¶1I agree with the majority that plaintiff is entitled to the divorce, but I disagree with the formula adopted for the disposition of the property of the parties.
¶2Under the law, as laid down in Gibson v. Gibson, (this volume), we are without power to order the plaintiff in this case to turn over any of her property to the defendant since she is the successful party, yet, *437doing indirectly that which we cannot do directly, we hold a sword of Damocles over her head and say, “Do this — or else!” It is judgment by compulsion rather than by law. It is my view that her deed to him would be without consideration and might lead to future litigation.
¶3The purpose of so dividing the properties is clearly stated in the language of the prevailing opinion: “It will be advantageous to both parties if their interests in the commonly held properties are severed, … In other words, the majority opinion is in reality partitioning the respective properties of the parties for which no authority is found in the divorce statutes of our state. It is the settled law that a court, proceeding in divorce matters, is a court of limited jurisdiction, and its powers are circumscribed by the statutes thereto appertaining. If a severance of property interests is desirable in a divorce proceeding, the legislature should first act instead of the court’s invoking a novel and, I believe, dangerous and troublesome precedent. I, therefore, dissent.