Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 194 F.1d 37 - Sanborn v. Bay

Sanborn v. Bay’s Empirical Analysis

194 F. 37 · 1911

Citation profile

7
cited by 7 later decisions
April 1964
most recently cited

5 federal appellate ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently April 1964

5 federal appellate ·

30191119201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Bronson v. Schulten · Aspen Mining & Smelting Co. v. Billings · Conboy v. First National Bank · Kingman Co v. Western Mfg Co · Malony v. Adsit

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Is such absence from the circuit a disability, within the meaning of the statute? It is an accepted canon in the construction of statutes that ‘when particular words are followed by general ones the latter are to be held to apply to persons and things of the same kind as those which precede.’ * * * In the case at bar the statute authorizes the allowance and signing of the bill of exceptions by a judge other than the trial judge only in case of ‘death, sickness or other disability’ of the trial judge. ‘Noseitur a sociis.’ The term ‘other disability’ means disability of like character, to death or sickness, not a disability arising from temporary absence from the district or •circuit, if, indeed, legal disability could arise by reason of absence from the district. The statute means a physical or mental disability arising from •either death, sickness, insanity, or disorder of like character, by reason of which the judge was disabled from the performance of judicial function. “The mere absence from the district or circuit in which the case was tried is not such a disability. If it be needful that the trial judge should be personally present in the district to allow and sign the bill of exceptions, his presence -should be procured. In the district from which this cause comes it is usual to procure the attendance of the District Judges from other districts to hold, court in aid of the dispatch of business, it is not supposable that the •statute designed that during the temporary a”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““While we might well agree with the conclusion reached in that particular ■case, we cannot think the act of 1900 was intended by Congress to limit the ‘disqualification’ referred to, to one occasioned by physical or mental ailment. This in our opinion would be too narrow a construction. It would not seem to accomplish the legislative purpose or afford the relief which Congress intended to afford by the language actually employed. Inability to perform duty occasioned by death or sickness was obviously not the only disability Congress had in mind. It employed a comprehensive term sufficient to cover all disqualifications, and we do not think the artificial rule, ‘noseitur a sociis,’ invoked by counsel, was ever intended to be employed to thwart an obvious purpose. Nothing in fact could create a more effective ‘disability’ than an utter disqualification of the presiding judge to perform the act which Congress attempted to provide for.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.