¶1*288Myles J. Lane, New York City (Stanley D. Robinson and Robert Martin, New York City, of counsel), for appellee in the Southern District of New York.
¶2M. J. Fein, New York City (Henry G. Singer, Brooklyn, N. Y., of counsel; Harry Silver, Brooklyn, N. Y., on the brief), for appellant, Chabot.
¶3Frank J. Parker, Brooklyn, N. Y. (George W. Percy, Jr., Maurice Z. Bungard and Mariano Marrocco, Brooklyn, N. Y., of counsel), for appellee in the Eastern District of New York.
¶4Henry G. Singer, Brooklyn, N. Y. (Harry Silver, Brooklyn, N. Y., on the brief), for appellant, Fliegel.
¶5Before SWAN, Chief Judge, FRANK, Circuit Judge, and COXE, District Judge.
¶7Chabot and Fliegel were each indicted for wilfully possessing gold bullion without licenses in violation of Executive Order 6260, as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 95a note, and 12 U.S.C.A. § 95a.1 Fliegel pleaded guilty, but Chabot stood trial. The government showed that customs agents had found 4300 ounces of gold bullion hidden in the body of Chabot’s car which he was attempting to ship abroad. Chabot rested after the government’s case, and the jury found him guilty.
¶81. Both appellants claim that Order 6260 and 12 U.S.C.A. § 95a, originating in 1933, were effectively repealed by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 442, 443.2 The alleged repeal, if any, *289must be by implication, for in no place in the 1934 Act is there any express suggestión that the earlier measures are replaced. It is true that both the 1933 and *290the 1934 measures regulate the possession of bullion. The 1933 Act gives the President emergency powers to regulate the hoarding of gold, and, pursuant to this Act, he forbade the possession of bullion without licenses. The 1934 Act authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe the conditions under which gold might be held —without limiting his power to times of war or national emergency. The 1933 Act and Order 6260 imposed criminal punishment upon wilful violators of the Order. The 1934 Act invoked only civil penalties for all violators — wilful or otherwise — of Treasury Regulations issued pursuant to it. The two measures dearly supplement one another, and the 1934 Act in no way suggests repeal of the earlier Act and Order. So the courts have held. Farber v. United States, 9 Cir., 114 F.2d 5, certiorari denied 311 U.S. 706, 61 S.Ct. 173, 85 L.Ed. 458; Ruffino v. United States, 9 Cir., 114 F.2d 696. See, also, United States v. Levy, 2 Cir., 137 F.2d 778.
¶92. Chabot argues that the government did not prove that he knew about the gold found in his car — i. e., that he did not knowingly violate the Order. His contention lacks merit. Customs agents testified that the gold was found in Chabot’s oar, shortly after- he himself had delivered it to the freight agent for shipping, and that he admitted after arrest, “Oh, I knew that I was carrying the gold.” This was sufficient proof of his knowledge to support the jury’s verdict of guilt. The government was also- required to prove,’ under the judge’s charge, that Chabot owned the gold. Chabot, according to the agents’ testimony, claimed upon arrest that he was delivering the car and its contents abroad for a mysterious “Carl.” 3 The jury, however, did not have to believe all of Chabot’s story to the agents; they could properly conclude there was no “Carl,” and could reasonably infer ownership of the gold from the circumstances of its discovery in Chabot’s possession.
¶10 3. Chabot’s final argument for reversal is that the agents conducted an unreasonable search of his car to- find the gold which was hidden behind the fenders. We. think not. The car had already been delivered, along with the keys, to the freight agent; it was parked alongside the pier when the customs men began to inspect it. The right of customs officials to inspect cargo being shipped abroad at a port of embarkation is apparent. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1581; § 379.1(e) Export Control Regulations, 15 Fed.Reg. 2725 ;4Landau v. United States Attorney for the Southern District, 2 Cir., 82 F.2d 285, 286, certiorari denied 298 U.S. 665, 56 S.Ct. 747, 80 L.Ed. 1389; The Atlantic, 2 Cir., 68 F.2d 8. Here, the car was heavily weighted down in the rear without any apparent cause. The fenders, upon tapping, sounded peculiar. The car, in such obviously bad condition, was being shipped -abroad. This *291seems to us sufficient cause to authorize a more thorough and even dismantling search of the car, for possible secret exports. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 401.5 B-oth 19 U.S.C.A. § 1SS1 and 22 U.S.C.A. § 401 seem to dispense with the necessity of a search warrant in such circumstances.
¶11Affirmed.