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191 So. 2d 612

Docket No. 66-251.

Brown v. State

Thomas Mitchell BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided October 18, 1966.

Rehearing Denied November 30, 1966.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1966-10-18

Relies on Escobedo v. Illinois · Simpson v. State · Montgomery v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1966-10-18

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently January 1986

7 state decisions

40196619701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Nicholas Tsamoutales, Miami; for appellant.

¶2Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Barry N. Semet, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

¶3Before HENDRY, C.J., and PEARSON and SWANN, JJ.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5The appellant brings this appeal from a denial of his motion for relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix. Since the order was entered without an evidentiary hearing, the question presented is whether or not the motion was sufficient in substance to support the relief prayed.

¶6The substance of appellant's motion is that his court-appointed counsel was incompetent in that he did not spend sufficient time in the preparation of the case. While allegations of the incompetency of court-appointed counsel may be a ground for relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 1, an allegation that the court-appointed attorney did not spend enough time with the accused is not sufficient to constitute a basis for an evidentiary hearing. Simpson v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 164 So.2d 224.

¶7We agree with the trial court that those portions of the motion attempting to raise collaterally the voluntariness of the confession are insufficient to constitute a ground for relief. See Brown v. State, Fla.App. 1966, 187 So.2d 669, and cases cited therein.

¶8*613 Appellant's remaining allegation attempts to collaterally attack the judgment upon the basis of his interrogation prior to trial. See Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 48 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977. The trial court correctly held that under the allegations of this petition, the judgment was not subject to collateral attack on this ground. See Montgomery v. State, Fla. 1965, 176 So.2d 331.

¶9Affirmed.

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