¶1also specially concurring:
¶2The majority holds that section 607 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/607 (West 1998)) allows Gail Lulay to file a petition in this case and that “[t]o allow such interference would unconstitutionally infringe on the parents’ well-established fundamental liberty interest in making decisions regarding the upbringing of their children” (193 Ill. 2d at 479). With both of those propositions, I agree. The majority then continues, holding that the statute is unconstitutional only “as interpreted and applied to this case.” (Emphasis added.) 193 Ill. 2d at 479. With that, I respectfully disagree.
¶3I would hold the statute unconstitutional on its face. In the majority’s own words,
“section 607(b)(1) allows the State to usurp the decision-making function of parents with respect to the relationships that their children will have. This decisionmaking function lies at the core of parents’ liberty interest in the case, custody, and control of their children.” 193 Ill. 2d at 474.
¶4Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, such usurpation is not a function of the particular facts in this case. We are reviewing this case not because Gail Lulay simply failed to allege that Michael and Kiley Lulay are unfit parents. Rather, this case is before us because section 607(b)(1), on its face, does not require any such allegation before any parent can be dragged into court to defend his or her parental decisionmaking to the state. Consequently, the fatal flaw that the majority so astutely identifies in the passage above will be present in every section 607(b)(1) case, and the statute is unconstitutional on its face. This is a facial flaw, and I would hold section 607(b)(1) unconstitutional on its face.
¶5JUSTICES HEIPLE and FREEMAN join in this special concurrence.