of properties. In sucR a case, scienter or its equivalent must be proven. Richards v. Fredrickson, 171 Iowa 669.
¶11TRere is a wide divergence in tRe tReories of counsel as to tRe cliaracter of tRe transaction, and, tRerefore, Row tRe case sliould be considered and tRe law applied. TRere can be but little dispute as to tRe law applicable to tRe case, wRen a correct tReory of tRe case is arrived at.
¶12We Rave carefully examined tRe record. We Rave also examined tRe transcript of tRe evidence. TRere is conflict in tRe evidence on material points, wRicR we always find in sucR cases. Plaintiff left no material eRarge of fraud or untoward fact undenied, or witRout plausible explanation. His case was bandied by his counsel with consummate skill. We are constrained to believe that the plaintiff overreached the defendant by subtle and effective fraud. Davis was a shrewd, resourceful man, a dealer and trader in lands of large experience. He Rad owned the Jasper County land for several years, and knew all about it. Walker was a farmer, with limited business experience and witRout experience in land dealing. He was totally unacquainted with the Jasper County land, and ignorant of its value and character, and Davis knew that. We think the record abundantly shows that Davis, through Nelson, and by Ris own talk with Walker, gained the confidence of Walker, so that Walker believed Ris statements to be true, concerning the land and its value, and implicitly relied upon them.
¶13We are convinced, from the evidence and the facts and cir*1272cumstances surrounding the transaction shown in the record, that Davis made representations as to the kind and quality o£ the Jasper County land, its productiveness, and freedom from overflow, and also as to the establishing of a drainage system which would include the land, substantially as claimed by Walker; and that such representations were false, and known by Davis to be false, at the time he made them. We also find that it was proved that Davis said to Walker that he knew the value of the land, and made the positive statement of fact for the purpose of having it acted upon as true, that the land was of the actual value of $175 an acre. Walker, ignorant of the value, believed the several statements made to him by Davis concerning the land and the value of the land, and relied upon such statements, and because of such belief and reliance was induced to exchange farms. Davis cannot be heard to say that he did not know that such statements were false, at the time he asserted them. Haigh v. White Way Laundry Co., 164 Iowa 143; Richards v. Fredrickson, 171 Iowa 669.
¶14Making due allowance for conflict in the testimony as to the values of the Jasper County farm and the Minnesota farm, and all other questions in dispute, it stands out in bold relief in the record that Walker received not one cent in value for his Minnesota farm of 320 acres, whatever interest he had in it; and we think it is shown by the evidence to have been worth approximately $75 per acre, in which the defendant had an interest worth, above the incumbrance, about $16,50.0. Of course, the mere fact that Walker got the worst of the deal and lost his farm would not entitle him to relief. We must determine whether the representations claimed by defendant to have been made by plaintiff were in fact made, and their legal effect, and whether there existed also the other essential elements necessary to make out actionable fraud. Counsel for plaintiff argue ably and plausibly that the transaction involved was simply an exchange of farms, wherein both parties placed upon their farms inflated values, for the purpose of trade and exchange; that neither plaintiff nor defendant attempted nor intended to put on actual values; that thei’e was no fraud committed; and that plaintiff did not make the representations attributed to him by the defendant as to the value and character of the Jasper *1273County land. Counsel for plaintiff strenuously argue that the representation as to the value of the Jasper County farm was merely an expression of opinion, on which the defendant had no right to rely, and did not amount to fraud. We cannot agree with the theory of plaintiff’s counsel as to mutual placing of inflated and trading values upon the two farms. Defendant priced his farm at from $70 to $75 per acre, and we think the evidence establishes that his farm was fairly and reasonably worth that amount; that that was a fair and reasonable market value of his farm; and that he did not inflate the value of it, at least to any considerable extent. On the other hand, we are convinced, from the testimony and the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, that Davis positively stated to Walker, before the contract was entered into, that he knew the value of his Jasper County farm, and that its actual value was $175 per acre. We are strongly convinced that Davis made this positive statement to Walker as to the value of his land, and that Walker believed and relied upon such statement. In making-such statement of value, which he knew to be false, the law imputes to him a fraudulent purpose. Davis v. Central Land Co., 162 Iowa 269.
