¶1 On Rehearing.
¶2 Sam Howard, appellant, intervenor, and plaintiff in injunction, sought and obtained a rehearing in this case.
¶3 In our original opinion, we recited in detail the pleadings and facts of this case. It is now only necessary to recite the pleadings and facts essential to a determination of the issues raised on the rehearing.
¶4 Charles Fourroux leased, under a verbal lease, a parcel of land from A. J. Cristina. Fourroux, while in possession of the land under the verbal lease, moved a building thereon and granted a chattel mortgage on this building in favor of the plaintiff, Mrs. C. A. Buchler. Sometime thereafter, Four-roux bought the. land from Cristina and granted a mortgage on the land and building in favor of the intervenor, Sam Howard. Howard brought suit to. enforce the mortgage on the land and building and obtained a judgment, which was duly recorded. Mrs. Buchler brought foreclosure proceedings on the chattel mortgage against Fourroux. Howard intervened and filed injunction proceedings to enjoin the sale of the building. A preliminary injunction was issued. On trial, the injunction was set aside and the intervention dismissed. The intervenor appealed to this court. On the hearing of the appeal, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. The intervenor moved for a rehearing. A number of attorneys were given permission to appear as amici curiae and were permitted to file briefs in support of the intervenor’s application for rehearing. The rehearing was granted. The rehearing is now submitted for our determination.
¶5 Counsel for intervenor contends that the provision of Section 1 of Act No. 198 of 1918, making it lawful to place a chattel mortgage upon “buildings on leased ground,” is unconstitutional because this provision is broader than the title of the Act.
¶6 The title of Act No. 198 of 1918 is “An Act To grant the right to mortgage movable property,”- etc.
¶7 Section 1 of the Act provides that it shall be lawful to mortgage certain enumerated movables, including among them buildings on leased ground, and provides that all other movable property not specially named therein may be so mortgaged.
¶8 In the case of Westwego Canal & Terminal Co. v. Pizanie, 174 La. 1068, *573 1071, 142 So. 691, the doctrine laid down in 'the case of Vaughn v. Kemp, 4 La.App. 682, was cited- with approval; which is as follows:
“ ‘Lands and buildings or other constructions, whether- they have their foundations in the soil or not, are immovable by their nature.’ …
" “There is no qualification of this rule. The law makes no distinction between buildings erected by the owner and those erected by tenants or others. If they are erected on the land, they are immovable by their nature.
“There are also things which are immovable by their destination, as:
“ ‘Things which the owner of a tract of land has placed upon it for its service and improvement.’ Civil Code, art. 468..
“Under this article things become immovable by destination only when placed thereon by the owner of the soil.
“But the provisions of the Code, Article 464, with reference to things immovable by their nature, does not state that they shall be placed on the soil by the owner thereof.
“It therefore follows that a building placed upon leased premises by the lessee is an immovable under Article 464 of the Code.”
¶9 This doctrine was approved in the cases of Lighting Fixtures Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 176 La. 499, 146 So. 35; and Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Cook et al., 179 La. 857, 155 So. 249.
¶10 Section 16, Article 3 of the Constitution for Louisiana of 1921 reads: “Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of such object.”
¶11 Article 31 of the Constitution for Louisiana of 1913 reads: “Every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in its title.”
¶12 The purpose of the Act, as stated in the title, is to grant the right to mortgage movable property. The title makes no reference to immovables, and there is no language therein to indicate that the Act applies to immovables. The body of thé Act, insofar as it grants the right to mortgage buildings on leased ground, is broader' than the title. Buildings on leased ground are immovables by nature, and the inclusion of such in the body of the Act is beyond the purpose stated in the title. The mere fact that in Section 1, where the various kinds of movable property that might be mortgaged is. listed, buildings on leased ground (immovables) are included by inadvertence or otherwise without any provision for the deimmobilization of the immovables could not have the effect of changing the status of the immovables to that of movables. Under the provisions of Article 464, R.C.C., buildings on leased ground are immovables. The Legislature has never changed or repealed this Article of the Civil Code. The mere inclusion of buildings on leased ground in the body of the Act could not have the effect of repealing Article 464, R.C.C., even by implication, because there is nothing to indicate therein *575 that such was the intention of the Legislature.
¶13 We find no provision in the body of the Act, or in its title, declaring buildings on leased ground to be deimmobilized. If it was the purpose of the Act to reclassify the immovable property, buildings on leased ground, the title should contain some provision to that effect. If it was the purpose of the Act to change the status of the immovable property, it would be necessary that there be some declaration in the Act to the effect that the immovable property is deimmobilized. If we were to view the Act in the light that it repealed Article 464 of the Civil Code and changed the status of the property, the Act would be unconstitutional because it would embrace more than one object. In addition to granting the right to mortgage movable property, the Act would change the status of immovable property, and in effect, repeal Article 464 of the Civil Code.
