¶1See 72 S.Ct. 629.
¶2Davidson & Davidson, New York City (David Haar, New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.
¶3Donovan Leisure Newton Lumbard & Irvine and Roy W. McDonald, all of New York City (George H. Bailey, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
¶4Before SWAN, Chief Judge, FRANK, Circuit Judge, and COXE, District Judge.
¶6Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 2 Cir., 182 F.2d 329, is not apposite, as there the district court refused to order a trans*86fer. For where, as here, the order directs a transfer, we have held that a petition for a writ of mandamus will not be entertained if it alleges merely an “abuse” of discretion.1 2Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 2 Cir., 178 F.2d 866.2 If, however, the district judge lacked power to make his order of transfer, we will entertain such a petition. See Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 2 Cir., 181 F.2d 949. In that case, the defendant, which could not have been served in the transferee district, objected to the transfer, and we issued a mandamus writ. But here, one defendant could have been served in the transferee district, while the pther defendant, which could not there have bgen served, has joined in the application for, and thus consented to, the transfer. That consent is a waiver of lack of venue; had such a waiver existed before plaintiff commenced suit, it could have been brought there. We think 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) covers such a case.3 Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, 3 Cir., 186 F.2d 111.
¶7Petition dismissed.