Johnson v. Crouse’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 2 district · 44 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"... Our habitual criminal act merely provides a more severe penalty for the commission of a felony by an habitual criminal than by one who is a first time offender ..." (l.c. 700.)”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fairbanks v. State · State v. Felton

2. ““. . . since there is no evidence of bad faith, petitioner must be held to be bound by the acts of his attorney when the acts were performed in his presence and without his objection. This has long been the rule with respect to retained counsel (Miller v. Hudspeth, supra. Syl. ¶ 14), and the administration of criminal justice dictates a similar rule where counsel is court appointed.” (1. c. 699.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Hasty · State v. Spain

3. ““The petitioner asserts he was not given reasonable notice or apportunity to be heard prior to being sentenced by the district court under G. S. 1949, 21-107a, as an habitual criminal. This case is similar in many respects to State v. Messmore, 115 Kan. 354, 264 P. 2d 911 , where it was held that when a defendant does not object to the notice given, freely admits the former felony convictions, and does not object to the imposition of the increased sentence, notice is waived and the judgment will not be set aside. Likewise, it is similar to Sanders v. Hand, 190 Kan. 457 , 375 P. 2d 785 , where the petitioner was not informed of the state’s intention to request sentencing as an habitual criminal until he was before the court for judgment and sentence. In the opinion it was said: . . the petitioner was present in person and by counsel at the time the state requested the district court to invoke the habitual criminal act and increase the sentence. Neither he nor his attorney objected to the application of the statute in sentencing, or attacked the authenticated records of the two previous felony convictions. The court gave them an opportunity to do so, but they remained silent. The time for complaint was then, not now. The claim that the petitioner was denied due process of law is rejected, and the writ is denied.’ (l.c. 460.)” (pp. 698, 699.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Ralph