¶14 The Act is unconstitutional insofar as it applies to buildings on leased ground because the title is not sufficiently broad to include the mortgaging of immovables. Moreover, the Act would be unconstitutional if it granted the right to mortgage movables, and at the same time provided for the change of the status of immovables by nature, because it would embrace more than one object. It appears that the words “buildings on leased ground” were included in Section 1 of this Act by inadvertence because there is no language in the Act expressing any intention to change the status of buildings on leased ground from immovables by nature to movables. Furthermore, the mere inclusion of such property without any expressed intention to change the status could not have the effect of repealing Article 464, R.C.C., and of reclassifying the property.
¶15 The appellee cites Bank of White Castle v. Clark, 181 La. 303, 159 So. 409. An examination of that case shows that the property involved was immovables by destination.
¶16 Article 464, R.C.C., reads: “Lands and buildings or other constructions, whether they have their foundations in the soil or not, are immovable by their nature.”
¶17 In Bank of White Castle v. Clark, supra, wherein immovables by destination were involved, it is' stated to the effect that if the movables were mortgaged .before they were placed on the land, by the owner, they could never become deimmobilized so as to defeat the rights of the mortgagee, and if the movables had been immobilized by the owner of the land that he might subsequently deimmobilize them by granting a mortgage on them. Otherwise, the landowner desiring to mortgage his immobilized chattels, would be subject to the inconvenience and expense of temporarily removing from his land the chattels he desired to deimmobilize and mortgage. The court further stated, in effect, that the landowner by the mere changing of his mind could not alter the status of the movables which had become immobilized by destination, unless his change of mind be accompanied by a separation and de *577 tachment of the movables from the land, and in view of the Chattel Mortgage Act, that the intention of the landowner to deimmobilize the movables could be manifested by the execution and recordation of a mortgage covering the movables. In effect, the court said that the execution and recordation of the chattel mortgage indicated the landowner’s intention and constituted his overt act, which were in themselves sufficient notice to a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee dealing with the mortgaged movables, or with the land on which they were located.
¶18 It is thus to be seen that there is a vast distinction between immovables by destination and immovables by nature. The status of an immovable by destination can be changed by an act of the landowner, but there is no provision of law that we are aware of, and none has been cited to that effect, that the act of the landowner, or any other person, can change the status of an immovable by nature. It is to be borne in mind that an immovable by destination was originally a movable and that the movable becomes immovable by destination by the act of the owner in placing it on the land for service, etc.
¶19 The status of an immovable by nature is never changed by any act of the owner, while the status of an immovable by destination changes according to its use by the owner. In the case of Bank of White Castle v. Clark, supra, it was merely held, in effect, that the execution and recordation of a chattel mortgage on immovables by destination indicated the landowner’s intention and constituted his overt act which would be sufficient to put a person on notice. In the instant case, the status of the property could not be changed by the intention or act of the landowner because its status is fixed by law and does not depend upon its use.
¶20 Since we have arrived at the conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it affects buildings on leased ground, it is unnecessary for us to recite or consider the other contentions advanced by the intervenor.
¶21 For the reasons assigned, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that our decree herein rendered on original hearing be, and the same is, hereby annulled and set aside.
¶22 It is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the lower court be, and is hereby, reversed and set aside.
¶23 It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that there be judgment in favor of Sam Howard, intervenor, appellant, and against Mrs. Conrad A. Buchler, plaintiffappellee, decreeing the chattel mortgage granted by Charles Fourroux by act before Conrad A. Buchler, Notary Public, November 16, 1934, and recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Book 7, p. 178, entry 1074 of the Mortgage Office of the Parish of Jefferson, to be, and the same is, null, void, and of no effect.
¶24 All costs are to be paid by the plaintiffappellee.
¶25 Appellee’s right to apply for a rehearing is reserved.
¶26 On Rehearing.
¶27 (dissenting).
