Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
194 F.2d 737 · 1952
Citation profile
27 federal appellate · 4 district · 9 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 71 later decisions — most recently February 2013 · most notably 67 Cal. 2d 695 - Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967), Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1968)
27 federal appellate · 4 district · 9 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 13 (§ 2 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 15 (§ 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 29 U.S.C. § 201 (American Samoa Labor Standards Amendments of 1956)
Relies on Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad · Gibbs v. Buck · Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp. · Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc. · Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"Obviously, the phrase `common relief,' as used in the rule, was not intended to mean joint relief, for the expressed purpose is to permit joinder of parties who have several or separable causes of action. Hence to say that `common' means `joint' is to defeat the very purpose of the rule. `Common relief' for persons having separate causes of action who may recover only several judgments, it seems to us, must mean, in order to give life to the purpose of the rule, relief emanating from the same original source, either by way of grant, contract, tort or statute, where the claims of all beneficiaries flow from the same fountain but are allowed not in a joint judgment but in several judgments. Strictly speaking, this may not be common relief in many senses, but it is separate relief for each growing out of a common source of right to recover. The same character of right to recover exists in several; in that sense, when there are common issues of fact and law, we think, the relief is common within the meaning of the rule."”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““We fully appreciate the difficulty encountered by trial courts in attempting to give to these two rules the force we have attributed to them. Both, interpreted as we feel they must be, are innovations at odds with earlier ideas of proper law and equity practices. It was once axiomatic that multifariousness of claims was to be avoided and that multiplicity of parties could be permitted only in cases far afield from those of the so-termed spurious class. The latter, obviously, has unity only as an expedient invented and introduced into modern practice for the purpose of reducing multiplicity of suits and speeding up trials. We know the invention has novelty; whether it possesses also the other quality sought, utility, is not yet fully proved. However, sensing as we do that these novel insertions into our rules of procedure were inspired by certain specific supposedly beneficent purposes, it is our duty to give them effect. Perhaps in a case such as this, where each of the parties is entitled to a jury trial, where the transactions are voluminous, complex and intricate and the possible parties so numerous as to be beyond possibility of retention in the memory of any trier of the facts, it may eventuate that the expedient provided is not efficacious in improving practice and procedure. But that possibility does not authorize us so to interpret the rules as to nullify them.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““ * * * [Tjhere can be no question but that it is the law of this circuit that persons claiming to have been injured in their respective businesses by another’s conspiracy to violate Sections 1 and 2 of the AntiTrust Act constitute a so-called spurious class for which less than the full number of injured persons may maintain a Class suit under Rule 23(a) (3), provided plaintiffs will adequately represent the class.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.