Deposit Bank of Frankfort v. Board of Councilmen of the City of Frankfort’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

98 federal appellate · 25 district · 86 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 357 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “final until reversed in an appellate court, or modified or set aside in the court of its rendition.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Stoll v. Gottlieb · Indiana Public Interest Research Group v. City of Bloomington

2. ““ It is urged that the state judgment upon which the Federal decree of 1898 is based was afterward reversed by the highest court of Kentucky, and, therefore, the foundation of the decree has been removed and the decree itself must fall. But is this argument sound? When a plea of res judicata is interposed based upon a former judgment between the parties, the question is not what were the reasons upon which the judgment proceeded, but what was the judgment itself, was it within the jurisdiction of the court, between the same parties, and is it still in force and effect? The doctrine of estoppel by judgment is founded upon the proposition that all controversies and contentions involved are set at rest by a judgment or decree lawfully rendered which in its terms em bodied a settlement of the rights of the parties. It would undermine the foundation of the principle upon which it is based if the court might inquire into and revise the reasons which led the court to make the judgment. . . . We are unable to find reason or authority supporting the proposition that because a judgment may have been given for wrong reasons or has been subsequently reversed, that it is any the less effective as an estoppel between the parties while in force.” “It is to be remembered,” the court added (p. 512), “ that we are not dealing with the right of the parties to get relief from the original judgment by bill of review or other process in the Federal court in which it was rendered. There the court m”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Reed v. Allen · Lapin v. Shulton, Inc.

3. ““It results from the foregoing that, the two judgments rendered after the expiration of the original charter necessarily adjudged the claim of exemption upon identically the same facts and conditions as those here presented, and 1liey. therefore, are conclusive, unless the proposition be sound that, a claim for taxes for one year being a distinct cause of action from the tax for a subsequent year, the judgment holding that the tax of the prior year cannot he assessed or collected can never be the subject of the thing adjudged as to the tax for the future year, however absolute may be the identity of the defense aud of the facts upon which the defense is founded. * * * The estoppel resulting from the thing adjudged does not depend upon whether there is the same demand in both cases, but exists, even although there be different demands, when the question upon which the recovery of the second demand depends has under identical circumstances and conditions been previously concluded by a judgment between the parties or their privies. This is the elemental role, stated in the text-books and enforced by many decisions of this court.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fitch v. Stanton Tp. · George Kemp Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner