193 Mich. App. 479 - Paul v. Bogle’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 1 district · 9 state decisions

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The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Having determined that Wolverine is potentially liable under the statutory employee doctrine for Freed’s negligence, we next address the question, “What is the applicable Michigan law?” Under the Vehicle Code, M.C.L. § 257.1 et seq.-, M.S.A. § 9.1801 et seq., an owner of a motor vehicle includes any person or entity having the exclusive use of a motor vehicle under a lease for more than 30 days. M.C.L. § 257.37(a); M.S.A. § 9.1837(a). An owner of a motor vehicle is liable for any injury occasioned by the negligent operation of the vehicle, unless the vehicle is being driven without the owner’s “express or implied consent or knowledge.” M.C.L. § 257.401(1); M.S.A. § 9.2101(1)[ 2 ] Given that the lease agreement between Bogle and Wolverine granted Wolverine the exclusive use of the truck for a period of not less than thirty days, we believe that there can be no dispute that Wolverine constituted an owner of the vehicle under M.C.L. § 257.37; M.S.A. § 9.1837. We also believe that Wolverine’s failure to remove its identifying placards and to re quest, in accordance with ICC regulations, a receipt for surrender of the vehicle constitutes its implied consent to Bogle and Freed to utilize the track for whatever purposes the vehicle was being used at the time of its collision with Paul’s vehicle. Such a conclusion is also supported by our holding that Wolverine was Freed’s statutory employer. Accordingly, we find that, under applicable state law, Wolverine was liable as an owner of t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 859 F. Supp. 1058 - Prestige Casualty Co. v. Michigan Mutual Insurance

2. “[W]e reject Wolverine’s assertion that the disputed fact that Freed was driving the track on Bogle’s business, and not Wolverine’s, at the time of the accident relieves it of any liability. The applicable statute, when taken into consideration with Wolverine’s duties under the applicable ICC regulations, precludes the success of such an argument. Under ICC regulations, Wolverine continued to consent to the use of the vehicle, no matter whose business or interests were pursued, as long as the identifying placards remained on the vehicle and Wolverine had not obtained a receipt from Bogle or his agent for the return of the vehicle. Given this implied consent, it is immaterial whose business was being pursued at the time of the accident.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 859 F. Supp. 1058 - Prestige Casualty Co. v. Michigan Mutual Insurance

3. “We hold that, even as Freed’s constructive employer, Wolverine is entitled to “seek contribution or indemnification from other potentially responsible parties,” including Freed_ Such a holding in no way undermines the purpose underlying the ICC regulations. The innocent victim is entitled to prompt compensation from an easily identifiable responsible party. However, nothing in the ICC regulations precludes a carrier from seeking recovery from another party who may also be at fault.... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting Freed’s motion for summary disposition of Wolverine’s countercomplaint for common-law indemnification.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 859 F. Supp. 1058 - Prestige Casualty Co. v. Michigan Mutual Insurance