192 Md. App. 1 - Morris v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 district · 31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We defer to the fact-finder’s decisions on which evidence to accept and which inferences to draw when the evidence supports differing inferences. In other words, we give deference to all reasonable inferences [that] the fact-finder draws, regardless of whether ... [we] would have chosen a different reasonable inference. In our independent review of the evidence, we do not distinguish between circumstantial and direct evidence because [a] conviction may be sustained on the basis of a single strand of direct evidence or successive links of circumstantial evidence.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mason v. State · Montgomery v. State

2. “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the common law of Maryland guard against “multiple punishments for the same conduct, unless the Legislature clearly intended to impose multiple punishments.” Jones v. State, 357 Md. 141, 156 , 742 A.2d 493 (1999). To evaluate the legality of the imposition of separate sentences for the same act, we look first to whether the charges “arose out of the same act or transaction,” then to whether “the crimes charged are the same offense,” id. at 157 [ 742 A.2d 493 ], and then, if the offenses are separate, to whether “the Legislature intended multiple punishment for conduct arising out of a single act or transaction which violates two or more statutes....” Id. at 163 [ 742 A.2d 493 ].”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Alexis v. State · 218 Md. App. 230 - Clark v. State

3. ““[Defendant’s] charging document is ambiguous as to the particular act for which he was charged with first degree assault of [the victim]. See Gerald, 137 Md.App. at 312 [ 768 A.2d 140 ] (conviction for first degree assault merges into a conviction for robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon when the charging document is ambiguous as to the particular act alleged to have constituted first degree assault). Moreover, the court did not instruct the jury as to ‘how the assault and robbery charges related to one another, how they differed, and what the jury needed to find to convict under both charges.’ Id. (citations omitted). In light of the court’s failure to give curative instructions, and the ambiguity of [defendant’s] charging document, we must resolve the question of whether the charges of robbery and assault of [the victim] were based upon the same conduct in [defendant’s]favor. Id.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 219 Md. App. 234 - Wallace v. State