¶15
¶16In Mattauch v. Walsh Bros., supra, we said:
“Counsel have discussed somewhat the question as to whether a statement of value may be regarded as an assertion of fact, or should be treated as the expression of opinion merely. This must necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case, and usually upon the intention of the party making the statement. Here, the evidence in behalf of plaintiff clearly indicated the intention of Walsh that his assertion of the value of the land should be acted upon as true, and not merely as his estimate; and if so, and it was knowingly false and induced an exchange by plaintiff to her damage, it was actionable. ’ ’
¶17It must be borne in mind also that Davis, according to the testimony of Walker, re-enforced his statement as to the value of his land by telling Walker that he had paid $140 an acre for it, some years before. Davis denied this statement in a modified way. He admitted that he told Walker he paid $125 an acre for it. The record shows conclusively that he paid only $82 an acre for the land. We have held that false representations as to the cost of property are statements of fact entitling recovery, if relied on to one’s injury. Dorr v. Cory, 108 Iowa 725; Holmes v. Rivers, 145 Iowa 702.
¶18The transaction in controversy seems to have been initiated by Myers, a real estate broker, of Bamsville, Minnesota, who told Walker that he knew a man in Minneapolis with a farm *1275east of Des Moines which he would exchange for Walker’s Minnesota farm. Myers said he would have a man come out and look at it. Three or four days later, he brought one Chris Nelson out. It appears that Nelson was a real estate agent, one of Davis’s acquaintances, with whom Davis had had some dealing. When Nelson came to Walker’s farm, he told Walker that he and Davis owned this Jasper County farm together, and that he wanted to get his money out of the Iowa farm, and wanted Walker’s land for his share. He told Walker that he owned a one-half interest in the Jasper County farm, and said that the farm was a very productive farm for corn — was rich land; that his partner, Davis, had always fed cattle on this farm; and that it was a very rich, productive farm. Nelson arranged a meeting with Davis at Des Moines, and brought Walker with him. From Des Moines,' Davis, Nelson, Myers, and Walker went to Newton by train, and from there 12 miles out to the Davis farm by auto. Nelson is accredited as the agent of Davis. He was a good decoy. On the way down from Minnesota, Nelson sought to al-lay any suspicion that Walker might have when he came in sight of the Davis farm, regarding the overflow of the Skunk River. He told Walker that it was not the Skunk River that ran through the farm, but was just a small branch; that it never overflowed very often, and when it did, it never hurt anything. Nelson was present at the trial of the case, but was not called as a witness, to deny any of the statements attributed to him by Walker. Walker testified that Davis represented to him about the same as Nelson had: that it was only a branch of the Skunk River that ran through the farm, and not the main channel of the river, and that it very seldom overflowed; that it had only overflowed once since he had had the farm — six years. On the contrary, it appears conclusively from the record that the main channel of the Skunk River runs the entire length of the farm, and that about 200 acres of the land is located on either side of the Skunk River in the bottom, and is overflowed by the river’s coming out of its banks, a number of witnesses say, as many as ten times a year. Witnesses who have been well acquainted with the land for many years testified that only one crop has been raised on it in 38 years, and that on only a small portion of it. We think the lower court placed the value of the land fully high enough *1276at $80 an acre, under the record. Land that has raised only one crop on a small portion of it in 38 years is not very valuable, especially when it further appears that it is not fit for meadow, and is very poor pasture because of the frequent overflow.
¶19Witnesses called by defendant, who were acquainted with the land many years, and owned land in the vicinity, placed the value of the land at from $40 to $50 an acre. Two real estate men, produced by Davis as witnesses, placed the value of the land at $100 an acre. The trial court found the land to be worth $80 an acre, which we think was a high value — even beyond what the evidence shows the land was worth.
¶20We are warranted in finding’ from the record that Davis represented to Walker that a drainage district had been established which included this land. It appears from the record that no drainage district was ever established. One had been petitioned for and had been abandoned three years before this time.
