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193 Kan. 533

393 P.2d 1015

State v. Irish

Supreme Court of Kansas

Decided July 14, 1964

Supreme Court of Kansas · decided 1964-07-14

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently July 1966

2 federal appellate · 12 state decisions

Relies on Smith v. United States · State v. Mooneyham

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1964-07-14

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¶1The opinion of the court was delivered by

Price, J.:

¶2The defendant was charged with and convicted of the offense of manslaughter in the first degree (G. S. 1949, 21-407).

¶3Following the overruling of his motion for a new trial, defendant was sentenced to confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of not less than five years nor more than twenty-one years (G. S. 1949,21-421).

¶4Defendant then made application to the court for a parole.

¶5The application was denied.

¶6Defendant subsequently filed this appeal from the order overruling his motion for a new trial and from the judgment and sentence.

¶7The state contends that by applying for a parole from the sentence imposed defendant thereby recognized the validity of the judgment and acquiesced therein, thus precluding appellate review of his conviction.

¶8*534The point is well taken.

¶9In State v. Mooneyham, 192 Kan. 620390 P. 2d 215 (March 7, 1964), (certiorari denied June 1, 1964, 377 U. S. 958, 12 L. ed. 2d 502, 84 S. Ct. 1640), it was held:

“When a defendant in a criminal action, following conviction and sentence in the district court and the overruling of his motion for a new trial, voluntarily makes application to the district court for a parole (to be released on probation, or for suspension of the execution of the sentence imposed), he thereby recognizes the validity of the judgment and acquiesces therein, which renders the judgment unassailable and precludes appellate review of the conviction.” (syl.)

¶10We adhere to the foregoing rule and, accordingly, this appeal must be and is hereby dismissed.

Fontron, J.,

¶11dissenting: Our statutes grant a person convicted of crime the right to apply for judicial clemency. They also give him the right to appeal from a conviction. The defendant’s application for clemency in this case may not, in my view, be considered as acquiescense in the judgment of conviction; it was simply the exercise of a statutory right of long standing. I agree with Justice Price that it is wrong to deny a defendant the right of appeal just because he applies for parole. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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