Jack Davoll’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 35 district · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 108 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[a] treating physician is not considered an expert witness if he or she testifies about observations based on personal knowledge, including the treatment of the party.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ferris v. Pennsylvania Federation Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees · 153 F. Supp. 2d 736 - Ferris v. PENN. FED. BROTH. OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY

2. “The plaintiff in a pattern-or-practice suit is the Government, and its initial burden is to demonstrate that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer or group of employers. At the initial, ‘liability’ stage of a pattern-or-practice suit, the Government is not required to offer evidence that each person for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer’s discriminatory policy. Its burden is to establish a prima facie case that such a policy existed. The burden then shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a pattern or practice by demonstrating that the Government’s proof is either inaccurate or insignificant.... If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises from the Government’s prima facie case, a trial court may then conclude that a violation has occurred and determine the appropriate remedy. Without any further evidence from the Government, a court’s finding of a pattern or practice justifies an award of prospective [equitable] relief.... When the Government seeks individual relief for the victims of the discriminatory practice, a district court must usually conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the trial to determine the scope of individual relief ... [A]s is typical of Title YII pattern-or-practice suits, the question of individual relief does not arise until it has been proved that the employer has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Murray, Inc.

3. “We understand plaintiffs’ concern that by denying their class certification motion and upholding the United States pattern and practice action, this decision may be interpreted as holding that only the government can bring a class-wide ADA employment suit. Such an interpretation would be unfounded. Given the deferential standard by which we review class certification, it is possible the district court could have certified the class in its discretion, or could have modified the proposed definition so that it was sufficiently definite. Of course, we do not decide those questions as our holding here is limited to the issue directly before us. At the same time, we do note that a pattern and practice action brought by the United States pursuant to section 707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6, is not subject to the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Hohider v. United Parcel Service, Inc.