¶21
“It is to be conceded that authorities substantially to this effect may be found, but it is equally true that the rule, as broadly stated by counsel, is now generally repudiated by the courts. We have repeatedly refused to recognize it in cases of this character. The more reasonable and just rule is that, as between the parties to a contract obtained by fraud and deceit, the party making a representation for the purpose of inducing another to act will not be heard to say that his false statement ought not to have been believed. ’ ’
¶22We think appellee was not guilty of negligence that would defeat his recovery.
¶23After a careful examination of the record, we come to the conclusion that appellant, J. W. Davis, made false representations as to the Jasper County land, substantially as claimed by appellee Walker, and that the other elements necessary to make out actionable fraud were established; that the reasonable market value of the Minnesota 320 acres was $23,360, or $73 per acre; that the mortgage given by Walker to Davis on the Jasper County 281-acre farm was $21,500; that the reasonable market value of the Jasper County farm was $22,480, or $80 per acre; that defendant Walker has made out a case entitling relief in damages in the amount of $22,380, being the difference between $44,860, which he paid Davis for the Jasper County farm by conveying his Minnesota land of the value of $23,360 and giving a mortgage on the Jasper County land for $21,500, and the value of the Jasper County farm; and that the notes-and mortgage in suit should be canceled and held for naught. Substracting the amount of the notes, $21,500, from the $22,380 damages found, reduces the damages to $880, with interest thereon to date of judgment, $100.47, making $980.47; and Davis, having paid the interest on the first mortgage on the Jasper County farm, which payment, with interest, thereon amounted to $818, was entitled to credit in that amount, leaving a balance of $162.47 due the defendant Prank Walker on his counterclaim, for which he was entitled to judgment against the plaintiff, J. W. Davis.
¶24*1278
¶25We think the proof found in the record furnished an unobjectionable measure of damages in the instant case. While ap-pellee had a right to submit evidence invoking the approved rule, and thereby avail himself of the full fruits of his bargain, appellant cannot complain that he did not.
¶26*1279The judgment of the lower court is modified by reducing the personal judgment for $1,845 to $162.47; and otherwise the decree and judgment are affirmed. — Modified and affirmed.
¶27Supplemental Opinion.
¶28ARTHUR, J. — To avoid misunderstanding of our holding as to measure of damages adopted in this cause, perhaps something should be added.
¶29It is insisted by appellant, in petition for rehearing, that, by assessing damages in the amount of the differences between the price which Walker paid Davis for the Jasper County land, as found from the evidence, and the reasonable market value thereof, we depart from and abrogate the rule heretofore announced by this court in many cases, and even in this case,— that, as said in the Stokecase:
‘ ‘ The overwhelming weight of authority in this country approves the allowance, as to the measure of damages, of the difference between the actual value of the property at the time of the purchase and its valuefif it had been what it was represented to be.”
¶30Our holding in the instant case is not intended to and does not effect a renunciation or abandonment of the rule announced in the Stokecase and other cases holding similarly. In such eases as the instant case, as in the Stokecase, the party claiming damages flowing from fraud has properly insisted upon the rule that gives the defrauded innocent party the full benefit of his bargain. But a party guilty of fraud, as was appellant, cannot consistently complain that the damage he has inflicted has been calculated in a manner more favorable to him and less favorable to the injured party. In some jurisdictions, and notably in our Federal courts, a party who has sustained damages is confined to measure his damages by the difference between the price paid — his outlay — and the value of the property purchased ; the defrauding party is bound to make good the loss sustained, but his liability does not include the defrauded party’s expected *1280bargain. Appellee, who has manifestly sustained great damage, may not be denied recovery because he has not availed himself of the approved rule, which might yield him larger damages. Since the proof shows appellee entitled to recover under the so-called Federal rule, the appellant cannot complain that appellee did not prove himself entitled to a larger amount, under the general rule.
¶31The original opinion must be adhered to, and the petition for rehearing is overruled.