¶1concurring specially.
¶2I fully concur in Divisions 1 and 2. Because of the dissent’s interpretation of Division 3, I must explain my concurrence in that division. The majority acknowledges that plaintiff must show a causal connection between the breach of a legal duty and the damages complained of but then points to the fire chief’s affidavit as evidence related to the amount of damages. That does not address the proximate cause element of the alleged tort. The fire chiefs affidavit provides some evidence that the defendants’ failure to post a watchman was a contributing cause of the extent of the damages sustained. Since mo-vant failed to show conclusively that its acts or omissions while it was in custody and control of the premises were not a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by plaintiff as a result of the fire, it was not entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint.
¶3concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶4I fully concur with Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion. However, I am compelled to dissent to Division 3.
¶51. Negligence per se provides only two of the four elements required to sustain a cause of action based on a negligence tort, that is duty and breach thereof. In order to prevail, plaintiff must still establish the elements of causation and damages. See generally Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 254 Ga. 728, 730 (333 SE2d 829); Whelchel v. Laing Properties, 190 Ga. App. 182, 185 (378 SE2d 478). Unlike my learned colleagues, I do not believe that causation has been established in this case. There exists not one shred of evidence in this record that any act or omission of Orkin or its agents was the proximate cause of the starting of the fire on this premises (a part of *626which is shown to have been built over 100 years ago). Nor is there any evidence in this record to establish that Orkin, who was using a nonflammable, flame-retardant gas to fumigate the premises, was a joint tortfeasor. Thus, clearly the evidence of record creates no genuine issue of proximate cause for jury resolution.
¶6It is a “ ‘well settled principle of negligence law that the occurrence of an unfortunate event is not sufficient to authorize an inference of negligence.’ ” Cherokee County Hosp. Auth. v. Beaver, 179 Ga. App. 200, 202 (345 SE2d 904); Franklin v. Elmer, 174 Ga. App. 839, 842 (332 SE2d 314). Moreover, for reasons stated by the majority in Division 2 of its opinion, appellant is not entitled to avail herself of the principle of res ipsa loquitur in this instance to supply the necessary inference to overcome the lack of proof of causation.
¶7The majority apparently, however, finds a sufficient showing of causation solely in the fire chief’s affidavit. I do not. First, the affidavit fails to establish that failure to notify the fire department of the contemplated fumigation was the cause of appellant’s injury, that is, the fire. Moreover, the affidavit in effect establishes that if the fire department had received earlier notification of the existence of a fire, such notification at best would have allowed the fire to be controlled easier to some unstated degree; thereby, in the fire chief’s opinion, resulting in some unspecified lesser amount of damage. It is well established in this state that the causal connection required is between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury. See generally International Brotherhood &c. v. Briscoe, 143 Ga. App. 417, 429 (7) (239 SE2d 38); accord Locke v. Vonalt, 189 Ga. App. 783 (7) (377 SE2d 696); Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute, 188 Ga. App. 106, 115 (3) (b) (372 SE2d 265). It seems to me that the majority has required that only a genuine issue exists as to damages, and has ignored the element of causation of injury in reaching its conclusion that a jury question arises as to Orkin’s liability based on a theory of negligence per se.
¶8I am seriously concerned that the majority today has in effect established precedent expanding the doctrine of negligence per se in this state. In particular, as I interpret the majority opinion, negligence per se now establishes three of the required elements of a tort based on negligence, that is, duty, breach, and causation; henceforth, plaintiff to prevail under such a cause of action needs only establish that the defendant in some manner, no matter how remote, caused or contributed to the causation of some degree of defendant’s damages. This in my view is contrary to the established tort law of this state.
¶92. Additionally, I am not persuaded by the majority’s threshold conclusion that “the requirement of notifying the local fire department would make little sense” unless it is construed to have been promulgated with the intent of guarding against the risk of fire. This *627bare conclusion flies in the face of both the implementing regulations when examined in toto and the nature of the fumigation process itself. OCGA § 43-45-8 (1) on its face shows that the general purpose for requiring the promulgation of rules and regulations by the State Structural Pest Control Commission primarily was to “protect the interest, health, and safety of the public.” This statute does not make any reference to the specific type of regulatory requirements needed, but leaves that matter to the sound expertise and discretion of the Commission. “ ‘(A) statute must be construed with reference to the whole system of which it is a part. . . .’ ” Allison v. Domain, 158 Ga. App. 542, 544 (281 SE2d 299). Likewise, “[i]n the interpretation of a statute the courts must look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly. [Cit.] This is the cardinal rule in the construction of statutes. . . . The construction must square with common sense and sound reasoning.” (Emphasis supplied.) Blalock v. State, 166 Ga. 465, 470 (143 SE 426). These same rules apply in the construction of administrative regulations promulgated in implementation of statute. Cross v. Balkcom, 102 Ga. App. 81, 83 (115 SE2d 783), reversed on other grounds, 216 Ga. 530 (118 SE2d 185); see Risser v. Thomasville, 248 Ga. 866 (286 SE2d 727) (applying rules governing the construction of statutory enactments to an ordinance).
¶10Applying these rules, I find that the purpose for requiring modification of the fire department was not to prevent fires on the premises, but rather to alert them to the location and time of the dangerous fumigation process so that they could timely respond with proper emergency rescue equipment if someone accidentally was to become contaminated by the lethal gas during fumigation. This interpretation is supported by the very words of the Commission’s rules which expressly require the presence of a watchman “to prevent entry of any unauthorized person until the exposure period has elapsed. . . .” Further, this interpretation is the one which best squares with “common sense and sound reasoning.” Vikane not only is nonflammable; it is flame retardant. There exists no danger of a fire being caused by Vikane. Further, the record establishes that the fumigation process does not pose a reasonable risk of fire, but that the lethality of the gas used during fumigation does pose a real threat to human life. Certainly, the Commission can be expected to have used its knowledge and expertise as to the fumigation process when crafting its rules. Thus, common sense and sound reasoning compel the conclusion, in addition to the express words contained within the rules, that the rules were designed to protect the public against the clear possibility of accidental exposure to the fumigant and not against any perceived danger of exposure to fire. Therefore, I believe that the majority has erroneously concluded that the appellant falls within the class of persons the rules actually intended to protect.
¶11I respectfully dissent.