¶28 I am of the opinion that the legislature of the State of Louisiana, by adopting its Act No. 198 for the year 1918, did not intend to nor did it in fact repeal or supersede the law of registry, in so far as it affects third persons dealing with real property. The holding of the majority opinion to the contrary is “in violation of the well-established principles of law that ‘repeals by implication are not favored and zvill not be indulged if there is cmy other reasonable construction; … ’ Ruling Case Law, vol. 25, § 169 (see, also, Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321, 27 S.Ct. 539, 51 L.Ed. 816, 10 Ann.Cas. 636; Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654, 662, 20 L.Ed. 689; Succession of Hebert, 5 La.Ann. 121; State v. Brown, 48 La.Ann. 1569, 21 So. 143; Wachsen v. Commission Council of Lake Charles, 162 La. 823, 111 So. 177); that prior laws are repealed by subsequent lazvs only in case of positive enactment or clear repugnancy (Johnson v. Pilster, 4 Rob. 71) ; that nothing short of irreconcilable conflict between two statutes works a repeal by implication (Bank of Lecompte v. Lecompte Cotton Oil Co., 125 La. 844, 51 So. 1010; City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Jockey Club, 129 La. 64, 55 So. 711; State ex rel. Plyams’ Heirs v. Grace, 173 La. 215, 136 So. 569); that where a statute is ambiguoiis and susceptible of two constructions, the courts will give that construction which best comports with the principles of reason, justice, and convenience, for it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended such exceptions to its language as would avoid its leading to injustice, oppression, or absurd consequences (Encyc. of U.S.S.S.Ct.Rep. Statutes, vol. 11, pp. 151, 152, and cases therein cited; see, also, Corpus Juris, vol. 59, § 171; Ruling Case Law, vol. 25, § 242; Greek-American Produce Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 4 Ala.App. 377, 58 So. 994) … State v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 188 La. 978, at page 1054, 178 So. 601, at page 626. (Italics mine.)
¶29 In the instant case, the act being “An Act To grant the right to mortgage movable property … ” necessarily could not have been intended to affect immovable property and when providing in section 1 of the act that “ … it shall be lawful to mortgage … buildings on leased ground … (Italics mine.) *569 It is my opinion that the legislature intended thereby to mean, in order to affect third persons, a recorded lease. That fact is accentuated in its later act of 1926, No. 186, the title of which reads as follows: “An Act To authorize any Lessee, Sub-Lessee, or Assignee of a lease or sub-lease, to mortgage, affect and hypothecate his interest in such lease, or sub-lease, bearing on real property in the State of Louisiana, together with his interest in the buildings, constructions and improvements then or thereafter existing upon the leased premises ; to provide for the recordation of such mortgages; and to repeal all laws, or parts of laws, in conflict herewith and especially Act No. 21 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana for the year 1908, provided such repeal shall not affect the validity or legality of bonds and mortgages executed under said act.”
¶30 In that act, it is provided that “… 'such mortgage shall not affect third persons unless and until recorded in the manner provided by law for the recordation of conventional mortgages upon real estate.” (Italics mine.) Section 1.
¶31 It is provided in the Constitution of the State of Louisiana for the year 1921 that "No mortgage or privilege on immovable property, or debt for which preference may be granted by law, shall affect third persons unless recorded or registered in the parish where the property is situated, in the manner and within the time prescribed by law … *. Privileges on movable property shall exist without registration of same except in such cases as may be prescribed by law.” Section 19 of Article XIX. The same provisions were contained in the constitutions of 1913, 1898, 1879 and 1868. See Articles 186 and 187 of the Constitutions of 1913 and 1898, Articles 176 and 177 of the Constitution of 1879, and Article 123 of the Constitution of 1868. The manner prescribed by law for the registry of mortgages is found under Title XXII of the Revised Civil Code, Section 3 of Chapter 2, dealing with the inscription of mortgages. (Italics mine.)
¶32 If the legislature had intended by its Act No. 198 of 1918 (Chattel Mortgage Act) to repeal or supersede the law of registry that stood so long on the statute, books of this state and had been assured by incorporation into every Constitution of Louisiana beginning with the Constitution of 1868, it would have expressly done so.
¶33 The holding of the majority opinion in this case, in my opinion, beside violating the rules above referred to, will lead to “injustice … and absurd consequences.” For instance, if A, who erected a building on an unimproved tract of land verbally leased from B, grants a chattel mortgage on the building, in accordance with Act No. 198 of 1918, to C, and subsequently B sells the real estate to D, who obtains mortgage certificates, both real and chattel, in the name of B, having no knowledge of the transaction between A and C or between A and B, the consequence will be that the certificates will not show any encumbrances, as the chattel mortgage is recorded in A’s name only, thus *571 leading to a grave injustice to D, who purchased on the faith of the record with clear certificates. In other words, the only way D could protect himself would be to run all of the chattel mortgages granted within the time prescribed by law for the prescription of such acts, irrespective of the name of the grantor or mortgagor, and check them with the view of discovering if any of the act's cover a building situated on real property having the description of the property he contemplates acquiring, which is, in my humble opinion, an injustice and absurdity never intended by the legislature.
¶34 I therefore respectfully dissent.